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This thesis stems out of a dissatisfaction with the present polarized
development in Iraq, in which the resultant pattern of out-migration from
the rural areas and rapid urbanization focussed on Baghdad has increased
the inequities between urban and rural areas. It has also required a
greater dependency on imported technology and know-how from the West,
thereby ensuring-a continuing form of external and internal colonialism.
The approach followed attempts to look into policies for the diffusion
rather than the concentration of development so as to ensure greater equal-
ities and to establish a broader and self-sustaining indigenous base for
development in the full sense of the word. Implicit in this is an emphasis
on 'development from below', coupled with self-reliance and self-suffi-
ciency. This thesis only looks into certain aspects of this vast subject
pertaining to rural developments and concentrates on agriculture and rural
industry.
To be more explicit, the proposed policies concentrate on the use of
intermediate technology and more locally appropriate and relevant educa-
tion. It is by starting from the existing situation and levels of tech-
nology in Iraq, that the maximum number of people can benefit and not by
simply transferring more sophisticated technology from the West. The
latter is concentrated in location and benefits, does not take root, and
soon becomes out of date or inoperative because of the lack of a support-
ing infrastructure.
These policies necessitate a decentralised planning process; that is,
devolving power to the regions and localities while at the same time re-
ducing the authority of Baghdad. This institutional aspect is perhaps the
most difficult to study from a distance and is here presented in an embry-
onic form. In any case, the absolute necessity of local participation in
planning (of both citizens and local organizations) renders the proposals
of this thesis preliminary and of necessity inconclusive.
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11 - INTRODUCTION: POSING THE PROBLEM
Development in Iraq is characterised by its polarity. Since the
early 1950's, the country has suffered from massive migration to Baghdad,
the primate city. This migration has been mainly at the expense of the
rural areas, denuding them of their most able inhabitants, and simultan-
eously involving considerable cost to the urban communities. A glance
at a map or almost any of the statistics in Part 1, illustrates Baghdad's
role as the overwhelming radial centre of social and economic development
in Iraq. The end product is reflected in a real difference in the quality
and style of living between the main urban centres and the rural areas.
This thesis looks into means of-stemming this polarity and diffusing
the benefits of development. Its premise is that much greater emphasis or
priority should be placed on creating jobs (in both agriculture and in-
dustry) and improving amenities in the countryside. Urban pressure would
thereby be lessened through a reduction in migration to the cities. Income
disparities between urban and rural areas would be narrowed, and the focus
of development would be on the rural poor, who have to date received few
of the benefits of social and economic development over the past quarter
of a century. The investment requirements will be less in rural areas, not
only because costs are lower, but also because standards are more aligned
to and can make greater use of local resources rather than being based on
'higher' foreign standards, which implies the use of imported goods and
services. Furthermore, with this diffusion of development in rural areas,
emphasis is placed on self-reliance, and the use of local labor and
know-how.
We shall discuss in Part 1 Lhe present bias of urbanization trends to
Baghdad in which the costs of relocation of migrants are not sufficiently
taken into account. Also, industry is not charged the full social costs
of their operations and benefit from economies of scale at the expense
of the lower-income rural population. Above all, the concentration of
political power at the centre produces the present favored position of
Baghdad in receiving the lion's share of all investments. It is well to
note at this point that the suggested diffusion of benefits and devolution
of policy-making call for some very radical changes.
Dualism between the 'traditional' agricultural sector in rural areas
and the so-called 'modern' industrial sector in urban areas increased and
became a trend in Iraq with the initiation of development planning in 1951.
The plans soon began to place emphasis on high rates of economic growth
based on industrialization, which created rapid urbanization and the assoc-
iated inequities (both between and within regions). Cumulative investment
has taken place mainly in the most prosperous areas, that is, Baghdad, and
to a lesser extent, Basra and Mosul, where the returns and potential growth
rates are highest, and where the major benefits are realized.
In Iraq, to date, 55% of the population are employed in agriculture, and
this is where the primary problem lies; but this sector remains substan-
tially untouched and even negatively affected* by these planning policies
*Before industrialization took precedence, Iraq was self-sufficient in ag-
riculture, but for a number of years now it has been a sizeable importer of
agricultural produce. There can be few excuses, for the country has a re-
markably good agricultural potential, with a present population of just
over 10 million. Although the population growth rate is particularly high
by global standards, (close to 3.5%), it should be remembered that the
country (historically known as Mesopotamia), is thought to have supported
up to 25 or 30 million people.
and techniques borrowed from the West, for they have a selective bias to-
wards investment in the modern sector. That is, the aggregate economic
objective of higher per capita income, (which is not nearly as significant
a datum in underdeveloped countries as it is in the rich industrial coun-
tries, where it is still insufficient) ignores qualitative and institution-
al changes which are an essential feature of development, and has taken
precedence over social considerations of equitable distribution. The
assumption of an aggregate objective function conceals far more than it
reveals, and in any event, there is not a single objective function, rather
there are a complicated mixture of goals. This approach represents a sad
distortion of what development is conceived to be. As far back as 1949,
Schumpeter described it in terms of a diffusion of successive waves of
innovation in function (economic, social, cultural and institutional) in
geographic space.*
This schism between physical, economic, and social factors in planning
in most developing countries can be traced historically from the West's
early days of development planning. Thus, with the great upsurge of indus-
trialization in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there was
little time to reflect on the negative spatial consequences. The social
consequences had, in fact, been the subject of criticism well before the
mid-19th century, when the serious drawbacks of the growth process, par-
ticularly for some social groups, began to be perceived. Long term prob-
lems in physical planning only began to be seriously studied with Ebenezer
Howard's 'garden city' movement in England early in this century in which
*See T. Hermansen in A. Kuklinski (ed.), Growth Poles and Growth Centres,
Netherlands, Mouton and Co., 1972.
the demand was for physical order, environmental amenity..., leading to
static physical determinism, which generally overlooked local resources and
equity considerations. Economic planning on the other hand, was geared to
greater rates of growth of income per capita, balance of payments, etc., in
the short term. It is only fairly recently that regional aspects, con-
cerning the spatial distribution of people and activities (particularly
industry) and welfare implications began to merit official consideration
(although regionalism as a concept goes back at least to Patrick Geddes in
the late 19th century). Social planning, or rather social science (since
the attempt to produce anything like a social plan has yet to take place)
responded to disruptions and stresses accompanying physical and economic
policies, but it was rarely considered an indivisible aspect of them.
The outcome is that each planning function (physical, economic and
social) evolved separately in response to particular problems at different
times. The problems studied and solved were not generally seen as so many
aspects of one and the same central problem.* Implicit in this evolution
were organizational structures which embodied this separation of tasks.
Similarly, planning education was carried out in different institutes using
different tools, methods, and indeed, languages not directly communicable
to each other. As a result, the three basic planning disciplines address
different and often conflicting goals. Even in the USSR, although Marxist
theory basically integrates the social, economic and political aspects,
the end result is generally uncoordinated. The idea of integrating physi-
cal, economic and social planning has a long and unsuccessful history. To
*Again, exceptions can be found as in the case of Patrick Geddes.
5attempt an explicit remedy is well beyond the scope of this thesis, however
such integration is clearly implicit in the approach, policies and pro-
cesses evolved.
This fragmented and divisive planning process inherited in its en-
tirety in Iraq and other developing countries, is quite definitely not in
the best interests of overall or spread development in Iraq. The conflicts
in time and space between physical, economic, and social goals cannot, as is
often the case, be simply stated as being either external (as between the
economic objective of maximizing GNP and the social objective of achieving
equity) or internal (as between primary, secondary, and tertiary aspects or
within any one of them), for in reality there are strong links between both.
All compete for the same resources, and any selection based on quantifiable
measurement on its own is misleading, and tends to favor the modern sector.
For example, cost/benefit analysis or shadow pricing techniques must be
carefully and cautiously used, if at all, for important qualitative aspects
which are difficult to measure are omitted, and any comparisons are gener-
ally based on Western standards. The question that must be asked is 'bene-
fits to whom'? The primary emphasis of this thesis is given to the poor
majority in rural areas, and not the elite few in the urban areas, and this,
as is discussed in Part 2, is not possible by the grafting, (however skill-
fully done) of foreign techniques and sophisticated technology. Not only
does this not serve the development objective in Iraq, but it also increases
dualism and dependency.
Development in Iraq can only truly succeed if carried forward as a
broadly based movement of reconstruction, concentrating on the rural areas
6and rural power, with primary emphasis on self-reliance and self-suffi-
ciency. Anything less must end in failure. In the words of Albert Camus,
"real generosity towards the future lies in giving all to the present".*
In this, the need is for more appropriate types of technology and education
suitable to the needs of specific areas and towards a lowering of the pri-
ority given to economic growth as opposed to social objectives. When it
comes to getting practical results, local perspectives and biases not only
count but are essential for satisfactory implementation.
The process advocated requires a shift away from the preparation of
vast planning documents, towards an approach concerned with execution taking
place primarily at the lower levels. In Part 3, this study suggests means
of moving away from the abstractions of national development planning in
Baghdad, to one where the people affected help in making and executing
policies, that is, at the local and regional level. However, the necessary
local and regional organizations cannot be left in isolation from the na-
tional planning and political levels, and therefore, their interrelation-
ships or integration are also explicitly considered (in Part 3).
Tackling these issues for development in Iraq from such a distance,
with the inevitable dearth of specific information, is bound to have con-
siderable limitations from several points of view. However, this thesis is
intended to be an initial working document, and not solely an academic
essay, from which more specific and detailed proposals for local areas may
evolve in the near future. It should not be forgotten that the call for
wider citizen participation in policymaking renders it a matter of principle
that these proposals are regarded as no more than initial guidelines.
*A. Camus, The Rebel, Vintage Books, N.Y., 1957, p. 304
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PRESENT POLICIES, INEQUITIES, AND PLANNING PHILOSOPHIES
2 - PRESENT POLICIES AND INTER AND INTRA-REGIONAL INEQUITIES
art 1 describes the present planning policies and processes in Iraq
and sets the context for the proposed rural development policies and de-
centralized planning process described in Parts 2 and 3. This chapter
examines the existing development policies and the resulting inter and
intra-regional inequities. Its principal aim is to determine real dif-
ferences in income and 'quality of life' between people in the different
geographic and ethnic regions, and in urban and rural areas. The extreme
polarity of development in Iraq focussed on Baghdad soon becomes evident.
Not only does this adversely affect other regions and particularly the
rural areas, but due to the country's cultural diversity it also by-passes
certain ethnic peoples.
The discussion then focusses on the polarity of population distri-
bution located mainly in Baghdad, at the expense of the rural areas fol-
lowed by the imbalances and inequities between and within the principal
productive sectors, namely agriculture and industry. The dualistic pic-
ture is completed with an examination of the gross maldistribution of ed-
ucation and health facilities and the chapter concludes with the basic
objectives and priorities for development that emerge from the earlier
discussion.
2.1 CULTURES AND NATURAL ENVIRONNENT: DIVERSITY
Iraq is fortunate in the wide diversity of its natural environment
and cultures. There are four primary geo-physical regions*:
- the rugged mountain regions of the North and North East,
*See Lord Salter, The Development of Iraq, The Development Board, Baghdad,
1955, p. 189.
which can be subdivided into the higher mountain areas,
the forests of the mountainous slopes, and the grass-
lands of the northern plateaux;
- the great deserts in the West and South West (Badia al
Shimaliya and Janubiya), and the Jazira Desert (be-
tween the Tigris and Euphrates in the North West) ;
- the alluvial plains of the Centre and South, composed
of silt deposits from the two rivers;
- the marshlands in the extreme South.
Cultural diversity is equally rich, mainly comprising Arabs (urban/rural,
beduin, and marsh) and Kurds, with small Turkoman and Assyrian minorities.
Map 1 (which only gives an approximation), shows the geographical location
of the different cultures and sects. The present polarization of develop-
ment in Iraq is taking place at the expense of the Shi'a Arabs in the
South, and the Sunni Kurds in the North (as will become clear later). An
important tenet of this thesis is that only diffused or decentralized de-
velopment will ensure more even benefits for all the culturally diverse
peoples of Iraq.
2.2 URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH: POLARITY
As in most parts of the world, the population of Iraq has historically
been located in varying proportions:
- on good agricultural land;
- along the rivers and other major transportation routes;
- and in major cities, particularly those with high level
economic and social capital (e.g., schools, clinics, etc.)
MAP 1
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ
Source: Harvey Smith et al, Area Handbook for Iraq, American University
of Washington D.C., 1971, p. 58.
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The country's population is.estimated at 10.4 millions in 1973, with some
63 percent* being nominally urban, but this represents considerable exag-
geration.** This high rate of urbanization does not indicate high levels
of development, rather it is the consequence of specific policies to which
this thesis is adamantly opposed. A glance at Map 2*** illustrates the
extreme and increasing population polarity, with the Baghdad region assum-
ing absurd proportions (over 25 percent of total population), mainly at the
expense of the lagging regions. A more spatially specific distribution
can be seen in Map Al in Appendix 1, showing 1965 population density by dis-
tricts (sub-regions). The settlement pattern is similarly polarized, rang-
ing from a predominance of large urban centres, to very small rural towns
and villages. Some 90 percent of the rural population live in villages
from 200-2,000 population distributed inover 14,000 villages.**** In
between these two extremes there is a corresponding scarcity of medium-
sized settlements.***** All this is essentially a manifestation of the
*See Table 1, Appendix 1.
**From the very first census in 1947, to date, the urban population in Iraq
has been defined as the population within municipal boundaries, and this
has no correlation with the generally accepted UN definition of urban pop-
ulation as living in towns of over 20,000 population; for example, in mid-
1967, the UN estimated Iraq's urban population (in towns over 20,000) at
45.7 percent (see UN Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various
Countries in the Middle East, 1971, UN, N.Y., 1971, pp. 68-69.) whereas
the Iraqi figures for 1965 are 52 percent urban.
***Derived from Table 1, Appendix 1. It should be borne in mind that the
projections seem to have been derived by extending past trends, using the
growth between 1965-1973 as a base.
****Al Dahiri, The Introduction of Technology into Traditional Societies
and Economies, Al Ani Press, Baghdad, 1969, p. 69.
*****About 40 percent of the total population live in large urban centres
(100,000+), the figure rising to 70 percent when applied to the urban pop-
ulation in the five Northern regions (Dhok, Nineveh, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulei-
maiya; see Appendix 2), while only 6.5 percent of the total population live
in 8 cities with populations of 50,000-100,000.
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unevenness of development opportunity, commonly called dualism, which is
the real problem in Iraq.
Internal migration has accounted for about 1/3 of this massive urban
growth, typically flowing from rural areas and towns to large cities
(rather than from rural areas to intermediate towns and then on to large
cities). Some 60 percent of the total population increase between 1957-65
is estimated to have occurred in the 12 main cities.* Further confirmation
comes from the 1957 census, which indicates the following percentages of
population as having been born outside the respective regions:
Baghdad 28.9% Kirkuk 9.1% Arbil 4.4%
Basra 17.6% Diwaniya 5.8% Amara 3.2%
Kerbela 16.7% (now Qadisiya) (now Maysan)
Kut 12.1% Hilla 5.3% Mosul 2.6%
(now Wasit) (now Babylon) Naisriya 2.3%
Ramadi 8.1% Sulaimaniya 5.1% (now Thi-Qar)
(now Anbar) Diayala 4.9%
In Baghdad, over the same time span (1957-65), migration accounted for
5 percent of the population increase per annum out of a total annual
growth of 8.3 percent.** It is well to note that a very sizeable pro-
portion of unemployed or underemployed urban dwellers are very recent
rural migrants living in 'sarifas' or shanty towns. According to the
World Bank, 35 percent of Baghdad's population in 1970 was made up of
recent migrants living in sarifas.*** Furthermore, most migrants con-
*UN International Social Development Review No. 1, 1968, UN, N.Y., p.63.
**See UN Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in
the Middle East, 1971, UN, N.Y., 1971, pp. 70-71.
***World Bank, Urbanization, (Sector Working Paper), June 1972.
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sider themselves as having moved permanently.* The four regions, Qadisya,
Muthanna, Maysan, and Thi-Qar, worst hit by out-migration are in the
South, followed by a fifth region, Wasit, also in the South. The policies
to be outlined in this thesis aim to drastically durtail the growth of
Baghdad by concentrating effort on developing some secondary urban cen-
tres, but more importantly, on agriculture and rural settlements which
will not only reduce migration and the pressures on the large cities, but
will also reduce dualism, and help the majority of the population, rather
than the elite few.
2.3 AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY: IMBALANCE, INEQUITIES AND LACK OF
COORDINATION
The Iraqi economy is dominated by the oil sector (primarily extrac-
tion) representing over 30 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
with agriculture following with 20 percent. The following figures for
GDP in Iraq,** (at current factor cost) illustrate the relative evenness
in its formation since 1953, in absolute terms:
1953 1957 1961 1965 1969
Agriculture 22% 20% 19% 20% 19%
Oil 40% 27% 34% 35% 32%
Manufacture 6% 8% 10% 9% 9%
Other 32% 45% 37% 36% 40%
Gross National Product (GNP),(at current factor cost) grew from ID.265
*The most widely available index of non-permanent migration is the sex
ratio between males and females. If men substantially outnumber women,
then a part of the explanation lies in the presence of large numbers of
bachelor migrants. This phenomenon is often associated with non-perma-
nent migration. (See J.N. Nelson, Soiourners vs. New Urbanites , Un-
published paper) However, in Iraq, the figures indicate relative even-
ness in male/female ratios in both urban and rural areas.
**See A. Badre,"Economic Development of Iraq", in C. Cooper and S. Alex-
ander (Ed), Economic Development and Population Growth in the Middle East,
American Elsevier Pub. Co., N.Y., 1972, p. 305.
NB: The figures for 1957 are distorted because of interruptions in oil
flow after the Suez crisis, and those for 1969 are from the 1970-74
National Development Plan, Ministry of Planning, Iraq, p. 117.
millions in 1953 to ID. 698 millions in 1965. This represents an annual
growth rate of over 8 percent with the growth of real product (at constant
factor cost), at 7 percent, being not much less because of relative price
stability. These very high growth rates also appear when the oil sector
is omitted.*
The concurrent employment distribution in the country between 1962-71
emphasizes the overwhelming importance of the agricultural sector in pro-
viding employment for over half of the labor force. This can be seen in
the following table showing population employed by economic sectors
(in '000s):**
Year Agri- Manu- Elec/ Cons- Com- Ser- Unem- Labor
cult Oil fact. Water truct. merce Transp vices Others ploy. Force
827
1,010
1,254
1,435
1,770
130
140
146
160
208
110
125
140
155
179
117
129
140
154
169
255 215
270 230
290 260
310 280
710
110
163
135
167
1,838
2 ,148
2,458
2,759
3,166
For 1971 the employment distribution is about 55 percent in agriculture
(includes some disguised unemployment), 0.6 percent in the very capital
intensive oil industry, 6 percent in manufacturing, 31.4 percent in other
sectors (includes some disguised unemployment) and 7 percent unemployed.
The magnitude of the agricultural sector is quite clear. Interestingly
enough, employment in agriculture rose from 45 percent in 1962 to 55 per-
cent in 1971, however, if read with Table 1, Appendix 1, it would seem
*For an expanded viewpoint, see A. Badre, op. cit., p. 304.
**Central Statistics Organization, Abstract of Annual Statistics, Ministry
of Planning, Baghdad, 1971 and 1974 figures from 1970-74 National Develop-
ment Plan, op. cit., p. 173.
1962
1965
1968
1971
1974
that most of this increase is located in urban areas in production rela-
ted to agriculture. Another reason for this increase may be attributable
to the distribution of land tenure, which could have the effect of in-
flating figures on agricultural employment.
The fact that agriculture employs over half the country's population,
that is, almost ten times the employment in industry (combining oil and
manufacturing), has not prevented the government, until very recently,
from concentrating development in industry on the urban areas, to the de-
triment of agriculture and the rural areas. Although per capita income
has been rising at consistently high rates, the gains have gone largely to
the urban sector, and migrant labour while agricultural labour has hardly
benefited. In fact, there seems to have been a slight decline in the
standard of living in rural areas (as measured from 1934-61).*
Beyond this, the interdependence of agriculture and industry has been
overlooked and is constantly obscured by the 'glamour' of industry. A
dynamic agriculture requires an expanding off-farm market for its products.
Furthermore, experience dictates that industry will not be able to progress
beyond a rudimentary stage unless agriculture is helped to make great
strides forward.** Thus the onus is primarily on agriculture. It is only
in the very long term, as productivity greatly increases and agriculture
*J.L. Simmons, Agricultural Development in Iraq, St. Anthony's College,
Oxford, 1965, p. 2 .
Determined that between 1934, (when the first FAO figures became available)
and 1961, the rural population, with 5 million out of a total population
of 7 million in 1961, suffered from a slight drop in their standard of
living judging from grain equivalents,(a more accurate tool of measuring
standards of living in rural areas).
**See G. Jones, The Role of Science and Technology in Developing Countries,
Oxford University Press, p. 55.
becomes more efficient, that productive employment will increasingly have
to be found in the manufacturing industry; but the mistake should not be
made of equating such industry solely with major urban centres.
Policies that will reduce this dichotomy between the so-called mod-
ern and traditional sectors (the present emphasis being on the former),
are outlined in this thesis. The proposed policies will by definition
be contrary to the government's present approach (concentrating invest-
ment effort on the 'more productive sectors' to the neglect of agricul-
ture), as expressed by policies to maximize National Income or GNP.* A
more detailed look at the existing situation in agriculture and industry
is quite revealing.
In the case of agriculture, a glance at Map 3 indicates that agri-
cultural land covers almost all the inhabited areas, extending from (and
including) the foothills of the North, to the Central and Southern allu-
vian plain.** However, agricultural growth has been found to be lagging
behind population growth, part of the reason being because rural/agri-
cultural areas are treated in considerable isolation from the rest of the
economy. National planners (being primarily urban oriented) tend to iden-
tify economic development with industry. Industrial expansion is more
*UN, op. cit., p. 4
The ratio of the National Income per worker in agriculture to the National
Income per worker in other sectors is 0.3-0.5 in most developing countries
(in Iraq, it is closer to the lower figure, but in Syria it is 0.52),
while in most developed countries it is 0.6-0.8. It is this type of con-
sideration that prompts the government to naively concentrate on the more
'productive sectors' (which maximize GNP) and neglect agriculture.
**According to the UN, in Popular Participation in Development: Emerging
Trends in Community Development, UN, N.Y., 1971, p. 106, in Iraq there
are 74,960 sq. km of arable land and 36,750 sq. km of irrigated land.
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easily planned, financed and implemented than agricultural expansion.
Furthermore, industry is more spatially concentrated and technically more
controllable in its input-output relationships. In contrast, planning
and implementing agricultural expansion under the present centralized sys-
tem in Iraq is handicapped by its wide geographic dispersion, and its in-
numerable small family farms and cooperatives, all of which require de-
centralized management, which is difficult in the framework of the present
system. Another handicap is the present inadequacy of infrastructure in
rural areas.
Lagging agricultural development in Iraq can also be attributed to
setbacks caused by bad management.* Management and organization problems
were consistently underestimated. This is particularly evident in the
land reform programme in which the transfer of ownership was not accompan-
ied by much thought for alternative organization to take over certain
critical functions (of the previous landlord). In fact, it was long felt
that "...Land tenure is the human problem par excellence in Iraq. In one
way or another, it lies behind most if not all social, economic and poli-
tical problems of the country".** Belief in simplistic attitudes of this
nature are a prime cause for the fact that to this day only the political
goal of land reform (removing the old landlords) has been achieved in Iraq,
and the social and economic problems remain, more or less as before. The
cooperative movement in Iraq is relatively recent, emerging out of the
*J.L. Simmons, op. cit., p. 1.
**F. Qubain quoted in A. Al Nasrawi, The Philosophy of Economic Develop-
ment in Pre and Post Revolutionary Iraq, Ohio State University, 1970.
agrarian reform law of 1958, which has been only partially implemented to
date. Unfortunately, success has been limited, due to bad organization
and inadequate financing* and lack of inter-departmental coordination,
for to be successfulco-operatives require technical advice, funds, mar-
kets and administration, while the livestock and crops must be supplied
with material and service inputs, irrigation, and drainage.** In short,
to succeed, thoughtful and thorough policy-making is needed, but it will
remain ineffective, howcver carefully thought out, if the policy is impos-
ed from above. That is, the villagers' creative and active participation
is needed at the earliest planning stages.
In the final analysis, this inability to formulate an effective co-
operative theory and construct and initiate a realistic rural credit pol-
icy are both results of the present overcentralized administrative struc-
ture in Iraq.*** Furthermore, if the agricultural administration, (Minis-
try of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform) is reviewed, the staff are found
to owe their position to their academic ability, (which mainly trains to
analyze and not to administer), and not to their administrative capa-
*UN, op. cit., p. 218.
The extremely low level of credit can be seen in the slow expansion of the
number of co-operatives from 271 to 501 between 1964 and 1968, and accom-
odating 29,000 and 62,000 people respectively, yet receiving only ID.
79,000 and ID. 197,350 respectively.
**C. Nader and A. Zahlan (Ed), Science and Technology in Developing Coun-
tries, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 90; p. 15.
***Experience in Taiwan and Japan has demonstrated conclusively that the
most effective organisation for achieving a high rate of growth in agri-
culture is the complete integration of the extension services and co-oper-
ative programmes (the responsibilities of which were just reviewed).
See J.L. Simmons, op. cit.
hi,lities,. Added to which, previous political instability has created an
almost total unwillingness to take responsible decisions, except at the
very top, and this totally blocks the transition to a decentralized struc-
ture.
With regard to industry, the vast majority of establishments have
been located in major urban centres. This is due to the existence there
of large markets, infrastructure, skilled labour, managers, marketing
facilities, and social capital, all of which allow for maximizing pro-
ductivity and GNP. These unfortunately remain the criteria by which the
location and type of industrial investments are decided. The last five-
year plan continued with this process of expanding major existing centres.
As a consequence, industry is rarely to be found in rural areas, and is
concentrated in four cities, namely Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk
(mainly oil) leaving large gaps in between.* These four cities have de-
veloped more rapidly than the others, partly because of their unique lo-
cation, resources, labour, good export potential, and so on, but also be-
cause of deliberate government investment in them. This concentration
reflects the viewpoint that immediate economic returns are more profit-
able in the four cities than in other locations, but this is a very short-
sighted approach.
Some of these cities (other than Baghdad) have good reason tD con-
tinue to grow. For example, Basra as the only major port with local
*The disparities are even more glaring for commercial enterprizes, with
Baghdad employing 55 percent of the labour force in this category in 1971
and Basra over 30 percent.
supplies. of Qil and natural gas, is a natural site for export and import-
based industries, and heavy industries, such as oil refining, chemical,
and steel; while Mosul with its wealth in raw materials, is suitable for
the building-construction industry. The greatly increased oil revenues
in the next 5 years ('74-'79), will permit both the concurrent develop-
ment of heavy industry and further expansion of the petroleum sector.
This can be seen in projects for a steel mill in Khor al Zubair (South
of Basra), a two-fold expansion of the Basra refinery (reaching 140,000
barrels per day) and a new mammoth refinery (200,000 barrels per day)
near Fao (South of Basra), plus expansion of the Basra fertilizer plant,
increasing the production of Urea by 9 times.* However, this approach,
concentrating on heavy capital-intensive industry, sadly overlooks the
true need, which is to reduce dependency and inequity by ensuring that the
benefits of development are diffused, (so as to help the majority of
people rather than an elite few.)
Tables 2 and 3 (in Appendix 1) clearly show the regional disparities
in both the location of industry and income levels. The distribution of
large industries is very imbalanced, with some 60 percent located in
Baghdad, while the Qadisiya, Thi-Qar and Wasit regions in the South, and
Arbil and the other Northern regions lag far behind. A similarly dis-
parate income distribution exists as can be seen in Map 4, with the
Qadisiya and Thi-Qar regions lagging very far behind, followed by Arbil
and Wasit. It is interesting to note that there.are very low levels of
*See Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Review, Iraq, 1973, London,
1973, p. 9-10.
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employment for female employees in industry in all regions lacking a ma-
jor city (the exception is Kirkuk).
With regard to small industries, the most startling fact concerns
the extremely low wages earned (about 1/5 of that for large industry).
However, even at this level, the same lagging regions, namely Qadisiya,
Muthanna, Maysan, Thi-Qar, Arbil and Kirkuk have the lowest wages. It
seems clear that the Qadisiya, Thi-Qar and Arbil regions are in need of
immediate infusion of investment, closely followed by Wasit, Maysan and
Muthanna. Consideration of the preferred size, type, sophistication
and employment intensity of industrial plants will have to remain unan-
swered till Part 2, so as to allow a fuller context to be developed.
2.4 EDUCATIONAL AND HEALTH FACILITIES: MALDISTRIBUTION
The following simple and straightforward description of the facts
and figures is quite enlightening as to the regional disparities in ed-
ucational and health facilities. In 1965, illiteracy at the national
level was as high as 70 percent (58 percent male, 82.5 percent female).
A literacy drive is clearly a national priority, but not taught in the
abstract form as at present, where the subject matter is set elsewhere
and has little relevance to the local situation. However, these qualita-
tive aspects will be considered in Part 2 as an integral part of the pro-
posed development policies.
With regard to primary and secondary education, Table 4 in Appen-
dix 1 illustrates that there are sore new regions, namely Sulaimaniya,
and Diala, which do not have enough of these schools in addition to
the regular lagging ones, Qadisiya, Muthanna, Thi-Qar, Wasit, and
25
Diala. Although not shown in this table, there is also a strong imbalance
in university allocations. Out of a total of 37,290 students (29,245
males, 8,045 females) in 1970, 48 percent were in Baghdad University,
26.6 percent in Mustansiriya (also in Baghdad), 10.5 percent in Mosul,
7.4 percent in Basra, 2.6 percent in Sulaimaniya, and 4.8 percent in
private colleges.
Map 5 illustrates the maldistribution of vocational and technical in-
stitutes in Iraq. Only the regions of Dhok, Muthanna and Basra are lack-
ing in agricultural achools, with Muthanna* being the most needy. Tech-
nical colleges are missing in all the lagging regions (Arbil, Qadisiya,
Thi-Qar, Maysan, Wasit and Anbar) with the exception of Muthanna. The
impact of this school is reflected in relatively high wages for workers
in large industries in Muthanna (see Table 2, Appendix 1). Home Arts
colleges are available in all regions except Dhok and Muthanna. The
distribution of Commercial schools is the most disparate of all these
types, with Baghdad having four, Basra two, and Mosul and Sulaimaniya.
one each.
Concerning health facilities, the Baghdad region has a full 50 per-
cent of all allocations, as compared to 25 percent of the total population,
(see Table 5, Appendix 1), while Thi-Qar, Wasit, and Sulaimaniya, follow-
ed by Kirkuk, Diala, Qadisiya, Muthanna and Maysan are in very short sup-
ply of such facilities.
*Because agriculture in Basra is basically limited to date-palm groves,
for which there is a specific and efficient institute, while Dhok is
primarily a forest region.
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Most qualitative aspects concerning educational and health policies
are dealt with in Part 2 (section 5.4), but a few general comments at
this stage will help to establish the way this topic will be approached.
From certain points of view, present education in Iraq almost cripples
social progress and learning through its conservative rigidity. Teachers
reduce their classes to a ritual incantation and success in formal exams
(of fairly artificial knowledge learned by heart) is the accepted ladder
to positions of power. Education as advocated in this thesis needs to be
a growing and living effort, relevant to particular situations, as well
as the needs of the country as a whole*, and not the present static, ab-
stract approach, where every level is incomplete, and considered as a
step to university, which only a small percentage of the population
attain. Although the primary aim of the development process should be
the diffusion of development benefits, present expenditure in education
and health are heavily weighted in favour of higher education and major
health centres located in the very large urban centres. This is also the
case with most other public utility investments (streets, parks, sewage
disposal, drinking water, etc.). Thus, it is the same middle class that
has always derived the benefits of development, to the exclusion of the
lower classes and farmers, who form a clear majority.
In all this, the complaint is not with the levels of expenditure on
*Ghazi Derwish,"Scientific Research in Iraq," in C. Nader and A. Zahlan
(Ed.), op. cit., p. 290; states that Iraq's manpower needs are primarily
for semi-skilled and skilled workers, technicians, paramedics, etc.
education and health facilities, for they are already very high by any
standards*, but rather in quality, relevance, and ease of diffusion of
knowledge and know-how. To these issues we will return in Part 2.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND OBJECTIVES
So far, the discussion has focussed on the over-concentration of
development in Iraq in a few urban settlements (Baghdad, Basra, Mosul),
coupled with the basic neglect or badly thought-out policies for rural
development. By concentrating on the so-called 'modern sector' (to the
exclusion of the 'traditional') policies followed have on the whole in-
creased internal dualism, and external dependency, in that the modern
sector's call for greatly increased productivity and higher quality so
as to compete internationally, demands new and more complex technologies
which have to be imported, and leads to a subsequent drop in employment.
It is arguable that there is a need for a 'modern sector' but to believe
that this can be expanded to cover the employment needs of the whole
population and quickly, is totally falacious.**
Hans W. Singer supports this argument in defining 'dualism' as
comprising:***
-different sets of conditions (some superior
and others inferior) which coexist in a given
space at the same time.
*UN, op. cit, p. 103. For example, expenditure on education in 1968
totalled 23 percent of government investment (the highest in the region)
and 21.9 percent in 1969.
**See G. Brutzkus, Centralized vs. Decentralized Patterns of Urbanization
in Developing Countries, prepared for Conference on Urbanization and De-
velopment in Developing Countries, Jerusalem, 1971.
***Hans W. Singer, in International Social Development Review, No. 3,
UN, N.Y., 1972, pp. 26-30.
-that this coexistence is chronic and not
merely transitional.
-that the degree of superiority or inferiority
shows no sign of diminishing, and may be con-
stant or even increasing.
-that the inter-relationship (or lack of one)
between superior and inferior elements are
such that the existence of a superior element
does not do much to pull up the inferior ele-
ment, or it may even positively pull it down.
He goes on to say that the modern sector cannot provide sufficient jobs
to absorb surplus agricultural labour (exacerbated by rapid agricultural
mechanization, which promotes greater migration).* The point is that the
mere possibility of a job in the modern sector causes migration on a
scale that cannot be absorbed. Thus, in Iraq, as in most developing
countries, open and disguised unemployment exists as much in the towns
and cities as it does in the countryside. This employment crisis is the
most dangerous dualism of all.
In other words, this systematic confounding of the so-called trickle-
down effect reinforces the fact that no simple rural/urban dichotomy will
do, for their problems are very interconnected. In this context, the in-
creasingly dualistic development approach in Iraq has resulted in urban
settlements, which are little more than industrial and service enclaves
with very little outward diffusion or filtering of benefits. The results
*Ibid.
of these policies have been quite clearly detrimental to national devel-
opment in Iraq (if defined as progress with diminishing inter-and intra-
regional inequities) as indicated by the following list:
-grossly unequal spatial incidence of social
(schools and hospitals, etc.) and economic
(industry, etc.) development has emerged
within the 16 regions;
-relative neglect of agriculture and the rural
areas has resulted in domestic food production
increasingly lagging behind national needs,
and with this, imports of critical foodstuffs
have increased, with a negative effect on the
balance of payments;
-inequities in inter-and intra-regional income
have increased;
-migration to the main cities, primarily
Baghdad, has accelerated, with all its inherent
problems;
-urban employment and under employment has
increased;
-alienated national elites have emerged;
-options for future development have been re-
duced (due to over concentration and polari-
zation);
-overall quality of life has perhaps not deter-
iorated in terms of access to health, educa-
tional facilities, etc., but it leaves much
to be desired in rural areas in particular.
The regional disparities are summarized in Map 6, which illustrates
that Qadisiya, Muthanna and Thi-Qar in the South are the worst off in
terms of out-migration, low levels of investment in both agriculture and
industry, and insufficient social capital. These are closely followed by
Wasit and Maysan in the South, and Arbil and Dhok regions in the North.
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The next category (of less immediate concern) covers Anbar in the West
and Diala region in the East. It is clear that Iraq must concentrate
more effort on removing the burden on Baghdad and encouraging the devel-
opment of other regions, particularly the lagging ones just identified.
This should be done not just by means of expanded regional urban centres,
which are likely to remain enclaves of development, but more through well-
distributed rural settlements, where the crux of the problem is located.
More evidence of the destructive quality of these policies can be seen
in the more or less continuous war between the Kurds (in the North), and
the Central Government, for over fifteen years. Kurds have demanded de-
centralization and some form of regional autonomy implying certain con-
trols over local affairs. As the earlier analysis shows, the Kurdish
areas include some of the more lagging regions in Iraq. The fact that a
similar revolt has not erupted, (and is not likely to) in the Southern
and basically Shi'a regions does not preclude their rights concerning a
just share of the fruits of development.
As far back as 1952, Lord Salter, in observing this undesirable con-
centration in a few urban centres, particularly Baghdad, said, "...There
must be careful distribution between regions in Iraq, in the interests of
both social justice and political stability."* There can be few excuses,
particularly as Iraq's already considerable resources have been powerfully
boosted with the recent increase in the price of oil. Diffusion of the
benefits of development is clearly the only positive means of integrating
*Lord Salter, op. cit., p. 6; p. 36.
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and developing Iraq in the full sense of the word. To this end, this
thesis goes on to show that an important part of the development effort
should bypass the big cities and be directly concerned with agriculture
and in creating small and medium sized agro-industrial communities in
small towns and rural areas. In other words, this thesis rejects the
arguments for maximizing GNP or per capita income, of which Hirschman is
probably one of the most influential proponents. Hirschman states that
.. "if the economy is to be kept moving ahead,
the task of development policy is to maintain
tensions, disproportions and disequilibrium...,
and. .. to lift itself to higher income levels,
and economy must first develop within itself
one or several regional centres (or growth poles)"*
This philosophy of disequilibrium (the sequence of a previous disequili-
brium in turn creating a new disequilibrium, and so on) or the polari-
zing effect of each industry taking advantage of external economies cre-
ated by previous expenditure,** misses out the essential problem, that
is, people, unemployment, increasing income inequalities, etc. In this,
social, cultural, physical, and psychological factors are only analyzed
from the point of view of how conducive or obstructive they are to eco-
nomic growth. The lesson to be learned is that one must not treat a city
or region as a free market, and individual or enterprise costs and bene-
*A.O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1958, pp. 66-67; p. 183.
**Ibid., p. 184.
Hirschman goes on to contradict himself in saying that "the resulting
concentration due to external economies, although real, is consistently
overstated by economic operations.
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fits must be counterbalanced by the social or overall costs and benefits.
Myrdal's postulation of "perpetuating and self increasing regional dis-
parities under regions close to laissez-faire" seems entirely correct.*
A mature expression of a country is when there are few 'differences'
between people in different regions and between the countryside and met-
ropolitan areas. In this context, more income will remain in a well es-
tablished diversified region, because the majority of goods and services
needed are produced locally, while in the lagging regions, most benefits
will leak out to the regions where the products are bought. It is there-
fore not just a quantitative question of inter-regional balance that is
of concern, but more importantly, qualitative issues concerning the type
and diffusability of investment within regions, for this determines the
level of equality and quality of life.
With regard to cultural differences, as has been pointed out earlier,
Iraq is fortunate in its cultural diversity, which represents a national
wealth to be enhanced. The time scale very directly affects the choice
of development policies for different cultural areas (such as Kurdistan).
For example, an ultra visible, prestigious, large-scale development policy
may well damage the culture by leading to its very rapid transformation.
At the same time, to literally preserve a culture in such a way that so-
cio-economic development is sacrificed, would eventually lead to revolt,
as has happened in the Kurdish region. A more locally appropriate form
of development, as is proposed in Parts 2 and 3, is therefore called for.
These policies take on immediate importance due to the re-eruption of the
*G. Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor, Harper and Bros., N.Y., 1957.
Kurdish revolt.
An important issue in the context of the diffusibility of invest-
ments is to ensure economic security through diversity. The reason for
this is that a policy calling for the rapid economic development of a
region is quite likely to concentrate resources into a narrow area, of-
fering the best prospects, which apart from concentrating the benefits,
is also more vulnerable. Although the diversity clearly has to be limit-
ed because some concentration and specialization is inevitable as certain
regions are more suitable for particular activities. A second issue here
concerns the economies of scale, in that a small number of larger units
result in greater dependency, and inequalities, cause damage to the en-
vironment, and are more vulnerable than a large number of small units,
which by definition are more inclined to diffusion. The policies pro-
posed in Part 2 are mainly concerned with tackling these issues.
The discussion of objectives remains relatively general in nature,
for it is not in the scope of this thesis to identify detailed goals,
nor is it in keeping with the principle of maintaining flexibility to
cope with future modifications. There are two important points to con-
sider here. First, that more detailed goals would represent isolated and
far too precise value judgments that may well change, and second, that
"neither the planners' technical competence nor his or her wisdom en-
titles him or her to ascribe or dictate values, per se".* In other
words, for a policy to be relevant to a locality, effective citizen par-
ticipation is called for from the very earliest stages of planning, and
*See P. Davidoff and T. Reiner, A Choice Theory of Planning.
this includes the determination of objectives.
This chapter has established the gross polarity and inequity of
development in Iraq, and the following chapter looks into the present
centralized planning processes which have been instrumental in determin-
ing these same development policies. The approach of this thesis to
always examine or evolve planning policies and processes simultaneously
represents an attempt to be concerned with the reality of the situation
in Iraq, and therefore with the feasibility of proposed policies.
To sum up, probably the most important single objective is to con-
centrate on physical, economic, and social development designed to re-
dress gross inequalities and irregularities in incore and wealth be-
tween regions and between urban and rural areas.
3 - PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL AND REGIONAL STRUCTURE AND PLANNING PROCESSES
This chapter complements the previous discussion on planning poli-
cies, and sets the context for necessary changes proposed in Parts 2 and
3. The chapter first describes the present rigid over centralized and
hierarchical structure of decision making in Iraq, with very little in-
volvement of lower levels of representation. This sets a meaningful
context for the policy formulation as well as clarifying the discussion
in planning processes in Iraq. It is followed by the determination of
more meaningful regional boundaries for the subsequent planning policies
and processes. The last two sections focus on the inadequacies of the
present physical, economic, and social planning methods used in Iraq,
particularly from the point of view of the objective described earlier.
3.1 THE PRESENT PLANNING/INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: A CRITIQUE
The present planning structure in Iraq is characterized by exces-
sive centralization, a lack of coordination or sufficient sense of ur-
gency, and low morale.* In addition, the promotion process is based on
seniority, or political or familial relations, rather than on merit. To
put it mildly, there is much room for improvement. The institutional-
ized framework within which planning takes place can be seen in the
following chart, (which is not a complete representation of the govern-
ment structure or of any of the organizations and departments it con-
siders):
*See F. Jalal, The Role of Government with Industrialization of Iraq,
London, Frank Cass, 1972.
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The planning tree is headed at the political level by the 'Higher
Planning Council', which in effect is the council of ministers, and
makes all major decisions. It is headed by the President and Vice-
President, and includes minister and other central agency directors as
members, the most important of whom are the Ministers of Planning,
*Exists in the constitution, but is presently nonfunctional, the higher
planning council acting as an effective council of ministers.
s
Finance, Economics, Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Industry, Culture
and Education, Transportation and Communications, Health, Public Works
and Housing, Municipalities and Rural Affairs, and Interior. It is
served directly by the steering committee of the Ministry of Planning
as well as by the other ministries and government agencies. The func-
tions of three other higher councils (agriculture, industry, and cul-
ture) are primarily executive, and are headed by the President, with
the respective ministers acting as Vice-Presidents. These councils
do represent tighter control from the centre, and create some friction
because of overlap with their respective ministries.
The Central Planning Organization (CPO) operates within this frame-
work and has overall responsibility for Five-Year Development Plans and
Master Plans, although most are carried out by the Ministry of Munici-
palities, or a specific municipality. The Planning Process, in effect,
consists of a flow of information from the various ministries to the
respective offices in the CPO, where they are received, redrafted and
are sent up to the Steering Committee, where in theory coordination is
supposed to take place. Decisions are eventually handed down from the
Higher Councils to the respective ministries for implementation.*
However, (and this is crucial), there is no effective communication
*For Agriculture, -Ministries of Agriculture, Agrarian Reform, Irri-
gations, Northern Affairs, Municipal and Rural Affairs, Economy; for
Industry -Ministries of Industry, Oil and Minerals; for Transportation
and Communications -Ministries of Transport and Communications, Educa-
tion and Culture, Higher Education; for Buildings and Infrastructures
-Ministries of Public Works and Housing, Interior, Public Works and
Housing.
between the various sectoral offices in the CPO.
Concerning the regional administrative framework, as can be seen
from the previous maps, there are 16 provinces, each having a governor
(Mutasarrif) who is appointed by the Higher Planning Council on the re-
commendation of the Minister of the Interior, and is responsible to him.
The governors are the chief agents of the central government, and can
be authorized by ministers to act on their behalf. However, their con-
trol over most functions is more symbolic than real,* that is, regional
authority is basically non-existent. Provincial public offices are all
subordinate to the governor, who is assisted by a general provincial
council of appointed officials (provincial officials, ministerial rep-
resentatives assigned to the province, and the mayors of the provincial
municipalities.
Each province is divided into districts (qada) having a deputy gov-
ernor (qaimmaqam). There are 3-10 districts in each province, and in
1965, there were 75 such districts in Iraq, an average of 4-5 per prov-
ince.** The districts are further subdivided into subdistricts (nahia),
headed by a subdistrict officer (mudir). In 1965, there were 180 sub-
districts in Iraq.*** The subdistrict officer supervises local teachers,
police, land registration and other governmental officials. This offi-
cer is invariably considered an outsider by the villagers, and never
fully enters into village life.**** So the successful administration
*Kahtan al Madfai, in Administrative Problems of Rapid Urban Growth in
the Arab States, UN, N.Y., 1964, p. 101.
**Harvey Smith et al., op. cit., pp. 184-185.
***Ibid.
****Al Dahiri, op. cit., p. 72.
of a village depends to a large extent on the level of cooperation be-
tween the subdistrict officer and the Mukhtar (titular head of the
village, or the most prestigious person). Popular participation is thus
not only ineffective, but also dependent on a powerless official body.
Within this framework, any major city or town* is administered by
a municipal authority headed by a mayor (rais baladiya) who is appointed
by and responsible to the Ministry of Municipalities, while at the same
time being subject to the control of the governor, who retains ultimate
provincial authority. This seeming overlapping of responsibilities oc-
curred because in 1958 the Ministry of Municipalities was created from
a section originally within the Ministry of Interior, to supervise the
other municipalities, and prepare town plans if they were unable to do
so. The Baghdad municipality (amanat al asima) is designated by law as
the highest municipality, with the broadest power of authority. Its
mayor is directly responsible to the Ministry of Municipalities (and not
to the provincial council), and has direct access to the other minis-
tries.
The conclusion is clearly that provincial authorities have no real
power, and do little more than follow up decisions made at the centre.
The central government in Iraq now recognizes the need for some decen-
tralization as witnessed by the very recent law for the establishment
*According to Harvey Smith et al, op. cit., p. 145.
In 1965 there were 5 classes of municipalities: superior (Basra, Mosul,
Kirkuk), first (11 No.), second (12 No.), third (47 No.),fourth (158 No.)
The classification is based on size of revenues collected, unlike prov-
incial authorities, municipalities are empowered to levy taxes, though
their budget is subject to the governor's approval. Note, Baghdad +
superior + first municipality = provincial capitals.
of a regional authority in the Kurdish regions.* The area covered is
very large, comprising over half the five Northern regions considered
earlier, with Arbil designated as the regional capital. The law makes
provision for a regional budget (as a part of the national budget) fin-
anced by local taxes, plus whatever the central government allocates
within the framework of the national budget, and national planning sys-
tem (articles 1-7a, 1-8a, 1-8b). The governing regional assembly is to
be headed by a central government appointee, with the rank of minister
(articles 2-13c, 2-13f).
The executive body of this regional assembly is responsible for re-
gional planning within the context of national planning, while the var-
ious sectoral regional offices are subject to the control of the respec-
tive central ministries which will result in conflict or subservience to
the centre. A start has been made in a country which has been highly
centralized for generations, but in the context of this thesis, it has
not gone far enough. The Kurdish regional body's authority is limited,
for it has gained some administrative and financial power internally,
but remains very much of a secondary body, in that finance and basic pol-
icy is handed down from above without much room for feedback. Further-
more, it is strongly controlled politically by the.central government,
but this is perhaps only natural as a first cautious step. For these
reasons and others, the law has been rejected by the Kurds.
In addition to these criticisms, what is also missing is a fuller
*Government of Iraq; The Law for Local Government in Kurdistan, (in
Arabic), Baghdad, April 1974.
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view of the spatial development of the country as a whole, that is,
the need to look at planning in all and not just in one or a few regions.
Clearly, some regions will receive concentrated attention, such as lag-
ging regions, but all must be considered. Failing this, the imbalance
and inequities discussed earlier will remain. This thesis quite defi-
nitely seeks to greatly strengthen regional and local authorities, en-
abling them to work with the centre, but not for it. The following sec-
tion initiates this process by determining more functional definitions
of regional boundaries in Iraq.
3.2 REGIONAL STRUCTURE: TOWARDS A BETTER DEFINITION OF BOUNDARIES
The need to revitalize and stengthen regional planning and regional
authorities to enable their active participation in formulating and im-
lementing development strategies and policies has already been stressed.
The process and institutional means by which this is to be achieved is
explicitly dealt with in Part 3. However, the issue of suitable region-
al boundaries for planning is more appropriately considered at this
stage.
As regional planning is concerned with the spatial incidence of
economic and social growth, it requires rationally defined regions.
Regions should describe a group of contiguous areas having certain com-
mon or complementary characteristics, are tied by extensive internal
activity. An examination of Map 7 makes it evident that most if not all
the 16 administrative provinces in Iraq are arbitrarily defined and not
conducive to good regional planning.
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It is important to realize that some functional regions are not
limited by national boundaries, such as the watershed basin of the Eu-
phrates, which includes parts of Syria and Turkey. To cite a particu-
lar example of the problems of lack of coordination between these coun-
tries, the planners of a project in the North Euphrates basin, within
Iraq, discovered that they could not draw adequate amounts of water, as
initially envisaged in feasibility studies, due to large withdrawals
upstream. Another example is the case of Basra (in the South of Iraq),
and Kuwait. Traditionally, these regions have been strongly linked so-
cially and culturally, while although economic links have decreased re-
cently for political reasons, this factor needs to be taken into account
when planning the Basra region.
The first of the examples just cited identifies a typical region
for Iraq, namely an agricultural, or water, resource region. There are
three other regional definitions relevant to Iraq, namely: core or met-
ropolitan regions, such as Baghdad and its environs; ethnic regions such
as Kurdistan; and desert regions. There is no doubt that the existing
regions represent a starting point for regional development, but even
in the immediate or very near future, better planning boundaries ought
to be obtained by regrouping the regions. In the long run, however,
rational regional boundaries, based on sound geographic, demographic
(a question of size of population), economic, social, environmental,
and cultural grounds are definitely required.
A criticism common to all the present boundaries, and one that
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should influence regional redefinition in the framework of the four
types of Iraqi regions is the question of regional population. There
is some need for population balance between regions so as to enhance
the more even distribution of investment, as well as to ensure inter-
regional dealings on a more equal footing. This is particularly impor-
tant when policy decisions are taken at the national level. In 1973
the regional populations were as follows (see Table 1, Appendix 1),
with smaller size and majority rural populations being synonymous with
relative backwardness:
-150,000 pop. (Dhok and Muthanna), which are lagging
regions;
-360,000-570,000 pop. (Maysan, Anbar, Wasit, Qadisiya,
Arbil, Diala, Sulaimaniya, Kerbela, Thi-Qar, Babylon,
Kirkuk), it is interesting to note that with the ex-
ception of Thi-Qar, the lagging regions are all at
the lower end of the scale;
-880,000 pop. (Nineveh, Basra) which represent the
two major growth areas;
-3,170,000 pop. (Baghdad).
In addition to problems of uneven size, common to all regions, the
other major criticisms follow and are grouped into Northern, Central,
and Southern regions. In the 5 Northern regions, one of the main cri-
ticisms (also applicable to the central Diala region) is the tendency to
locate regional boundaries along the rivers, thereby dividing an other-
wise economically and geographically sound functional area.*
*Such as along the Tigris, between Nineveh-Dhok, and Arbil; along the
Greater Zab for Dhok-Arbil; along the Little Zab between Arbil and
Kirkuk; and along the Diala between Kirkuk and Diala regions.
Dhok is miniscule, a little too strung out and relatively artificial
(only recently having been separated from Nineveh region). An important
consideration, mentioned earlier, reappears here in that Dhok only be-
came a lagging region after it was separated from Nineveh; that is, re-
gions may hide local inequalities, which is an important reason for em-
phasizing local organizations within a regional framework. Kurdish cul-
tural unity or definition is also lacking, particularly in the Southern
tip of the Arbil region.
Of the central regions, Baghdad is the most absurd. As a core re-
gion it should clearly be limited to Baghdad and its environs, with
Samarra and Tikrit (which are now parts of the Baghdad region) forming
another river basin region. The Anbar region could effectively be di-
vided into an upper Euphrates river basin region and a desert region.
Finally, the Kerbela and Babylon regions have too many functionally re-
lated cities and large towns in close proximity (15 km), and therefore
need to be unified.
The Southern regions seem to be better defined as a whole, except
for Muthanna and Basra regions. The former is basically a desert region
to which has been added a small part of the Euphrates basin, in order to
incorporate an urban area (Samawa). This section would be better inte-
grated into Qadisiya region with Muthanna becoming purely a desert re-
gion. The criticism of the Basra region pertains to the meaningless
subdivision of Hor al Hammar, the largest and most Southern marsh, which
is the home of the Marsh Arabs (see Basra region in Map 7).
Concerning new regional definitions, it cannot be overemphasized
that the new boundaries should not be seen as fixed or static, for re-
gional boundaries must be allowed to change in time, in keeping with
new social, economic, and physical realities. Nine regions and regional
authorities are proposed, in line with the above criticisms , the
boundaries of which can be seen in Map 7. The main criteria can be sum-
marized as aiming towards more even sizing, cultural unity considerations
for the Kurds in the Northern regions, and Marsh Arabs in the Basra area,
river basin unity for the Northern regions, and a metropolitan region
for Baghdad. Crude approximations for the new regional population are
as follows (for 1973):*
-Dhok + Arbil + Sulaimaniya (the
Kurdish regions) =1.1 million
-Nineveh =0.9 million
-Kirkuk + Samarra** =1.0 million
-Diala =0.7 million
-Anbar =0.35 million
-Babylon + Kerbela =1.1 million
-Qadisiya + Muthanna + Thi-Qar =1.05 million
-Wasit + Maysan =0.75 million
*Note: the names do not necessarily correlate with the old provincial
boundaries.
**This regional definition is the least satisfactory and requires fur-
ther information and analysis for a better alignment.
-Basra =0.95 million
-together with metropolitan
Baghdad (from which the desert
regions are administered) =2.5 millions
Total =10.4 millions
3.3 PLANNING PROCESSES, 5 YEAR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS: A CRITIQUE
This section does not attempt in any detail to describe or critique
National Development Plans per se. The criticism is of a more basic na-
ture, and therefore it is the whole principle and process of such plan-
ning that is under scrutiny.
Present National Development Plans are synonymous with National
Economic Plans, revealing their inherent bias and limitation. However,
the development process also implies social, institutional, and politi-
cal policies applied in space, and therefore, to consider economic as-
pects in relative isolation becomes more of academic than real interest.
Qualitative aspects are only given lip service, which in effect pre-
cludes traditional sectors from the process and focusses all attention
on quantifiable aspects of the modern sector. It becomes, in effect, an
instrument for encouraging dualism,** while the high level of aggregation
*The preliminaries of the latest plan for Iraq (1970-74), mention the
need "to coordinate economic, financial, monetary and commercial poli-
cies to ensure plan execution." As has been seen, in section 3.1, the
institutional framework leaves little room for such coordination or in-
tegration. There is also scant mention of social or spatial aspects
(although social investments are quantified at a later stage).
**In this context, the '70 -'74 Plan (p. 124) talks of "the traditional
sector, primarily agriculture, as having taken the first steps towards
the development of modern production techniques", but with no consider-
ation of its effect on employment, migration, dependency, alienation,
etc.
allow, for the effective masking of real issues, as does the fact that
all decisions are made from the centre, with little, if any, local or
regional involvement. The question of local social validity is therefore
discarded at the outset. Even the acceptance of the plan at the national
level is not a foregone conclusion, for the process, as has been seen
(in section 3.1) seeks to impose proposals on the operational sectors of
government administration, without their active involvement in its pre-
paration.
Formal economic planning of this nature was first adopted in 1951
in Iraq, when a Development Board was established. There have been
eight Five Year Plans to date.* The following table gives the breakdown
of relative expenditures (priorities), and the rates of implementation,
which have been dismal. As can be seen, the first five plans averaged
two years apiece, but have stabilized since 1961, but that is not to say
that these time spans are particularly suitable. The development and
political process is dynamic, and to fix five years as an interval for
which all proposals are established in advance assumes marking time,
which is certainly not the case. The approach, expanded on in Part 3,
seeks to emphasize the continuous nature of planning, particularly im-
portant when the purpose is to actively involve local people in the
development process.
*The early plans were allocated 70 percent of oil income, but since 1959-
1960 plan allotments have more frequently run-near the 50 percent mark.
For a good description of the first 7 plans, see A. Badre, op. cit.,
pp. 187- 188
PERCENTILE DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL PLAN INVESTMENTS 1951-74,
AND THE RATE OF IMPLEENTATION*
Agricul- Industry Transport & Building
Communication
Other** Total
Planned
Expend-
iture
First
Program 47.4 -- 24.2 19.2 9.1 ID 66
1951-55
Second
Program 49.1 20.0 17.2 11.6 2.1 ID155
1951-56
Third
Program 37.6 14.3 24.4 20.2 3.7 ID304
1955-59
Fourth
Program 33.6 13.4 24.9 26.6 1.5 ID500
1955-60
(Percentage
implemented (52) (37) (52) (63) (104) (57%)
from '51-'58)
Provisional
Economic 12 12 26 49 1 ID392
Plan
1959-62
Detailed
Economic 20 30 24 25 -- ID566
Plan
1961-65
(Percentage
implemented (46) (60) (31) (55) (68) (47%)
up to '63)
Five Year
Economic 25 28 16 26 5 ID561
Plan
1965-69
(Percentage
implemented (32) (53) (60) (53) (31) (55%)
up to '69
Five Year
National 34 24 11 12 19 ID537
Development
Plan
1970-74
*NB: All figures from A. Al Naswari, op. cit., except for '70-'74 plan,
which are from the 1970-74 National Development Plan, op.cit.
**Includes internal loans, international obligations, planning & followup
Sector
ture
The rates of implementation for all the plans have been very low
for a number of reasons, most of which are due to basic weaknesses in
the process itself. First, the lack of coordination between government
sectors emanates from the rigidly sectoral (as opposed to goal-oriented)
institutional structure, which is further exacerbated by the basically
economic nature of the plan itself. Thus, projects are not necessarily
mutually enhancing, even when they are in the same area. More often
than not, they are planned without knowledge of the other projects in
the region, (resulting in frequent changes in design during or after
construction, or worse, left unaltered). In this context, the coopera-
tive movement* and redistribution of land fell way behind schedule,
not because the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform was parti-
cularly negligent, but because of insufficient correlation with other
government organs with responsibility for completing surveys, irrigation
and drainage canals, selecting farmers, constructing various buildings
and facilities, organizing health and education, and ensuring agricul-
tural extension services, etc.
A second reason for low implementation rates is the current weak-
ness in the overcentralized government decision making process, which
makes it difficult to take the necessary decisions in the required
number and at the required speed.** In addition, there is often a lack
of political commitment to long-range planning policies and targets
*The 1961-65 plan called for the establishment of 2,000 cooperatives,
but by the end of the plan period, only 100 were operational..
**See A.0. Hirschman, op. cit., p. 25, or Economist Intelligence Unit,
op. cit., p. 7.
(partly as a result of political instability), and an inability often
for political reasons to carry out policies previously announced. The
third reason is the planning process' failure to involve the political
decisionmaking apparatus from the outset, resulting in lack of commit-
ment of the operational ministry to the planning policy proposed. Sec-
toral planning (for example, in transportation, housing, health, edu-
cation...) is considered more successful than either coordinated inter-
sectoral or regional planning, because detailed sectoral planning is
done by the very ministries or agencies responsible for the programme
investment and its implementation.
The planners themselves clearly continue to believe in the process
and do not fully appreciate these basic weaknesses. They blame the
'inadequacies of implementation at the national economic level' and
make no reference to the active participation of local levels, without
whom effective implementation is an impossibility. Or they point to
long gestation periods for major projects or to low levels of agricul-
tural productivity, due to the faint propagation of modern technology,
or to the underutilization of the productive capacities in many fac-
tories.
Such plans, formulated in isolation, are effectively tools of the
national elite, and it is not surprising that they should have primarily
benefited this elite. By concentrating on large dams, and water storage
infrastructure. up to 1958*, the prime benefactors were the large land-
owners, and a change of priority to industrialization after 1958, led
to greater urbanization, migration and increasing dualism and dependency.
Interestingly enough, the reason for this switch was justified as the
only means to liquidate the state of economic dependency on foreign in-
terests.
However, any decrease in dependency depends on the use of appropriate
levels and types of technology, and the emphasis in Iraq has been on
sophisticated capital for the modern sector, which has had the reverse
effect**(this issue is discussed in greater depth in Part 2). In both
cases, that is, before and after the 1958 revolution, the poor, rural
majority were not the main benefactors.
The latest plan is without doubt a great improvement on previous
plans, displaying a technical competence not always evident in earlier
planning, and some of its suggestions go a long way towards redressing
the previous imbalance. However, it does not recognize the implicit
and permanent weaknesses just alluded to in this borrowed planning model.
Although there is superficial mention of the need to involve the various
*31-46 percent of total investment before the revolution in 1958 was
allocated to this sector (see A. Badre, op. cit., p. 292), and this was
accompanied by neglect of secondary irrigation canals and drainage, which
always lagged well behind the construction of main arteries.
**See the National Development Plan 1970-74. op. cit., pp. 155, 164.
47 percent of the entire central government investment utilized foreign
currency and in industry this figure increases to 68 percent. The only
relief comes in the fact that 75 percent of these imports are inter-
mediate goods.
operational ministries and agencies in the process, as well as the need
f
to develop local government bodies to ensure a greater degree of initia-
tive on their part in the execution of development strategy, there is
little reference to participation in policy formulation, without which
involvement in implementation becomes a question of imposition.
The plan mentions the desirablity of a geographic distribution of
industrial projects, but the proposed enterprises are concentrated in
the main cities. Thus, although some territorial concerns were voiced,
the problem lies in the lack of a systemised spatial policy relating not
only economic but also social objectives to the physical regions. The
regional settlement patterns signify certain opportunities, constraints,
and needs for the succeeding stages of development by determining the mar-
ket size, level and need of social and economic infrastructure, degree
of labour specialisation and so on. Some of the reasons why such planning
pays little attention to space relates to: the high level of aggregation
(in which individual, group, and regional behaviour are subjected to sum-
mation by sector, thereby disguising the essential problem of income dis-
tribution); the relative insignificance of transport and communication
costs; a neglect of externalities (such as levels of pollution); and a
neglect of non-marketing costs (that is, the qualitative aspects are sub-
merged or discarded because of difficulty in measurement, whereas econo-
mic items are very measurable commodities (for example, production,
consumption GNP)
It is important to reemphasize that the concern here is not with
regionalising national economic plans and substituting GRP for GNP,
for the critical issue is the diffusion of benefits within regions. In
this, the present development indicators (GNP or GRP) used to determine
tprogress' are so aggregated as to be meaningless for the objectives dis-
cussed earlier. This lack of the use of any social indicators of devel-
opment certainly constitutes a main weakness in the present process.
Social indicators are intended to be means by which societal change can
be monitored, and 'objectively' measured. For example, a common type
of indicator measures the degree of access to modern services, but it
does not consider differences in quality between those services. UNRISD
determined what is probably as useful a set of indicators as is currently
available for measuring the quality of life (defined by some measure of
the relative happiness of the majority of the population), but doubts in
these remains.
The necessity to move away from GNP or per capita income to social
indicators, or some combination of the two is a welcome step in the right
direction, However, particularly in the context of the policies of this
thesis, it remains a measure or quantification of theoretically qualita-
tive factors, and therefore, because of its implicit abstraction from
reality, becomes insufficient on its own. This is particularly true for
rural populations and rural development.
The Iraqi government seems to have partially realised the mistakes
of the past, and for the first time in many years, has allocated a maj-
ority investment to agriculture, in the latest Five Year Development Plan
1970-74, with an overwhelming emphasis on irrigation and drainage pro-
jects (42 percent of agricultural investment). However, it remains to
be seen if the de facto priorities are the same,for the record here is
not favorable.* Furthermore, little is said of the necessity agricul-
tural support services, (health, education, etc.) or of local processing
and marketing of produce.
From the breakdown of investment expenditure, it becomes evident
that notwithstanding the priority allocated to agriculture, there is
no similar correlation with other sectors necessary for agricultural
and rural development, which remains overwhelminly urban.** Thus, of
the health budget, only 25 percent is allocated to rural areas and small
towns, to construct hospitals in Qadas (districts) and 85 medical centres
in Nahias (subdistricts). Similarly, with education, although there is
a shortage of technical and vocationally trained manpower and a relative
*It is interesting to note that in the 1965-69 plan where agriculture
was the second priority after industry, the de facto priorities of the
government (in actual expenditures) emerged as follows: industry, other
projects (mainly defence), building and social services, transport and
communications, and agriculture; that is, agriculture was given least
priority.
**agriculture, 34 percent of total investment: subdivided into 42 percent
irrigation and drainage, 15 percent water storage (dams), 13 percent
agricultural production projects (mainly farms), 22 percent agricultural
services projects; (the concentration is in a small number of large pro-
jects). industry, 24 percent of total investment: all of which is allo-
cated to cities. transportation, 11 percent of total investment: only
11 percent is allocated to rural areas for investment. buildings and
services, 12 percent: subdivided into 23.5 percent health and 27 percent
for culture and education (the rural allocation is in the text), 19 per-
cent water projects for municipalities and villages (no indicator of
distribution).
surplus of professionality*, the plan goes on to propose only 14 percent
of educational investment in vocational institutes, the rest being allo-
cated to the traditionsl degree-oriented education system. The damage
does not stop here, for even at the primary school level, only 25 percent
of the investments** are in rural areas.
A major criticism can therefore be levelled at the sectoral nature
of such planning as opposed to a goal orientation, such as to rural de-
velopment (which clearly incorporates both social and economic factors).
This practice of breaking down development plans into economic and social
sectors is very misleading, in that the construction of a feeder road
may, in certain circumstances, have a greater effect in terms of social
change and modernization than an equivalent investment for, say, a clinic
or school.*** This again emphasizes the importance of local participa-
tion.
Custom, tradition, social and religious institutions, all exert
powerful influences on the structure of society and way of life. Neglect
of these aspects can only result in either rejection of policies or cause
severe conflicts if implemented. As some changes in social structure and
way of life are often a necessary pre-condition for economic growth or
development, the success of such development depends on the nature of im-
lied changes. To quote Peter Marris, "It is important to distinguish be-
*The National Development Plan 1970-74, op. cit., p. 13.
**Ibid., p. 144.
***See B. Higgins, op. cit.
tween situations where unfamiliar events can be assimilated before a
structure has to adapt; and those where the structure has first to adapt;
before the event can be assimilated; the second being far more disruptive
and threatening than the first."
To succeed, projects must therefore relate to the natural resources
and human circumstances in the regions and localities. This information
is not available at the national level and depends on both regional and
local planning. These institutions will greatly encourage more partici-
pation of the local population, further politicization of the planning
process and greater decentralization of effective power as well as to
help in equalizing income distribution, all of which are the primary con-
cerns of this thesis. These issues will all be considered in Part 3.
The following section looks into physical planning in Iraq. Interestingly
enough, its problems are similar to those of economic planning.
3.4 PLANNING PROCESS, MASTER PLANS: A CRITIQUE
Most physical planning has, in fact, been an instrument of dualism,
that is, of rapid urbanization and industrialization, as advocated by
National Development Plans. In Iraq, as in most developing countries,
this has led to rapid polarization and increasing inequities, particu-
larly between urban and rural areas.* The major concern of this section
*Towfighi, in The Strategy of Concentrated Decentralisation for Regional
Growth,(M.I.T. Ph.D. thesis), p. 43, demonstrates how urbanisation will
not necessarily increase employment opportunities and is likely to in-
crease inequality and regional imbalances.
is not with good or bad land use or Master Plans, per se* but more with
criticising the present narrow and isolated basis of its approach, re-
lating only superficially to the broader regional and national implica-
tions.
Physical planning as presently applied in most developing countries
reflects its early European origins - demand for density limits, physical
order and social amenities, few of which are directly applicable to the
very different culture, problems, needs, and resources of Iraq.** _The
strong urban bias of physical planning (as is the case with standard
economic planning) reflects the low (5-10 percent) level of employment in
agriculture in Europe and the United States. In developing countries,
the range is more like 40-80 percent, and in Iraq it is about 55 percent.
Its application, therefore, implies exploitation of the rural population
for the supposed benefits of high growth rates. In other words, polar-
ized urbanisation induces the rapid imposition of more capital-intensive
farming on a large scale (to the detriment of the rural population). The
resulting cycle of out-migration from rural areas occurs at a scale and
rate which denudes these areas of their most able people, while not being
able to absorb all the migrants into urban areas.
In a similar manner, as the transplanted technology induces larger
*In rough terms, decentralized land use plans are good (e.g., the Kuwait
Master Plan) or at least better than accretive land use plans (e.g., the
Baghdad Master Plan).
**Thus, in the United States, a cultural preference for free standing
houses, no boundary walls, and little mixing of commercial with residen-
tial land use (all calling for social homogeneity) has led to equating
high land values with low densities. The situation is basically reversed
in Iraq, from social, cultural, climatic, and structural points of view.
and larger scales of production, the relative advantages of central loca-
tions increase, and agglomeration tendencies build up. Left on its own,
development investment soon concentrates in the major cities because of
the external benefits. But who benefits and who is paying for this free
bonus to investors? The point is that one must not treat the city as a
free market, and individual (or enterprise) costs and benefits must be
counterbalanced by the social or overall costs and benefits. It is on
the multiple repercussions of such policies that attention needs to be
focussed.*
The Master Plan paradigm has come under severe attack recently, with
the physical determinism and static quality of such planning, methods
limiting their relevance or utility as a guide to action in developing
countries which are changing rapidly.** Thus, the consultants for the
Baghdad Master Plan talk of the need for a continuous planning process
(correctly stating that the plan is not an end in itself), and lament
the damage done to Baghdad by the earlier and dated Minoprio and Doxiades
*For example, improved or innovative transportation applied to a peripher-
al region in isolation, is likely to increase the opportunities for fur-
ther concentration by opening new markets for centralized industries.
This results in the collapse of small-scale industries serving more limi-
ted and localized markets in urban and rural areas in such regions. Fur-
thermore, most transportation innovations of this nature enhance physical
mobility and facilitate increased migration.
**Often, the techniques used favor gradual change, as in Western cities,
allowing for relative equilibrium. In situations where change or growth
is very rapid, as is the case in Baghdad, Basra, and in most cities in
developing countries, such models cannot function adequately. In the
words of Britton Harris, "such models tell you what's going to happen if
nothing happens."
plans, but they still go on to produce an equally static and dated plan.
Some additional weaknesses in the Master Plan process are as
follows:
-lack of appreciation of the fluid and dynamic
nature of urban phenomena and little consider-
ation of their inter-dependence with other
sectors (either ignoring them, or assuming
programme inputs from economics and demography
without feedback), and other scales (rural and
regional) which, amongst their elements, makes
projections even more inaccurate.
-insistence on high amenity standards in urban
centres results in limited allocations elsewhere
due to the scarcity of resources.* Only recently
has such physical planning become more sensitive
to the particular local needs and resources,
but still with only superficial consideration of
the consequences of its activities on equity
(e.g., on income distribution) or on economic
growth.
-inattention to costs and the apolitical view of
the process often stymies action and implementation,
culminating in general neglect of and apathy to
Master Plans; after all, planning is primarily a
process of choice, and it should therefore be
designed so that the process by which decisions
are taken do not remain entirely outside the scope
of comprehension or implementation (that is, some
remain tied to long term considerations).
-the lack of participation (particularly bad in the
case of the Baghdad Master Plan**) and the imposition
of decisions from above.
*For example, in the United States, housing costs are about $30./sq. foot.
Applying American or European standards to Iraq (or other developing
countries) with 1/10 of the per capita income, does not make much sense,
especially when cultural requirements vary. The point is that standards
should have some relationship to the local social and economic circum-
stances.
**The terms of reference allocated 6 months for elaboration of the con-
cept + 1 month for comments, coordination and approval; followed by 6
months for the final plan preparation + 1 month for formal acceptance.
This time span is so brief for such a large and important job as to make
It is interesting that criticism of the Master Planning process
bears so much resemblance to those of National Economic Planning dis-
cussed earlier. Expansion on a few specific issues concerning the
Baghdad Master Plan sheds further light on the inherent weakness in its
process.
The consultants subdivided Iraq into 3 major regions(North, Central,
and South), but nowhere in the report was there any economic, social, or
even physical analysis which leads to this division. Thus, the crucial
step of determining Baghdad's regional context was not only superficial,
but it omitted critical interrelationships. Their specific subordination
of regional agriculture and the surrounding rural settlements and towns
to the needs of Baghdad does not consider the resulting increased migra-
tion* and greater regional inequalities, or any balance of payment prob-
lems (due to probable increased food imports). Further myopia is appar-
ent when the report mentions that the regional considerations are only
spatial and not economic. It is generally accepted that most spatial
decisions have both social and economic impacts.
a mockery of the whole process. Thus, during the interim 1 month alloca-
ted for official consultations, only superficial participation would have
been possible, let alone any participation by citizens.
*This has been an ongoing process for many years, and according to census
figures for Baghdad Muhafadha (very much smaller than the Baghdad region
determined by consultants), the urban population grew as follows:
1947 500,000 pop. =10.5% of country's population,
1957 1,000,000 pop. =16.6% of country's population,
1965 1,500,000 pop. =18.3% of country's population.
A massive 60 percent of this growth is made up from immigration, repre-
senting an excessively high migration rate and concentration (absorbing
42 percent of total rural-urban migration in these years.)
At this high level of aggregation, the Baghdad region (as defined
by the consultants), comprises 53 percent of the country's total popula-
tion (in 1965), or 4.5 million people, of which 2.4 million are urban.
This larger region extends Baghdad's nodality and dominance to an even
larger area, ignoring the numerous important cities within this region,
(Baquba, Hilla, Kerbela, Kut, Najaf, Ramadi and Samarra). In addition,
such aggregated figures cover over inequities, and make the task of
allocating benefits whe.re they are specifically needed even more diffi-
cult. Furthermore, their projections for 1990 (19.3 million for Iraq)
show increasing concentration in the Baghdad agglomeration (city and
suburbs) with 4.9-5.3* million or 70-75 percent (up from 62 percent in
1965) of the total population of the Baghdad region (as defined by the
consultants). This represents an astonishingly high and increasing
level of primacy in this region, and indeed the country as a whole.
The following table records the overall population implications:
1975 1990
Iraq 11,500,000 19,300,000
Baghdad agglomeration
-low alternative 20.4% 15.8%
-high alternative 22.3% 22.8%
*comprising a concentric (or accretive) central city of 3.2 million
+ a system of settlements in suburban zones
+ a system of satellites within 25 km of the Central Business District
(CBD) of Baghdad
The choice of 3.2 million as a target was partly because at 3.5 million
large capital expenditure on tracked transport becomes necessary (i.e.,
threshold analysis), but they fail to mention that this is the result of
an accretive pattern proposed in the first place.
Concerning the city's employment distribution, it seems that in
1965 only 18 percent of the city's population were permanently employed.
This is very low compared to future activity rates that may go up to
30 percent as employment for women increases. This is clearly a real
problem, (considered in Part 2) however, the consultants' choice of
increasing employment in all sectors at rates in excess of population
growth is very distressing, as it will lead to even further concentration
of development in Baghdad at the expense of other regions. Thus, for
employment in administration, commerce, industry and construction, the
plan calls for a coefficient of growth of 2.2-2.5 (slightly higher than
population growth) and for transportation, education and health services
of 4.0.* The futility of such a planning process with little coordina-
tion lies in such examples, in which employment levels are established
in isolation, regardless of the financial means available, or the en-
suing regional inequities. It is to avoid such damaging mistakes that
the more decentralized and therefore locally relevant process within a
regional (and national) context proposed in Part 3 becomes so urgently
needed.
This concludes Part 1, which has analyzed and criticized the existing
situation in the light of the objectives of this thesis. The discussion
now turns to an examination of policies for the diffusion, and not con-
centration, of development benefits focussing on rural areas where the
principal problems and solutions are to be found.
*This decision calls for locating a massive 1/3 of the 1965-69 5 year de-
velopment plans' allocation for social and technical infrastructure in
Baghdad.
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PART 2
POLICIES FOR DIFFUSION IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT
4 - DIFFUSIQN THROUGH RURAL DEVELOPMENT
4.1 A PREVIEW
In Part 1, the extreme polarity of the settlement patterns and gov-
ernment investment in Iraq, and the resultant human inequities were dis-
cussed. Urbanisation has not only been rapid, but has been directed to
the few large cities.* This is partly because of the strong urban bias
of both physical and economic planning, transferred from the West, where
only some 5-10 percent of the population are employed in agriculture or
in rural areas, and where agriculture occupies a very small and diminish-
ing percentage of the GNP. In emulating the Western model, most develop-
ing countries including Iraq, have overlooked or aggravated the problems
of rural populations who generally comprise a massive 40-90 percent of
the total population. In Iraq, the figure is only 40 percent accord-
ing to the official statistics. However, in reality the figure is higher
(55 percent of the population are employed in agriculture), for a consid-
erable percentage of the nominally urban population live in very small
towns (well below the standard UN benchmark for urban population of
20,000).
As has been illustrated, Iraq has a surplus of labour, (unemployed
or underemployed), while suffering from a scarcity of management and
technical skills, as well as institutional resources, making their dis-
*UN International Social Development Review No. 1, UN, N.Y., 1972, p. 8.
Between 1947-57 the total population in Iraq grew by 3.15 percent
annually, while it grew by 5.2 percent in cities with over 100,000
people. The rate throughout the '60's was even higher.
68
tributi.on uneconQmic theoretically, if development in its present form
is the criteria. According to the latter viewpoint, smaller centres are
liable to find their justification more in a criteria of equity than
growth.* In this context, growth poles have been suggested as an alter-
native means of spreading development and counterbalancing the primate
city, while ensuring a high growth rate. Although they represent an im-
provement over present policies, this philosophy is still dualistic and
primarily concerned with the modern sector and high technology industry
located in medium sized centres or growth poles. If the assumption is
made that the aim of any progress should be to add welfare, security,
happiness and not just economic growth, then the so-called benefits a-
chieved by perpetuating social imbalances becomes very questionable.
The growth pole solution for lagging regions cannot be accepted, for
this thesis goes on to argue that with the resulting industrial enclave,
inter-regional equities may well increase, but at the expense of greater
intra-regional inequities. For example, by modernising industry in a
lagging region, unemployment may be augmented by driving out marginal
enterprises and substituting capital-intensive technology. At the same
time, such industries might become depressed by competition from the more
efficient industries in the more developed regions. Thus, a pattern of
internal colonialism will predominate, both between and within regions.
In section 4.2, the use of empirical studies demonstrates that diffusion
or filtering of development does not take place through the medium of
*W. Alonso, The Economics of Urban Size, quotes Koichi Mera's estimates
that equalisation of per capita income by prefecture in Japan would re-
duce National Income by 15-30 percent.
growth poles.
Other policies attempt to use transport investments as a development
tool for reducing income differences among areas. The underlying theory
being that by increasing the accessibility of lagging regions to the main
urban centres, their economic development will be accelerated. The prob-
lem is that by increasing accessibility between the lagging region and the
core, the lagging region's dependency upon the core is being increased,
facilitating further out-migration. In the words of Peter Gould, such
transportation networks "serve a space-bridging rather than space-organ-
ising function"*; that is, forming islands of development surrounded by
non-participating peripheries.
Again, the filtering theory cannot be supported by evidence. The
supposition of the 'trickle-down' or 'spread effect' of development from
primate cities, put forward by Hirschman and others** is one of the most
doubtful and questionable premises. Brutzkus and others*** provide evi-
dence showing that this has been achieved in affluent countries only by
depopulating the lagging regions, while in the more evenly populated
countries, such as France and Italy, the income gap actually increased
(between 1951-61).
Similar schisms between the ordering of social overhead capital (SOC)
*Peter Gould, "Tanzania 1920-63: The Spatial Impress of the Modernisation
Process" in World Politics, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan. 1970) pp. 149-170.
**Such as J. Friedman, Urbanization and National Development, (unpublished
paper), UCLA, 1970, p. 33.
***E. Brutzkus, op. cit., p. 88.
quotes J.G. Williamson, "Regional Inequality and the Process of National
Development", Regional Analysis, L. Needleman (Ed)., 1968; and W. Alonso
"Urban and Regional Imbalances in Economic Development", Ekistics, May 1969
and directly productive activity (DPA) exist in policies for development
where Hirschman* and others call for the provision of DPA first, saying
that it exerts strong pressure for the provision of SOC in subsequent
periods, while the provision first of SOC is termed permissive. Other
studies suggest the reverse.** The argument remains one of the modern
versus the traditional sector, and it misses the essential point, in not
discussing or considering the type and diffusability of the respective
DPA or SOC. The conditions under which diffusion occurs and benefits mul-
tiply is the principle issue tackled in this part.
This thesis rejects the policies that have been advocated by many
academics, *** for it is explicitly directed towards a complementary (and
not a competitive) approach towards urban-rural planning. The need to
combine planning of urban and rural aspects in a regional context, is
often only seen after the size and rate of expansion of an exploding ur-
ban metropolis makes it imperative,**** and not in reaction to the needs
of the rural population or the country as a whole. Policies for self-
sufficiency and self-development are the primary concern, and these are
only possible with the active participation of local populations.
*Hirschman, op. cit., pp. 89, 93.
**Studies by Marcial Echenique in Chile 1970-73 and in the United States
(Consad '69, '70)
***Hirschman, op. cit., pp. 12-17, where he states that a group-focussed
image of change is incompatible with any large-scale development aiming
at fundamental transformation and modernisation of the economy. It is the
very nature of such development that certain activities and communities
receive temporarily preferred treatment, and that social mobility will be
vastly increased as whole social classes and groups are created through
industrialisation and urbanisation.
****For example, in Spain, it was only after the negative impact of the
first two five-year plans, that the need to concentrate on rectifying the
ensuing urban problems became fully appreciated (in the third Five Year
Plan, 1971-75).
It is the contention of this thesis that only when rural developemnt
is seen as the prime mover, will regional development in the full sense of
the word, occur. Most of the main urban settlements in Iraq are of a suf-
ficient size and level of development to survive with far less government
investment. The priorities not just for agriculture but also for industry
must switch to rural areas, if we are to see a reduction of income in-
equalities and a proper diffusion of the fruits of development (social as
well as economic). This chapter deals with these policy issues, first
discussing the lack of diffusion taking place through growth poles, fol-
lowed by aspects of migration, and income and employment multipliers
necessary for the diffusion of benefits through rural development. The
emphasis on rural development by means of agriculture and rural industries
forms the heart of the policy proposals and is considered in the last
section of this chapter. The success of these policies is contingent on
the use of appropriate levels of technology and education, which is the
subject of Chapter 5.
*Attempts to reduce inter-regional income discrepancies by large regional
urban centres alone do not seem encouraging.- In a recent study of The
Strategy of Concentrated Decentralisation for Regional Growth in Italy,
1950-59, by P.S. Towfighi (MIT Ph.D. thesis) states that..."if a regres-
sion line is fitted to the rank size distribution of cities of 100,000
population and more, most of the metropolitan areas of the south will
fall above the line, which means a relatively high degree of metropoli-
tan concentration." When he analysed the impact of regional investment
during the same period, on income equalisation between the South and
North, Towfighi found out that "net investment in the South as a per-
centage of that in the North did not have a positive effect on per cap-
ita income of the South as a percentage of that in the North".
4.2 THE LACK OF DIFFUSION THROUGH GROWTH POLES
The current popular development strategy, growth pole theory, is
more or less of the same family as the present polarising and dualistic
development policies in Iraq. It purports to speed up the process of eco-
nomic growth and promote inter-regional balance through investment in a
few selected growth centres. However, the danger of a growth pole is that
it merely concentrates development in a single centre on a regional scale.
This centre then prospers in isolation, and even at the expense of the
surrounding areas. Thus, it may well promote greater inter-regional bal-
ance, but is more likely to have adverse effects on intra-regional equity*
In this section, a refutation is given to the contention that economic or
social growth will diffuse naturally from a medium-sized growth pole to
the area immediately surrounding that centre, and eventually beyond (which
is the measure of success), into the distant parts of the region (basi-
cally the rural areas).
The point is that with incentives limited to capital inputs, isolated
large-scale industrial enclaves which contribute little to regional devel-
opment tend to be enhanced. In fact, such enterprises benefit the more
advanced regions, such as Baghdad, and through it, the industrialised
world. Only by limiting most regional investment and incentives to agri-
cultural development and small-to medium-scale industry, distributed in
rural settlements, can a self-sustaining process of regional growth, with
increasing equalities and decreasing dependency on external .(extra-region-
*H.W. Richardson, The Costs and Benefits of Alternative Settlement Pat-
terns, or Are Cities Bad? UN,ECOSOC World Population Conference, 1974.
al and international) inputs be achieved.
In Iraqa, although it has never been specifically stated, both Basra
and, to a lesser extent, Mosul, are in effect growth poles. The inter-
esting point is that both these cities are surrounded by the most lagging
regions in Iraq (particularly in terms of out-migration, identified in
Part 2) namely, Dhok and Arbil around Mosul, and Muthanna, Thi--Qar and
Maysan North of Basra.
Growth poles were derived from Perroux' theory* which considered a
system whereby monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions were dominant.
He was more concerned with growth industries and not particularly inter-
ested in urban or regional growth centres, but as his doctrine acquired
currency, it became more loosely used. Perroux argued that change is
strongly associated with certain large-scale, fast-growing industries,
which he called 'propulsive', that is, industries that induce growth.
This idea was picked up and further developed by Hirschman,** who argued
that such industries, located in relatively few geographic areas and
having high forward and backward linkages (maximising other regional in-
puts and outputs), would induce development by means of continuous im-
balance or tensions of shortages and disequilibrium to trickle down to
surrounding areas.
Gunnar Myrdal's*** theory of circular causation, in which a cumula-
tive process or vicious circle of poverty, bad health, and little educa-
*See F. Ferroux, "Note sur la notion de Pole de croissance," in Economie
Applique 8, Nos. 1 and 2, 1955.
**See*A.O. Hirschman, op. cit.
***G. Myrdal, op. cit.
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tion, continuously press levels downwards, contains a number of concep-
tual tools that coincide with those of Hirschman. Myrdal's backwash
(migration) and 'spread effects', which depend on the complementarity of
industry, local raw material, and agricultural produce, has something in
common with Hirschman's polarisation and trickle-down effects. However,
Myrdal went on to talk about such processes as increasing inequities be-
tween regions in the poor countries, (where the polarising forces are
stronger than the trickle-down forces), while diminishing them in rich
countries. The higher the level of economic development that a country
has already attained, the stronger will the spread effects be, due to the
self-sustaining nature of the cumulative process at this stage. In '
effect, while Hirschman argues in favour of the need for initial geo-
graphical imbalance through the creation of development centres, Myrdal
argues that the mechanisms for spread effects should be strengthened
from the outset.
There are numerous proponents of growth poles* as agents of develop-
ment and diffusion, but the discussion to date, together with the empir-
ical studies that follow, and the subsequent discussion on rural settle-
ments and intermediate technology will hopefully refute these proposi-
tions. Unfortunately, all empirical studies on questions of diffusion
*e.g., J. Friedman, op. cit., argues that development occurs through a
discontinuous, but cumulative process of innovation originating from a few
centres of change (core regions) and that innovations are diffused to per-
ipheral areas or regions.
L. Rodwin, Nations and Cities, Houghton and Mifflin Co., Boston, 1970,
p. 7. , talks of growth poles in lagging regions as helping to spark a
transformation in the agricultural and cultural patterns of the hinter-
land.
from growth- poles ware, for lagging regions in tbe United States. It
seems that the unavailability of very detailed and disaggregated data
precludes undertaking such studies in most developing countries, and
certainly in Iraq. Application of their conclusions to Iraq cannot be
directly made, but the fact that they concluded on the whole negatively
provides a guideline.
Vida Nichols cites the following reasons for economic development
to continue to concentrate in the growth pole itself, rather than to
decentralise and diffuse:*
-There is considerable doubt as to whether dim-
inishing marginal returns to investment ever
set in for a prospering town. As yet, there
is little evidence to show that even the very
largest of metropolitan cities have reached
the point of diminishing marginal returns.
-Investment in the centre continues because as
Hirschman has suggested, "the investment oppor-
tunities of the centre are frequently over-as-
timated, and that people often fail to perceive
those of the periphery."
-Uncertainty about other investors' actions may
make it advisable to remain in a central loca-
tion capable of commanding the whole regional
market rather than risk losing a disproportion-
ate share of the market to a competitor more
centrally located than oneself, but this is
applicable only to a laissez-faire situation,
which is not the case in Iraq.
-Rural-urban migration is not necessarily bene-
ficial. It is usually age and education selec-
tive, and often results in a sadly depleted
rural population incapable of bringing about
the necessary adjustments to agricultural prac-
tise. There is strong evidence of this in Iraq.
-The demand for the primary (typically low order)
*V. Nichols, "Growth Poles, an Evaluation of their Propulsive Effect",
in Environment and Planning, London, Vol. 1, (1969). p. 195.
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goods of agricultural regions is generally
very inelastic, so the increased per capita
income of the growth pole is unlikely to in-
crease demand for the products of its hinter-
land. The additional income which does come
into the hands of the centre's population is
most likely to be spent on high order goods
found either in the centre itself or in still
larger cities outside the region. Increased
per capita income in the centre may even de-
crease purchases from the surrounding area
as more expensive goods (bought outside the
region) are substituted for those produced
locally. That is, it is only with the poorer
rural population, where an increase in income
is likely to be spent locally (achieving a
high multiplier).
This last point is of particular interest, because it brings up the
idea that there are two aspects to the problem of diffusion. On one
hand, there is the problem of the spread of growth from one town to the
other towns in the region, and on the other, there is the problem of get-
ting growth to spread from a growth pole to the rural parts of a region.
Obviously, the processes by which these two types of diffusion may be ex-
pected to be brought about are very different, and if a region is pri-
marily agricultural, the market towns within it may be comparatively au-
tonomous.
Nichols examined this very point for the period, 1950-1960, in
Georgia, then a lagging region based on a cotton economy, by empirically
testing the increase in 'median income'. Atlanta, the growth pole, had
a population of half a million, rendering it large for comparison with
Iraq. Nonetheless, the results showed marked spread effects (in incomes)
to a large area surrounding Atlanta, while for other towns in the state,
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those nearer Atlanta grew faster, adversely affecting the more distant
ones.* For the rural areas, there was a large increase in income in
those near Atlanta (implying agricultural mechanisation), but not for
more than half the state's rural areas in the South, where the effect
on income was actually negative. Nichols concluded that although in-
vestment in the growth pole had an effect on surrounding areas (urban
and rural), advantages were to be gained by injecting capital into lower-
order centres and the agricultural base itself, because increased incomes
in these areas will generate strong income multipliers in higher order
centres, but not the other way around.
Some more recent studies, again in the United States, were even
more conclusive regarding the lack of diffusion. A study by Yukhin on 64
development centres considered as growth centres by the 'Economic Develop-
ment Agency' indicated that spread effects from induced growth centres
are likely to be non-existent or at best, ambiguous.** Another study of
the degree to which industry in the Ozarks region has by-passed the rural
poor, concludes that "in-migrants tended to intervene between jobs and the
rural poor, who were the targets for the industrialisation programme in
the first place.*** That is, from the perspective of the unskilled rural
*Ibid., especially pp. 198-199, and p. 205.
**Yukhin, in N.M. Hansen, Location Preferences, Migration and Regional
Growth: A Study of the South and South West United States, Praeger, N.Y.,
1973, pp. 18-20, used four independent variables of: growth centres
personal income growth rate for 1959-1968 and 1950-1959; population size
of growth centre; and ratio of growth centre to hinterland population.
These were regressed against the dependent variable, namely the hinter-
lands' personal income growth rate, (1959-1968)
***Ibid., p. 20.
poor in the Qzarks, such programmes urgently need to be supplemented by
auxiliary measures in human resource development.
Another study, by Irwin Gray on employment effects of new indus-
tries (aluminum reduction and rolling mill) in rural West Virginia,
found minimal benefits to local population. He concluded that "more
local people could be at work at the expense of in-migrants, if they had
had the necessary minimum education or training."* Thus, any industrial
policy must at the outset be fully guided by the local social (educa-
tional) and economic circumstances.
Due to the above failures in diffusion from growth centres, Hansen
concludes that rather than concentrating investment in the worst areas in
lagging regions, (rural areas or small cities), there are numerous inter-
mediate sized cities (100,000-500,000) whose primary function could be to
benefit people from lagging areas as migration centres rather than as
generators of spread effects. In other words, he is calling for increas-
ed mobility and depopulation, which is precisely the reverse of what this
thesis recommends. Perhaps this is right for a highly developed indus-
trialised laissez-faire country like the U.S., but for Iraq it is a non-
starter. In support of his theory, he cites a study** which concluded
that the more efficient migration centres in terms of increasing the in-
comes of migrants from lagging areas, had populations of 200,000-500,000,
and tended to be outside the lagging areas, but not in big distant cities.
In fact, of 45 growth centres for the study areas within the Coastal
*Ibid., p. 21.
*Ibid., pp. 149-151.
Plaing Qzarks, FQur Corners Area, Upper Great Lakes, 30 were outside the
immediate study areas. Only for Appalachia were 10 of the 14 centres
within the study area confines.
Another example can be seen in the case of Ciudad Guyana, where,
according to Utria,* the national economy has benefitted (in aggregate
terms) but at the expense of the population of the region (by marginal-
ising the non-industrial economy).
To conclude, it would seem that in Iraq the injection of effort and
investment in lower-order centres and in the agricultual base is more
likely to generate stronger income multipliers and better distribution
throughout the region, than will a growth-pole policy narrowly defined.
In this, a key distinction must be made between the spatial incidence of
new development, and its transmission or diffusion through space; that is,
the rural areas. The diffusion of new development or innovation takes
place within particular social systems or groups, by two processes, the
first by the dissemination of information, (the interpersonal**media is
held to be the most important), followed by the more complex process of
adopting the innovation (which is a learning process). In the context of
Iraq, the key point is the requirement for a qualitative change of tech-
nology, namely, the need for a more appropriate technology and a type of
local organisation. relevant to the existing situation, in terms of skills,
education, etc.
*Utria, in International Development Review, No. 3, UN, N.Y., 1972.
**T. Hermansen, in A, Kuklinski (Ed.), Growth Poles and Growth Centre,
Mouton and Co., Netherlands, 1972, pp. 51-52.
At this stage, before dealing with diffusion through rural develop-
ment, (that is, agriculture and rural industry) it is important to con-
sider two issues, namely migration and the multiplier effect, where the
type and location of investment become critical to achieving rural de-
velopment. The necessary or appropriate technology and associated edu-
cation policies are considered in Chapter 5.
4.3 MIGRATION
The previous section considered the negative effect of growth poles.
Its premise of actively encouraging some migration to regional urban
centres actually results in increased overall volumes of migration by in-
creasing the number of options available to the potential migrants*
(all other things being equal). Equally, as discussed earlier, such
centres on their own tend to become enclaves of development and few, if
any, reverse benefits accrue to the rural areas denuded of their most
able people. In this very brief section, means to prevent out-migration
from rural areas are discussed in the framework of policies emphasising
rural development.
Most migrants are only aware of their individual costs and benefits
associated with moving to another place, but are most unlikely to be
aware of the resultant costs (and benefits) to society as a whole. For
example, with the ensuing congestion and added strain on the infra-
structure and social capital of the chosen city, or of the potentially
*See W. Alonso, The System of Intermetropolitan Population Flows,
(unpublished paper), Berkeley, 1971.
negative effect on rural areas. As most migrants bring their families,
the demand for social capital will be very great.* A similar situation
arises when industry is located in major cities, leading to heavy polar-
isation and congestion. Furthermore, such development does not take
account of social cost due to environmental damage, for example, with
pollution caused by a concentration of industry. The point is that full
social costs are more likely to be adequately dealt with at the regional
than the national level, assuming the active involvement or participa-
tion of local groups, which is the only sure way of acquiring more know-
ledge of the area, its people, problems and needs. Otherwise, the re-
gional planners may become most concerned with keeping up with the pri-
mate city (as is the case with growth poles).
Migration is also promoted by compulsory education, which although
laudible, is not balanced by more investment in rural areas, and secon-
dary cities to provide the better jobs demanded.** As these rising ex.
pectations are not met in the area or region, migration increases and
often results in structured unemployment and impotence in the urban
areas versus the previous sense of community, identity, etc.*** The
point is that the education itself is misdirected, with its emphasis
on abstract or general knowledge that is often irrelevant to the local
*The situation is clearly explained by the relative balance between the
male and female populations in the relevant regions in Iraq.
**Educational aspects are dealt with more fully in section 5.4.
***Questions relating to life-style and socially restrictive rural life
with respect to migration are not directly dealt with here, due to limi-
tations of time and the scope of this thesis; however, they are clearly
implicit in most of the argument.
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situation and needs, which frequently raises false expectations of 'bet-
ter' or more urban jobs.
Migration can also be facilitated- by certain types of transporta-
tion investments, such as in major routes to lagging regions. To take
the Southern Euphrates regions of Qasisiya, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar as an
example, they lack an adequate paved road system and are the most so-
cially and economically backward. These communities have suffered from
high rates of migration and lagging agricultural development (partly
because the marketing of agricultural products becomes very inefficient
and difficult). To generate greater development activity on a regional
level, a priority is clearly to first develop a minimal road infra-
structure in the regions so as to facilitate the marketing of agricul-
tural produce. However, (and this cannot be over-emphasized), improved
transportation on its own in these areas (that is, without the comple-
mentary rural development policies proposed), will only facilitate fur-
ther migration and encourage increased dependency on the main cities
(as the roads effectively expand their markets.
In response, this thesis calls for the expenditure of additional
national resources in the lagging regions identified earlier, which
would also benefit the Baghdad region, as the very high social costs
consequent on continous rapid migration (to Baghdad) would be reduced.
This assumes that investment is not just in regional cities, but more
so in agriculture and numerous rural settlements (as will be discussed
later). This policy need not cost more per se, as it requires a re-
direction of expenditure away from Baghdad and the three other major
cities, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk, to other regions. It would also de-
crease urban congestion, reduce pollution and provide a more efficient
use of the national transportation system. In other words, only a pol-
icy of concentrating development in agriculture and numerous rural
settlements, is likely to neutralise the pull of Baghdad and the three
other major cities. This will also require certain complementary meas-
ures to curb out-migration.
This policy has been, to some extent, successfully applied in Cuba,*
where Havana's growth has been markedly slowed, and its relative size,
presently 1-3/4 million people, has diminished as a percentage of the
country's total population. This was achieved by putting most new pro-
ductive investment in second-order cities and rural areas, and by severe
locality based food rationing, so as to make regions more self-suffi-
cient. Some of the Chinese measures** to influence population movements
also have some relevance to Iraq. Their policies are motivated by com-
munity self-reliance and equality of access to resources and facilities.
They include:
-prompt registration requirements of incoming
migrants (perhaps this is not as difficult to
control in Baghdad as it may seem at first
sight, for the government is the prime employ-
er and therefore, should be able to enforce
such a law).
-instruction of rural cooperatives to welcome
*D. Barkin, The Redistribution of Consumption in Cuba , 1968, p. 90.
**International Social Development Review No. 1, UN, N.Y.
back migrants and facilitate their read-
justment, providing food, housing, etc.,
which is eased by state subsidies. However,
this programme of transfer or 'voluntary'
out-migration of young people from city to
rural area has been strongly resisted by
some; however, it seems that close to 25
million students, party cadres, medical
and industrial workers and others have
been transferred, willingly or unwillingly,*
(a similar, but perhaps less severe approach
should be encouraged in Baghdad);
-instruction of urban workers not to flaunt
the attractions of urban life during their
periodic visits to villages (control of this
aspect would seem to be very difficult, esp-
ecially in the early stages, before local
organizations have been sufficiently built
up; however, television and radio should not
be used to glorify the capital, as at present,
but rather in educating and disseminating
knowledge to the rural areas);
-ideologising education in villages to help rural
populations understand the importance of agri-
cultural production for national income and
development (which makes sense in Iraq);
-revision of urban subsidies and initiation of
rural subsidies (which is of prime importance
for Iraqi rural settlements);
-decentralisation of cities, that is, to move
centrally located enterprises to rural areas
selectively and over a long period.**
*See article by the Editor, "Peking's Programme to Move Human and Mater-
ial Resources to the Countryside", in Current Scene, Sept. 15, 1969,
Vol. VII, No. 18. p. 2 .
**See R. Thompson,"Containing the City", in Architectural Design, March,
1974, London, p. 51., where the transfer of a timber factory plus its
2,000 employees out of the centre of Chansha is discussed. NB: with
relocation plans, the enterprise must allow for the cost of new homes,
shops, schools, recreation facilities, as well as the cost of the fact-
ory, all of which is the financial responsibility of the enterprise
(again, a state subsidy aids the relocation).
In addition to these potential policies to prevent out-migration
from the rural areas in Iraq, the overall lack of intellectual stimulus
motivates migration among the young and educated, which calls for the
establishment of dispersed cultural centres. Some studies* indicate
that return migration is usually associated with a more or less guaran-
teed access to land or alternative means of livelihood. As the popula-
tion employed in agriculture is high at present, there is less demand
for such labour. However, the introduction or expansion of labour-in
tensive cropping (e.g., rice) and appropriate technology in agriculture,
together with alternative employment in rural settlements,** might be an
inducement for returning migrants, as well as preventing further out-mi-
gration. Such policies indicate a definite move to restore the balance
between urban and rural life, and are very strongly advocated in this
thesis. The full policy implications of migration cannot be fully dealt
with in the space of a few pages, but the essential points of relevance
to the forthcoming discussion have been made.
4.4 THE MULTIPLIER EFFECT
The multiplier concerns the direct and indirect effect of invest-
ment, where often the indirect effects are larger than the direct ones.
*J. Nelson, Sojourners Versus New Urbanites, The Urban Institute, Wash-
ington D.C., 1973.
**W. Alonso, op. cit., argues that there is no fundamental pull towards
larger urban areas, but there is a significant pull towards higher in-
comes; i.e., the flow towards large cities is in response to higher in-
comes. Additionally, according to Hirschman, op. cit., p. 188, the
actual pay differences between centres in developed and underdeveloped
regions, are likely to overstate the real productivity differences in
the most skilled trades. In other words, a government policy of evening
out incomes between similar employment facilities in all regions, would
be very beneficial for decentralisation.
As in the case of migration, it is an essential issue to be discussed in
considering the diffusion of development to rural areas, particularly re-
garding the types of investment and linkages between them. The discussion
here leads into the concluding section of this chapter on rural develop-
ment and its settlements. It is also an essential element of the forth-
coming chapter, which looks into the means of diffusion through approp-
riate technology and education.
The tendency is often to see and become conscious only of the visi-
ble, and to forget the invisible things that are making the visible pos-
sible, and keep it going. For example, the expansion of the beer industry
in Iraq may not only lead to the expansion of existing brewing capacity
in different regions, but also to increased production of bottles (at, for
example, the glass factory in Ramadi, or the creation of a new one else-
where*), and increased demand for barley, which increases the farmers'
income and spending power.. .and so on, creating a whole chain. In this
section, the primary concern is with regional and local (as opposed to
national), multipliers, as they concern the benefits in income and employ-
ment accruing to particular regions or localities. The higher the multi-
plier, the greater will be the indirect effects of investment. The rela-
tionship between multiplier effects and income distribution is similar.
Generally speaking, the higher the income, the lower will be the
marginal propensity to consume, that is, any further increase in income
*A.0. Hirschman, op. cit., p. 103, says that a good rule of thumrb is that
a new industry can be established as soon as existing demand is equivalent
to half the economic size of the plant, and that the additional demand
follows later.
will not all be spent on consumption, and will therefore have less effect
on other sectors. The contrary situation arises with any increase in in-
come for poor people, as it is liable to be spent (and not'saved) on the
kind of goods that may be expected to involve few imports and which are
possibly produced within the region itself. Therefore, the indirect stim-
ulting effects will be high. The latter proposition has the merits of
being socially just and economically sound, and is strongly advocated in
this thesis as a necessary policy to decrease dualism and urban-rural in-
equities by emphasizing rural development. This concept also implies
that the greater the degree of self sufficiency of a region, the greater
will be the multiplier effect, because of fewer leakages out of the
region.
The implication of the discussion to date is that it is important
not to select locations for industry on economic grounds alone, as this
would increase polarisation, but also to consider the social returns con-
sequent on investment in the lagging regions in general, and the rural
areas in particular. This point is continuously emphasised in this the-
sis, that is, the full range of physical and social implications of eco-
nomic planning must be considered in advance. Unfortunately, with few
exceptions, some of which are discussed here, industrial location in Iraq
has been governed by considerations of short-term profitablility, that is
the choice of maximum commercial returns as opposed to social benefits
has led to increased polarisation. In the long term, the situation is
further aggravated by such policies, whereas both commercial and social
benefits are achieved if industry is decentralised. Henceforth, unless
otherwise stated, reference to industry will be for rural towns and
villages.
It follows from the discussion to date that the types of industry
having high multipliers are those using local rather than imported raw
materials, and also industries with high income elasticities. In the
West, foodstuff industries generally have low income elasticities, but
as Iraq is not self-sufficient in food, and has a large regional role to
play as a supplier of foodstuffs to the Gulf region, this problem is not
likely to apply for a long time (this is not to mention the importance
of import substitution of foodstuffs). For this and other reasons (dis-
cussed previously and in the following section), it is of prime impor-
tance to invest in agriculture.
Large and/or sophisticated high technology industries require care-
ful siting or relocation (from major centres) in that such plants located
in a small town in a lagging region will probably require imported labour
from other regions (examples of this phenomenon were considered in sec-
tion 4.2). In other words, the local inhabitants will only benefit in-
directly, and such policies are likely to result in social friction. An
example of this can be seen with the initial development of the high-
technology, high-skill oil industry in Kirkuk (the point is emphasised,
as Kirkuk was not a small town or village at the time). Its establish-
ment led to considerable monetary gains, which, unfortunately, were dis-
tributed so narrowly that they resulted in large inequalities and con-
siderable social friction. When such industries are required, attention
should be focussed on their integration with the social surroundings
(which includes utilizing primarily local personnel). It should be noted
that this requires a decentralised process, and coordination between so-
cial, economic, and physical elements.
Some such industries are clearly required in Iraq, a country with
vast supplies of hydrocarbons and other minerals, but the point is not
specifically to extend this philosophy to the remainder of the develop-
ment programme. In such cases, we need to learn from the Chinese ap-
proach of 'walking on two legs',* which combines capital-intensive me-
thods in the modern sector in urban areas, with labour-intensive methods
in agriculture and indigenous industry in rural areas. This simultaneous
development is still dualistic, but it yields a high level of producti-
vity in the modern sector while mobilising untapped local resources and
gradually accelerating growth of agriculture and small-to-medium-level
industries in rural areas. This stress on local plants accords closely
with the effort to decentralise.**
The following examples clearly illustrate the very positive multi-
plier effect (both direct and indirect) of four large industries, re-
cently established in Iraq, namely the paper mill in Jazain, and the
sugar refineries in Mosul, Sulaimaniya and Amara. However, the argument
*Pi-Chao Chen, Over-Urbanization: The Rustication of Urban Youth and
the Politics of Rural Transformation, as evidence of decentralisation
in China, there is no direct control of factories by ministries; in
addition, costs are transferred from the national budget to local levels.
**Pi-Chao Chen, op. cit.
will return to the limited number of such potential industries and
therefore the need for a cheaper, more diffuse approach involving both
agriculture and small-to-medium-scale industries, which implies the
use of more locally appropriate technologies.
A 20 million dollar paper mill was constructed in Jazain, in the
Thi-Qar region, just north of Basra, using reeds from the marshes as
raw material. The plant is highly sophisticated and employs 800 skilled
labourers. The reed cutting process chosen could have been equally
sophisticated, requiring more skilled labour and resulting in few bene-
fits to the local inhabitants, namely, the marsh Arabs. What is re-
markable is the fact that the plant actually uses 5,000 marsh Arabs for
the cutting and transportation of reeds to the factory. This policy is
clearly laudable, but where it can be criticised is in the choice of
location, and more so in its high cost. Regarding the former, Qurnah*
would have been a better location, and equally accessible to the marshes.
With respect to cost, the mill works out at roughly ID 3500 (about
$10,000) per employee. In chapter 5 it will be argued that much more
employment could have been provided with such a large budget.
Similarly successful, but less expensive, ventures in sugar re-
fining were implemented in Mosul, Sulaimaniya and Amara, using local
raw materials. The local farmers were encouraged to switch to beet su-
gar cane production, whereas it would have been initially cheaper to im-
port raw sugar and locate the factories near a port, but the multiplier
*Qurnah, a town north of Basra, has a higher level of existing economic
and social infrastructure, while Jazain is a tiny village.
and distributive effects would have been negligible. In this manner,
industry can have a very direct effect in raising the standard of living
in particular regions.
There are, however, a number of critical considerations here. The
first concerns the relative shortage of skilled labour. This is a clear
indicator of polarising tendencies, particularly concerning high-skill
industries, and is exacerbated by the shortage and uneven distribution of
technical institutes. There is therefore a definite need for more tech-
nical training colleges, particularly when tied to new industries being
developed in lagging regions. The second is concerned with the impossi-
bility of presently obtaining mass employment in such high-skill, high-
cost industries. A need is therefore established for more broadly based
employment policies in rural areas in agriculture and agro-industries.
In this context, Hirschman quotes Aubrey*, who favors small industry in
rural or small town settings, on the grounds that you economise on over-
head capital expenditure such as water, power, housing, etc. required by
urbanised industry and its labour force. High levels of skill are not
demanded. These issues, concerning rural development through agriculture
and rural industry are now discussed.
4.5 DIFFUSION THROUGH RURAL DEVELOPMENT, IN AGRICULTURE AND RURAL
INDUSTRY
The failure of present policies to achieve equitable development has
*Aubrey: "Small Industry in Economic Development," in Social Research
No. 18, (Sept., 1951); in A.O. Hirschman: The Strategy of Economic De-
velopment, p. 44.
been wall documented and discussed in the previous section. In this sec-
tion and the following chapter, the core of the policy proposals for the
diffusion of development are to be found. At first sight, it might seem
that the object of rural development policy is solely to increase agri-
cultural production and farmers' incomes. But this would be altogether
too simple. The emphasis needs to be on agriculture and rural settle-
ments comprising service facilities and small-to-medium-scale industries
of appropriate technology. The question of employment in rural areas is
particularly important, for as we have seen, only a small portion of the
growing labour force can be absorbed in the urban areas.
The assignment of first priority to the rural areas does not imply
that industrialisation has to be delayed, per se; rather, industry is
mainly linked to agriculture, which will, in the long term, enable a
faster industialisation of the entire economy. The concentration on agri-
culture and rural industry creates an infrastructure in rural areas and
builds a technically trained labour force to work in future industrial
establishments. The location of industry in rural areas offers many other
advantages, such as reducing migration and cultural uprooting (any tran-
sition to a rural industrial life from agriculture is more likely to occur
without sharp disruption of family life and traditions). It also lowers
the real cost of labour, housing, and other services, and avoids many of
the diseconomies and social disadvantages of congestion in the cities.
Most of these yield immediate or short-term benefits, while in the long
term, faster agricultural development, with diminishing urban and rural
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inequities, and balanced regional development, is achieved.
An important aspect of the inter-relationship between agriculture
and rural industry is that, in addition to supplying goods required by
the agricultural sector, the industrial workers living in the rural areas
create local markets for agricultural products. This factor is of con-
siderable importance in Iraq, where the local transportation and mar-
keting systems are not well organised. Furthermore, such industries
provide resources for investment in agriculture by offering employment
to peasant families. Growth of rural industry is also likely to be a
stabilising factor for rural society* as well as providing employment to
the keener elements of rural population who are more prone to migration.
However, (and this is crucial), agricultural development makes more
demands than any other policy. Rural development requires efficiency and
widespread coordination of programmes from different sectors, agencies,
and ministries, as well as interaction between local groups and organi-
zations, and the higher scales (regional, national). Furthermore, its
natural geographic and cultural dispersion renders local participation
the only adequate means of ensuring the relevancy of policies. These
aspects of the planning process will be considered in greater depth in
Part 3.
An underlying assumption of rural development as advocated in this
thesis, is that the increased rural productivity is translated into in-
creased incomes for peasants (the present dichotomy between rural and.
*See D.R. Gadgil in R.Weitz (Ed.), Rural Planning in Developing Coun-
tries, pp. 90-91.
urban wages has already been discussed in Part 1). It is therefore
essential to the success of the policies proposed here that the prin-
ciple of exchange of industrial goods for agricultural produce is based
on more equal values. Clearly, price policies involve conflicts and
difficult compromises in allocating incentives between agriculture and
industry and urban and rural areas.* In the context of this thesis,
price policy must be based on guarantees, not just to the peasant, but
also to rural industry.
Rural settlements and their economic and social functions should
not be planned as individual units, but as components of a system of
settlements. Specialisation and interdependence among villages is an
important condition for developing a dynamic rural society. It is an
alliance of mutual benefit and assistance. In other words, a narrow
focus on a village, while ignoring its broader surroundings, will not
contribute much to rural development. That is, the rural settlement
policy proposed here is not intended to dominate and exploit the sur-
rounding countryside, but rather to serve as a catalyst and service
(technical, commercial, marketing), educational and processing centre.
In addition, a very local bias diverts attention away from the better
regional approach, which is able to tap the superior resources of the
national government as well as encouraging the participation of a wide
range of rural communities, organisations and authorities. A decentral-
*N.B. The specific incentives, subsidies, tax waivers, etc., gill not
be discussed fully in this paper.
ized planning process is implicit in these arguments. An important bene-
fit of the policy of proliferation of small plants in rural settlements
includes the means to assist in maintaining and repairing tools and ma-
chinery locally. The promotion of spread effects from these settlements
is then a matter of choosing the type of investment and means of produc-
tion that both stimulates employment and production in the hinterland
and trade through the centres. It is important to note that it is from
such revitalised villages and towns that a broader spectrum of rural
leadership will emerge, as part of the decentralisation process advo-
cated here.
At the heart of this drive for rural development is the desire for
local self-sufficiency, better income distribution, and the provision of
sizeable employment possibilities. Rural industry can be divided into
two scales comprising a few large industries similar to those identified
in section 4.4, and numerous small scale industries of intermediate
technology. The concern here is with the latter type, requiring smaller
investment, simpler construction, and giving.quick results while employ-
ing a level of technology requiring less skill and therefore easier to
assimilate. These can be subdivided into agro-processing, agro-support-
ing, and household consumer industries.
The type of industry most likely to impart a strong impulse to
agricultural development is that applied to processing and marketing
farm produce.* It is also a crucial means of integrating agriculture
*See R.Weitz,"Regional Planning for Rural Development"in R. Weitz (Ed.),
Rural Development in a Changing World, M.I.T. Press, p. 112.
and industry. Processing industries have three important advantages,
namely: a considerable saving on transportation costs, as most agri-
cultural products lose weight and bulk in processing; considerable re-
duction of the amount of wastage or perishability, which directly in-
creases local income and also reduces transportation costs; and most
important, its use of agricultural raw material, which means it can be
geographically dispersed.
Agro-supporting industries such as producing farm implements, pumps
and pipes, are next in priority. Small chemical fertiliser plants are
rural industries which seem unsuitable for Iraq, due to the lack of phos-
phates and the concentration of carbohydrates in a few areas. Other
labour-intensive industries appropriate for rural areas are those re-
quiring large amounts of space (such as leather, bricks, and cement),
abundant supplies of water (such as textile finishing, canning, pre-
serving, and dehydrating fruits and vegetables) ,* and having high elec-
tricity demands (calling for location near energy sources).
Additional rural employment, particularly with regard to seasonal
unemployment or underemployment in agriculture, is to be found in the
reintroduction of labour-intensive public works (such as roads, irriga-
tion and drainage canals, buildings) as a major tool of development
policy. The creation of rural infrastructure on a large scale also
contributes to the build-up of the productive capital of the rural
economy and its region. Furthermore, our assumption is that dispersed
*See ~. Malgavkar, Ibid., p. 132.
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and non-concentrated infrastructure does not call for large movements
of population. The increased demand for social services and administra-
tion, as well as in local consumer industries, will also add to the
employment opportunities. There is quite clearly no shortage of oppor-
tunities to greatly increase employment in both agriculture and industry
in rural areas.
To continue with the above policies for rural development in Iraq,
questions of size and location of rural settlements are now considered.
Determination of optimal settlement size is a very difficult issue.
Sizes for the larger regional towns or cities have been discussed and
debated endlessly by numerous people.* However,
the criteria have neither been specific, clear, or conclusive, and their
range has varied from 25,000-500,000 plus. This point will not be ar-
gued here endlessly, as there can be no conclusion; besides, the main
argument is concerned more with the small-to-medium-size rural towns and
villages. Perhaps, rather than determine an abstract range of sizes
based on inconclusive argument, it would be more appropriate to take the
actual situation in Iraq as a starting point, and worry about the rate
*In W. Alonso: The Economics of Urban Size (unpublished paper) Berkeley,
1970, a range of 250,00-500,000 minimum is cited for the U.S, by B. Berry
In E, Brutzkus, op. cit., Colin Clark is cited at 175,000 for pre-war
England; and two ranges of 20,000-50,000 and 200,000-400,000 for North
France; and 20,000-200,000 (with allowances for 10,000-20,000 and 200,000
-400,000) in the USSR. While Fernandez Cavada, The Problem of Integra-
tion of Physical Planning into Economic Planning in the Case of Spain,
UN, N.Y., 1973, cites 100,000-500,000 amd 25,000-250,000 for the first
and second Five Year Plans in Spain.
of change or growth. The following table generalises the settlement
pattern in the five Northern regions* of Iraq for 1970.
Bearing in mind the earlier discussion, the conclusion is that the
focus of the particular planning effort called for here should be on the
23 rural towns (but not all at once) in that they service, or should do,
not only the rural population of the five regions for most of their
needs, but also a sizeable part of the nominally urban population. The
reason for concentrating on these small towns rather than on villages,
is mainly because Iraq's rural population is very widely scattered in
over 14,000 villages, many with populations of less than 500.** Any
concentration on them as the prime movers, would quite simply be well
beyond the administrative and organisational potential of the country,
not to mention the problem of viable size, or the difficulties concern-
ing traditional conservatism at the small village scale.
The present catchment populations of these 23 towns (see Appendix 2)
vary roughly from 20,000-over 100,000, and in effect they form dist-
ricts (qadas). Their distribution in serving primarily the rural pop-
ulation within the Five Northern regions, seems satisfactory; however,
there are five major gaps in terms of localities with no rural towns of
5,000 population or over. If such a rural settlement network is assumed,
*Chosen partly because the available data are limited to these regions,
but also because they include lagging regions and are the focus of the
Kurdish problem.
**See UN, Popular Participation in Development: Emerging Trends in
Community Development, UN, N.Y., 1971, p. 207
URBAN AND RURAL TOWNS AND CITIES IN THE FIVE NORTHERN REGIONS OF IRAQ,*
1970 (All population figures are in thousands - '000)
Region Population Total Population Settlement Pattern
(Urban=u; (all towns and cities
Ru-ral=r) mentioned come out of
-the urban population
column)
Arbil 150 u 400 Arbil 101 pop.
250 r + 4 towns from 5-10 pop.
Dhok 50 u 240 Dhok 18 pop.
109 r + 2 towns from 7-14 pop.
Nineveh 430 u 870 Mosul 310 pop.,
440 r Tal Afar 46 pop.
+ 5 towns from 7-11 Pop.
Kirkuk 265 u 520 Kirkuk 191 pop.,
255 r Tuz Khurmatu 18 pop.
+ 6 towns from 5-8 pop.
Sulaimaniya 175 u 460 Sulaimaniya 103 pop.
285 r + 6 towns from 5-14 pop.
Total 1070 u 2490 4 regional cities from
1420 r 100-300 pop.
1 regional town at 50 pop.
23 rural towns from
5-15 pop.**
*Source, Appendix 2.
**With two exceptions, one at 16 and the other at 18.
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these gaps can be removed by adding five more settlements (presently
below populations of 4,500), namely, Shirqat, Qayara, and Shimal in
Nineveh province, where each expanded settlement would have a theoreti-
cal catchment of 50,000 population; Makmour in Arbil province, support-
ing up to 65,000 population; and Amadiya in Dhok, with a potential
catchment of 60,000. In Iraq, there is little to justify the commit-
ment of effort and resources to new settlements or towns, when existing
communities will serve the purpose. That is not to say that new towns
are bad, but simply that Iraq, inhabited for millenia, has an abundance
of existing towns on which to build.
These rural towns would form the nucleus for the government's agri-
culture policy in providing the requisite services to the surrounding
cooperative farms (technical advice, supplies, credit, and marketing)..
It is at this level that planning for the district can be coordinated
and integrated with the regional and national processes. The decen-
tralisation implicit in the previous arguments and discussed in more
detail in Part 3, enhances the effective participation of the vil-
lagers at the earliest stages of planning. This is particularly im-
portant, as the government's attitude that 'it knows best' and can im-
pose a cooperative spirit and organisation upon the peasants, has, in
practise, failed in Iraq.* The devolution of some powers to the local
level, which coordinates the villages, ensures a certain sense of local
identity and will go a long way towards enhancing the implementation of
*J.L. Simmons, op. cit., pp. 7-15.
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these proposals by making them more locally specific and taking account
of socio-cultural circumstances.
By planning with, and not against, local social conditions, the
process of diffusion can be eased and enhanced. For example, the ex-
tended family, which plays an active role in Iraqi village life, with
the nuclear family presently existing within it, is often construed as
being disadvantageous to 'modernisation'. However, the extended family
structure can provide the security and context within which change can
be more readily assimilated. In the words of Peter Marris,*
"We assimilate new experiences by placing them
in the context of a familiar reliable construc-
tion of reality...", and "...the more secure we
feel, the more 6pen we are to experience, so
long as we believe it will enlarge, rather than
undermine, our understanding."
The full importance of taking cognizance of the local social environ-
ment and ecology to avoid social and psychological crises, will
become clearer after the next chapter on appropriate levels of technol-
ogy and education.
It should be apparent that the infusion- of the appropriate social
and economic capital into agriculture and specific rural settlements,
requires well-studied and phased programmes, for the available resources
will constrain the feasibility of some villages, wh-ich, for various
reasons, are not in favourable economic situations, or where there
is little possibility of development at an acceptable cost. This calls
for the decentralised planning process considered in Part 3. The dif-
*Peter Marris, Loss and Change, London, 1974, pp. 6, 109.
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fusion of development benefits to rural areas as discussed in this
chapter, is not possible without the infusion of appropriate levels
and types of technology and education. These critical elements are
now considered.
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5 - THE CATALYTIC ROLE OF INTERMEDIATE TECHNOLOGY AND APPROPRIATE
EDUCATION IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT
One of the foremost concepts of this thesis concerns the applica-
tion, on a mass scale, of relevant intermediate technology and the
introduction of more appropriate forms of education, without which most
of the policies for rural development proposed in this thesis will re:-
main academic. Before expanding on this, however, it is necessary
to be more explicit about the implicit rejection of sophisticated high
technology (transferred from the West with all its trappings), which
complements the present polarised and dualistic development and applies
equally to growth poles. This is then followed by a discussion of the
indigenous technology context of Iraq, and the appropriate Research and
Development (R&D) institutes, conluding with the educational implica-
tions of the proposed policies.
5.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRANSFER OF SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY
The process of scientific and technological advance has been
heavily concentrated in the West (70 percent in the U.S. and 25 percent
in Europe)* with only about 2 percent occurring in the developing coun-
tries. This unequal distribution would not matter so much if the direc-
tions of advance, the priorities and means, were independent of where
the work is carried out. However, this is clearly not the case, for not
surprisingly, some 98 percent** of R&D expenditure is for solving prob-
lems in the same rich countries. Thus, both the choice of problems and
*Hans W. Singer, op. cit., p. 24.
N.B.: The figures exclude socialist countries.
**Ibid.
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the methods of solving them will generally not relate to the completely
different needs and context of the developing countries.
In the West, R&D in manufactured goods is primarily in the hands
of large multinational corporations, while for reproducible goods,
such as seeds, R&D is primarily supported by the public sector.* The
guidelines for the products and their pricing systems relate to the
presence of large domestic markets, sophisticated products and pro-
duction methods relying on large inputs of capital and high levels of
technical and managerial skills, while saving on high-cost labour. It
would therefore be remarkable if there was much correlation with de-
veloping countries, mainly interested in simple products and designs
using simpler production methods, requiring low inputs of capital and
high inputs of low-skill labour, and geared to smaller markets.**
Western manufacturers do not consider the actual designing of
products suitable for developing countries to be a serious obstacle,***
rather, their concern is for the size and stability of the potential
market and fear of inordinately high costs of distribution, maintenance
and training. However, with agro-chemicals, there are fewer prob-
*See M. Yudelman et al, Technological Change in Agriculture and Employ-
ment in Developing Countries, OECD, Paris, 1971, pp. 157-158.
**Although T. Vietoritz, Industrial Development Consultancy and Choice
of Technology, OECD, Paris, 1973, pp. 22-24, in talking of engineering
technology deduces that economies with large population are less depen-
dent on such inputs, indicating the importance of economies of scale in
highly technical industries.
***See M. Yudelman, op. cit., p. 152: in fact, several prototypes have
been prepared but not mass produced, with the exception of a new small
scale tractor plus attachments, called DNT, manufactured by Ford and
intended for use exclusively in developing countries.
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lems of this nature in transfer, but the question of environmental suit-
ability remains. This transferred technology is thus not only unrelated
to the needs, but also to the means of developing countries, drawing
heavily from limited foreign exchange.* In addition, it may not be use-
ful or even possible unless the importing country has the domestic in-
frastructure capable of selecting and adapting the chosen technology.
This is rarely the case, and the imported technology does not take root,
becoming no more than an enclave of modernity. In G.S. Stigler's
words, "Small economies that imitate us can follow our methods of doing
things, but not our methods of changing things next year, therefore,
they will be very rigid."** Furthermore, the composition of such tech-
nology is changing so as to become increasingly less relevant to de-
veloping countries.
The present rapid urbanisation and polarisation in Iraq is a func-
tion of the borrowed contemporary technology with its demands for econ-
omies of scale, etc. The innovations are imported to the main and ra-
pidly expanding urban centres forming modern enclaves. However, the
development of these technical products has been based on a perception
of the greatest potential for private profit and in the context of de-
veloping countries, encourages technological dualism. What is invar-
*Although Iraq's foreign reserves are now considerable, thereby facili-
tating acquisition of high technology, the qualitatively different needs
and social structure,as well as the limitation of existing institutions
and infrastructure, remain as critical factors.
**In Hans W. Singer, op. cit., p. 25.
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iably overlooked in this process is the resulting dependency (both in-
ternally - urban/rural; and externally), and the view that diffusion
gradually takes place to the periphery, has been and continues to be
strongly contested in this paper.*
Thomas Vietorisz** in discussing technological autonomy versus de-
pendency, says that,
"...a microsocial system with too many outside
connections, as compared to its internal func-
tional 'differentiation' (the number of separ-
ate components, e.g., industries) will tend to
be torn apart by being pulled in too many di-
rections."
In other words, development (concerning technological autonomy) is not
just a matter of increasing 'differentiation', but must be accompanied
by an adequate level of 'integration' (ability of the system to act
functionally as a well organised whole). In the case of Iraq, this im-
plies the need for structural and institutional change, due to the pres-
ent lack of 'integration'.
To advance technological autonomy, we must focus on technology's
self-upgrading potential. That is to say, it is preferable to see an
indigenous technolgy grow up from a modest beginning, than to see a
*Studies by Ove Pedersen on "Innovation Diffusion in Chile", in Friedman,
op. cit., p. 17, indicate that "at higher levels of economic development,
diffusion proceeds down the urban hierarchy from large to small", (note
the omission of rural areas), "while at- lower levels, the friction of
distance appears to have greater influence." (Note again diffusion, if
it does occur, is between cities, thereby increasing the isolation of
rural areas.)
**Thomas Vietorisz, op. cit., pp. 5-11.
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high-level foreign technology transplanted in a way that perpetuates
dependency. Our guide is the conviction that the essence of under-
development is the inability to generate indigenous technology.
To rapidly progress in this field, the importance of a large local
market is not contested. The Arab world not only forms a sizeable
market, but its wealth can also finance the rapid development of in-
digenous R&D institutes. In this context, Arthur Lewis has observed
that, "If developing countries want to grow faster than the developed
world, they will have to trade relatively less with the developed world,
and relatively more with each other."*
5.2 THE INDIGENOUS TECHNOLOGY CONTEXT
Innovation or change in technology can be defined as the incorpora-
tion of a new resource into a production process, as a partial (or com-
plete) substitute for some resource that is currently being employed.
In the context of the rural development policies proposed in this thesis,
appropriate levels of technology for agriculture and rural industry are
called for. The inter-relationship between the two sectors discussed
earlier reappears, for technology change in agriculture is not autonomous,
nor is it endogenous to the agricultural sector. Its spread depends on
the expansion of inter-and intra-sectoral trade between agriculture,
industry, and services. Real progress in these will come from within;
that is, from Iraq's indigenous technology and not with transferred high
technology.
*Arthur Lewis, The Devepmernt Process, UN, ECOSOC, 1970.
108
A most damaging aspect of transferred sophisticated technology is
that it tends to disrupt relatively self-sufficient traditional econo-
mies, rendering their supporting technologies obsolete, and therefore
resulting in the loss of employmEnt. This, together with the fact that
the innovations are more often than not, poorly adapted to local condi-
tions, cause major social problems, and adjustments in the local cul-
ture that are as much involuntary as they are unanticipated. In other
words, technical changes cannot be isolated from the social relation-
ships in which they are embedded. An apparently discreet innovation,
such as the introduction of hybrid maize may undermine a whole tradi-
tion of peasant life, as it did in France.*
The capacity of a society to assimilate new technology depends both
on its capacity to adapt the technology to its own conditions, and on
its capacity to adapt itself to the needs of the particular technology.
Thus, changes in technological structure seem only to be possible grad-
ually, within the limits of what can be assimilated.** So, whenever
disruptive changes are imposed upon people, there is a need
... to allow time for people to repair the
thread of continuity in their attachments,
for without continuity, we cannot interpret
what events mean to us, nor explore new
*1?. Marris, op. cit.,.p. 160.
**M. Yudelman, et al, op. cit., p. 42, quotes a study of the slow spread
of innovation in two villages in Mysore, India, which revealed that the
average length of time that elapsed between a farmer's first becoming a-
quainted with innovations and finally adapting them was 7.2 years for
improved seeds and 5.1 years in the case of chemical fertiliser. Part
of this delay may well be due to lack of guarantees by the government,
which is essential in such cases (to reduce risk).
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kinds of experience with confidence.*
Due to Iraq's varied population and culture, the pace at which such
adoption and assimilation is possible without disastrous social and po-
litical consequences is a very important factor in setting an upper and
lower limit to the pace of change. Specific decisions concerning rates
of change will have to be determined more or less on location; they
cannot be made in this thesis, nor will they be constant over any re-
gion.: The pace of change will probably vary shaply between location
and for different uses. In this context, one of the principal lessons
to be learned from the Japanese experience** is the importance of pro-
gressively modifying existing farming techniques to suit local, physi-
cal, economic, and social conditions, rather than attempting wholesale
substitution of modern for traditional agriculture.
Some of the negative economic and social effects of imported tech-
nology, particularly if sophisticated, have already been considered.
There are similar limitations imposed by Iraq's physical environment.
This continuous, integrative or coordinating thread in the arguments of
this thesis should be noted. To take agriculture as an example, its
modernisation depends as much on climate and soil conditions as it does
on economic, social and cultural considerations, or the size of holdings
or the means of irrigation. The following account illustrates the im-
portance of land suitability and validity.
*P. Marris, op. cit., p. 2, p. 150.
**B.F. Johnston in G. Jones, The Role of Science and Technology in Devel-
oping Countries, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 60-61.
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The Central and Southern plains in Iraq are marked by very hot
summer temperatures (up to 120'F) with simultaneously low humidity (down
to 5%). Thus, wooden parts of farm machinery become extremely dry, while
those of canvas, leather or rubber soon lose some of their elasticity
and therefore, fit improperly. Fischer explains that,
"...sand and dust storms coming from the Western
desert are the greatest enemies of farm machinery,
in particular the more complicated kinds. The
dust penetrates into nearly every part of the ma-
chine, causing heavy wear in all sliding and rotat-
ing parts and surfaces."*
It should be noted that tractor work itself stirs up dust and further
aggravates the problem. Thus, the frequent engine overhauls and replace-
ments requiredheavily tax the few and often distant maintenance work-
shops, and the end result is a slow deterioration in quantity and qual-
ity of output.**
A similar story is recounted by Al Dahiri*** concerning a forei.gn
experts recommendations to farmers in Northern Iraq. More often than
not, the soil in the North is mixed with stones, and an expert tried to
persuade the farmers to remove the stones before tilling their land.
The results at harvest time showed that the fields with stones had a
better crop. It seems that in Iraq's dry climate, the stones served the
function of preserving moisture. There are numerous other examples of
*K. Fischer, "Farm Mechanisation in Iraq", in A. Al Dahiri, op. cit.,
pp. 212-213.
**N.B.: Capital/output ratios are invariably used as determinants; how-
ever, as has.been seen, the machines are often idle up to half the time,
and certainly work at less than optimum capacity most of the time.
***A. Al Dahiri, op. cit., pp. 213-214.
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peculiaritiea of the local situation that limit the direct applicability
of foreign techniques, particularly the sophisticated ones.* It should
be clear that the primary concern should be with specifically local and
regional relevance or appropriateness more than the more general national
context, which, as with the previous planning policy statements for rural
development, render a local and regional approach crucial.
In addition to questions of local relevance, and levels of the tech-
nology, the qualitative aspects of the change, such as its effects on
the social organisation of the process of production are also of in-
terest. That is to say, does the technology weaken class barriers and
reduce income inequalities? Some experience shows that the present pat-
tern of early innovators are those of higher socio-economic status, hav-
ing larger farms, and subsidiary employment as well as having higher
levels of education.** In these circumstances, it is the government's
responsibility to acquaint the farmer with the new technology by local
trials, and to provide guarantees and credits, which, in the case of the
proposals made here, can be through the central cooperatives in the
selected rural towns. A suitable price structure is crucial here, for
with very adverse terms of trade between farm outputs and its technolog-
*A. Al Dahiri, op. cit., p. 214.
indicates that wheat in fertilised fields does not resist the drought as
well as wheat in other fields, and also that large pieces of equipment,
such as reapers, binders, and bulky combines, are very difficult to use
in the hilly areas in the North, as well as in irrigated areas criss-
crossed by canals, ditches, and waterways. The obstructions in irrigated
zones can, to some extent, be removed by relaying out the land.
**M. Yudelman, et al, op. cit., p. 43.
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ical inputs, a farmer efficient in traditional methods may well obtain
a higher net income than the farmer using the new technology.
Both China and Japan offer examples of countries that have delib-
erately followed courses of technological pluralism, but within diamet-
rically opposite institutional structures. In China, the emphasis is on
technology from the bottom up, which enhances diffusion, as opposed to
the more common philosophy (still prevalent in Iraq) of filtering from
the top down. Hopefully, this thesis has succeeded in illustrating
this point. Thus, the Chinese equip their labour force with new tech-
nical skills, however rudimentary, and rely on the innovative ability
of the skilled workers to generate technical progress.*
Johnston contrasts Japanese and Mexican approaches to agricultural
modernisation, where both have achieved high aggregate growth rates.**
In Japan, increases in farm output and labour productivity resulted
from the widespread adoption of improved techniques consistently of the
land-augmenting type (such as fertilisers) by a great majority of the
nation's farmers; (i.e., diffuse, small-scale, labour-intensive produc-
tion). Only very recently have the Japanese mechanised agriculture on
a large scale (due to force of circumstances). In Taiwan, the approach
has been similar, while in Mexico, the major portion of the impressive
gains resulted from a substantial increase in production by a small num-
ber of large-scale highly commercial farm operations; that is, primarily
*G. Jones, op. cit., p. 25.
**B.F. Johnston,"Agricultural and Economic Relevance of the Japanese Ex-
perience'in G. Jones, op. cit., pp. 60-61.
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through capital-intensive or labour displacing farm mechanisation, leav-
ing a majority of peasants untouched, and thereby increasing income in-
equalities..
Yudelman sought to examine whether a systematic pattern could be
said to exist between the two main types of technological change in
agricultural production and the subsequent demand for labour.* His
conclusions were most interesting, in that land-augmenting innovations,
such as ferilisers, were seen to increase yield per hectare as well as
resulting in a 30 percent increase in the demand for labour; while not
surprisingly, the introduction of large-scale machinery (e.g., four-
wheel tractors and their drawn implements) resulted in substantial re-
ductions in the labour requirement,between 12-27 percent. He concluded
that selective mechanisation (same as above) may relieve seasonal short-
ages without unduly displacing labour.
This aspect of agricultural technology is often overlooked; that is,
many modern farming methods increase rather than decrease labour inputs.
In addition to the example of fertilisers, cited above, better and more
timely tillage, weeding, efficient water control for irrigation, har-
vesting, threshing, and transporting larger crops and introducing live-
stock, all require more labour, as long as they are not accompanied by
more labour saving machinery.** There is a strong case for applying
these to the Iraqi situation; however, local R&D is needed to ensure
validity.
*M. Yudelman, et al, op. cit., p. 100.
**See K. Schickle in R. Weitz, (Ed.) op. cit., p. 60.
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The idea can be simply stated as production by the masses rather
than mass production. Or, put differently, "fundamental to unemploy-
ment apart from questions of population growth is the current lack of
modern labour-intensive technology."* A recent Puerto Rican study con-
cluded that there should be more imaginative exploration of small scale,
more decentralised, more labour-using forms of organisation such as have
persisted in the Japanese economy to the present day, and have contrib-
uted materially to its vigorous growth.** In a similar vein, a recent
study on innovation diffusion in Chile concludes that innovations which
have a low threshold population size and income, below which their in-
troduction to an urban centre becomes economically unfeasible, will tend
to diffuse more rapidly throughout the spatial system than high thresh-
old innovations.***
In addition, small scale operations, no matter how numerous, are in
principle less likely to be harmful to the natural environment (although
there may well be exceptions). Furthermore, they are much more compat-
ible with man's need for health, happiness, and creativity. .. versus an-
onymity and dehumanisation, or, in Schumacher's words, "Small is beauti-
ful". One can perhaps summarise the task of intermediate (self-help)
technology for Iraq as:
-creating employment opportunities in rural areas (i.e., no
*B. Higgins, op. cit., p. 5.
**L.G. Reynolds, Wages and Employment in the Labour Surplus Economy", in
E. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, Harper Torchbooks, N.Y., 1973. p. 165
***Ove Pedersen, "Innovation Diffusion within and between Nationsl Urban
Systems," in J. Friedman, op. cit., p. 17.
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enforced urbanisation);
-allowing for the establishment of cheap enough
employment opportunities so as to be accessible
to all;
-utilising relatively simple production methods
(including organisation, supply, financing, and
marketing), thereby minimising immediate demands
for high skills;
-advancing new skills* cumulatively and contributing
to indigenous institutions;
-producing mainly for local use, from primarily
local materials.
The emphasis on localisation demands a more decentralised approach to
planning. Intermediate technology in representing a level of technology
that takes off from the present context in Iraq, including the capabil-
ity of the supporting institutional structure, will in all probability
lead to genuine local autonomy in sophisticated production methods
withing a shorter time span than one that starts too high and therefore
*In T. Vietoritz, op. cit., p. 44.
an agricultural equipment workshop can be very dynamic as on the job
training and skill development is provided, which readily leads from
repair to spare parts production, to local adaptation of foreign de-
signs, and finally, to local designs for local markets domestically
manufactured; while in, say, cement manufacturing, the process is very
static, and even after 20 years, it will not lead to the introduction
of any related non-metallic manufacturing, such as refractories. In
the former, technological autonomy is introduced more rapidly.
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remains fairly static, and increases dependency.* The task every time
would be to find an intermediate technology which obtains a reasonable
level of productivity without having to resort to the purchase of ex-
pensive and sophisticated equipment from abroad. Such items should be
minimised, perhaps even in such sophisticated sectors as the oil indus-
try, by learning from and utilising knowledge from the early oil tech-
nologies of the West. A pan-Arab effort would be needed here. However,
it is neither in the scope of this thesis to discuss this issue, nor
within the present knowledge.
The emphasis on intermediate technology does not imply regression;
rather, it is a genuine movement into new territory, where the enormous
costs and complications of capital-intensive production methods are
eliminated, and where technology is made more appropriate for diffusion
and mass employment. To people whose objection to intermediate tech-
nology is that it withholds the best, or most sophisticated, the answer
is simply that theirs is not the voice of the real problem (the rural
poor). Further objections to the principle of diffusion arise from
Iraq's lack of sufficient managerial, technical, entepreneurial and
other skills, but they miss the point, for people incapable of acting as
entrepreneurs, etc., on the level of high technology may nonetheless
be fully capable of making a success of small-scale enterprises set up
on the basis of intermediate technology. Such abilities are not fixed
Note: that the emphasis is on the level of sophistication of the tech-
nology, (intermediate) more than on the level of capital-labour-intens-
ity, although they are clearly inter-related.
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or given, but must largely be a function of the level of the technology
used.* Furthermore, intermediate technology would help to dramatically
increase the supply of talent familiar with technical modes of produc-
tion. **
The choice of appropriate intermediate technology then, becomes
a central issue for Iraq, as it is for most developing countries. It
is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to determine a full range of
such technologies. However, a few general points would reveal the emp-
hasis as being primarily towards the low-income, agro-industrial rural
communities, and that the method of choice must cease to rely on the
principle of comparative advantage (that is, produce only what is most
efficient).*** The intermediate goods can be used directly or as inputs
into more sophisticated industries. Some examples might include:
easily maintained agricultural implements ranging from simple hand tools
to power tillers**** or two wheel tractors, (such as Ford's DST trac-
tors costing as much as a pair of oxen); simple industrial implements,
*See E.F. Schumacher, op. cit., p. 174; or G. Jones, op. cit., p. 60.
**See article by the Editor, Weekly Review, op. cit., p. 6, where he
discusses the immense value of the earlier use of backyard iron furnaces
in China, which failed from the production point-of view, but succeeded
in training a workforce, enabling the rapid expansion of its iron and
steel industry, using more advanced methods later.
***1n T. Vietoritsz, op. cit., pp. 38-41: to take a specific example of
feasibility studies for the manufacture of electric motors in Mexico,
where such methods of analysis would have rendered Mexico a producer of
of only large electric motors and not small ones, which would have been
cheaper to import from the U.S. This is clearly absurd from other points
of view.
****Even now, farmers in Japan rely more on such machines than on four
wheel tractors.
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sucbas water pumps; popular household goods; as well as innovations in
the already existing leather, food processing, textiles and clothing,
printing, and building materials industries. Some of these innovations
will be constdered in the following section on the development of indi-
genous R&D establishments which become crucial to the success of the
policies discussed.
5.3 THE CRITICAL ROLE OF INDIGENOUS R&D INSTITUTIONS
If it is accepted that most of the economic growth of the industrial
countries is attributable to social attitudes, technical progress, better
organisation and management relying on a heavy investment in education,
training, R&D, and capital, then R&D certainly is an important source of
modern technology. If the earlier arguments are correct, it follows that
R&D, together with local organizations and education, form cornerstones
of rural development, particularly with regard to such issues as self-
sufficiency. The social returns of R&D can be very high, if, as pro-
posed, it is directed at relieving constraints on farmers and enhancing
rural industry. Enormous gains are to be derived from research in de-
velopment of new farming systems with improved seeds, water, fertilisers,
insecticides and mechanical tools, and in supplying industrial processes.
The implications for Iraq, particularly in the context of this thesis,
are not confined simply to R&D, but also to the associated work on the
social, economic, and physical aspects of both total farming systems
and rural industries, as well as the requisite self-generating institu-
tional framework.
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Before moving on to these, a brief statement on an aspect of the
continual transfer of sophisticated technology, namely, its vehicle of
transfer, the foreign company or consulting firm, is called for. One
of the foremost problems is the prompt repatriation of profits and div-
idends, losing the developing country a good deal of investment poten-
tial.* Moreover, their high-wage standards tend to spread to indigenous
enterprises in the modern sector, and further discourages use of indig-
enous, labour-intensive techniques. In addition, by invariably using
their own personnel, they limit development to the original enclave, and
encourage further dependency, which is also increased by the fact that
the innovations are frequently imported under conditions of external
control. The best consultant and the rarest, is the one who helps the
client to a point where the client will not need the consultant any more.
The problem is that the task of teaching and training and acting as a
catalyst for local groups is plainly in conflict with getting the job
done rapidly. Programming and budgeting for such contingencies should
become mandatory.
The abandonment of mistaken concepts of modernisation, erroneously
identifying progress with physical capital and large scale units alone,
for the totally different concept of development proposed in this thesis
requires the creation of locally based problem solving capacity in R&D.
*The problem remains in oil countries, for the quantiative aspect is
quite secondary to the qualitative, in that if the policy is wrong, money
will not make it right, and if the policy is right, (in the context of
this thesis) money may not, in fact, present unduly difficult problems.
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For such institutions, there are four obvious directions of effort and
concentration:
-to start with existing traditional techniques and
utilise knowledge of advanced technology to trans-
form them suitably while retaining some aspects of
existing equipment, skills and procedure;
-to look back into the history-of advanced technology
to see what it began with, (bicycles, windmills, forges,
distilleries, etc.) for there is much forgotten
technology;
-to research and conduct experiments in a direct effort
to establish indigenous intermediate technology;
-to start from the existing foreign technology and
adapt and adjust it so as to meet the local requirements.
With the first alternative, technology can be built up from the experi-
ence and strength of the rural or urban people, rather than transplant-
ing industries completely unrelated to the rural context and atmos-
phere. The second alternative may well yield very fruitful results,
particularly as the present technology or sophistication gap is so
very great when compared to earlier times, and therefore more relevance
may be found in earlier technology. However, the third alternative
is certainly the slowest and most difficult, while adaptation, the
fourth alternative, may be very expensive. The local R&D institute is
all the more important for this alternative in so far as the introduc-
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tion of new technologies invariably generates new problems that have
to be resolved. Furthermore, as has been shown, imported technology
tends to be more up to date in those sectors in which activities in
the developing countries are most similar, typically manufacturing
industries in the 'modern sector'. By contrast, there is little or
no technical progress in areas where the problem does not exist in the
richer countries, which are invariably the most crucial to the devel-
oping country. For Iraq and the surrounding regions, such areas in-
clude arid zone agriculture, problems of soil salinity and often the
problem of subsistence farming, (and therefore the need for multiple
cropping), small-scale production methods, etc.*
Although the basic role of indigenous R&D institutes has been
defined here as being primarily to establish appropriate intermediate
technologies relevant to Iraq's needs, the importance of economies of
scale in such research and the need, therefore, of pan-Arab coordina-
tion have also been stressed. These may be modelled on two other in-
ternationally known agencies, namely the International Rice Research
Institute in the Philippines and the Wheat and Maize Improvement Centre
in Mexico, whose purpose has been to promote adaptive research for
certain types of developing countries. In this, they have been very
*To expand on potential areas of technological improvement (some of
which have already been mentioned), for agricultural outputs
rice mills, oil mills, sugar refineries, fruit and vegetable canning,
dairy production, wineries, brewing...and a host of industries for the
conversion, preservation, grading, storage, packaging, and transpor-
tation of agricultural produce.. .plus fertiliser pesticides, seed,
and mechanical equipment such as ploughs, harrows, weed killers, spray-
ers, seed drills, water pumps, pipes, small tractors, etc.
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successful in developing new varieties of high yield rice, wheat,
and corn suitable to the ecologies of many regions.
In Iraq, the Council of Scientific Research was established in
1966 to-which the following institutes are presently attached: the
Arid Zone Research Institute; the Biological Research Centre; and the
Petroleum Research Centre. So far, these institutes seem to have
published no annual reports nor have they been particularly active in
more practical ventures.* One of the reasons seems to have been their
inability to attract suitably qualified and experienced Iraqi scien-
tists, although it can also be argued that in the context of the rural
development proposals, technicians, agroconomists, etc., may be more
pertinent; the other being little government financial and psycho-
logical support. Although we have no figures of government expendi-
ture in these institutes, there is evidence that developing countries
spend between 0.05-0.5 percent of GNP on R&D, while in industrial
countries, the range rises to between 2-3 percent.** At a recent
international conference called "Technology in Asia (CATASIA)", an in-
crease of expenditure on R&D up to 1 percent was recommended, which
would also help to decrease the brain-drain in Iraq.
In considering some of the cost guidelines for intermediate
technology applicable to the indigenous R&D institutions, we can define
the level of technology in terms of equipment cost per workplace.***
*Ghazi Derwish,"Scientific Research in Iraq", in C. Nader and
A. Zahlan, (Ed.), op. cit., pp. 180-182.
**G. Jones, op. cit., p. 43.
***See E. F. Schumacher, op. cit., p. 169.
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The problems of transfer of high cost technology can be seen in the
following argument. In developing such technology, the rationale is
that the ratio of annual income per worker to average capital per work-
place, is roughly 1:1. When such technology is transferred to develop-
ing countries, the ratio moves up to 1:20, 1:50, 1:100 and much more,
rendering the relationship meaningless. In other words, a $5,000 per
workplace technology, as is common in the West, transferred to a country
where a $50-500 technology per workplace predominates, simply cannot
spread by any process of normal growth, and in fact, as has been seen,
the overall effect is negative. Therefore, the scope of the indigenous
R&D institutions should be more or less confined to intermediate tech-
nology at $50-500 workplace.
It is also important to realise that R&D involves a relatively
small proportion of the total cost of successful innovation.* Therefore,
not only must the entire cost be budgeted for (and figures need not be
very high for intermediate technology), but also R&D must be well integra-
ted into the production and marketing systems. One of the dangers of
isolation is that apart from the basic one of a considerable reduction in
effectiveness, there is also the danger that the institutes will concen-
trate more on the more sophisticated problems in industrial countries.
This is because of the way scientists are trained and acquire prestige.
The logical coordinating bodies are the regional and national planning
offices. The extent to which these various types of supporting institutes
*Estimate by G. Jones, op. cit., p. 9, indicates that R&D = 5-10 percent,
Engineering and Designing the product = 10-25 percent, tooling and getting
ready for manufacturing = 40-50 percent, manufacturing start-up expense =
5-15 percent and marketing start-up expense = 10-25 percent.
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are capable of working together on a day-to day basis with the R&D in-
stitutes is a key measure of successful technological development and
local absorption. In this, the higher the rate of participation, the
higher the rates of diffusion are likely to be.*
In the context of this thesis, two more R&D institutions immed-
iately spring to mind, one catering to intermediate agricultural im-
plements for the two main agricultural regions, namely the Northern
foothills, and the alluvial plains in the centre and South, and the
other for intermediate industrial implements, such as water pumps. The
reason for creating special centres for R&D is that the universities are
not well enough organised to provide the intellectual context for the
necessary integration (with other institutes, organisations, and people).
Academic subjects soon become institutionalised within their traditional
boundaries** and the kind of research conferring academic prestige is
rarely practical in nature. This same malady can fall on R&D institutions
if they are not well integrated into the social, economic, and physical
context of the country. Thus, the R&D institutes need to be reasonably
independent of both government and universities and need to attract people
who are adventurous enough to risk an unconventional career. Such centres
can also become a very important intellectual resource for the country.
*Evidence to support this can be found in Ove Pederesn, "Innovation Dif-
fusion in Chile", in J. Friedman, op. cit., p. 17.
**A major problem is that notwithstanding the fact that scientific re-
search is traditionally a product of universities, in Iraq universities
are thought of more as centres of teaching and not of learning, which
should be their main concern.
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In this, they, should also be seen in the context of the following
chapter on educational systems more oriented to the specific needs
of Iraq.
Research and development of the nature proposed here will remain
valueless until it is communicated to the rural populations. The gov-
ernment has prime responsibility in facilitating assimilation of the
new technologies. The extent to which the rural populations respond to
the new technologies depends also on their basic skills of numeracy
and literacy. This educational aspect is another very important aspect
of the rural development policies, and is now discussed.
5.4 EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Education has taught people to conform to and serve the system,
thereby acquiring its values in the process. It has fostered an ex-
clusive elite, somewhat like a caste system, where the number of years
of schooling determine position, privilege, prestige, and salary (par-
ticularly in government bureaucracy). It has been treated as a pro-
duction process with fixed inputs and outputs, and has led to raised
expectations and with it, increased qualifications (or rather, mis-
qualifications), thereby encouraging children to discover in themselves
openings that are really not available. The sad truth is that there
are large disparities between the promises of education at present and
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the ability of the country to absorb those it educates. As the list
of problems is endless, only those educational aspects that pertain
directly to the concepts previously expressed will be reviewed here.
The substantial re-focussing of policies and priorities directed
towards rural development with the aid of intermediate technology,
requires new structures of education and re-education. Stress has
already been laid on the necessity for responsible participation of all
communities (particularly rural) in the development process, as opposed
to their present omission, which has resulted in the destruction of
many of the traditional sanctions on which these communities were based.
Education, as viewed here, must be seen as a way in which such commun-
ities (and on a larger scale, cultures) assimilate new knowledge and
new interests, while seeking continuity and integrity in the transfor-
mation they must embrace, otherwise, dualism and alienation sets in.
Education, in Schumacher's words* "is essentially the transmission
of values, but values do not help us pick our way through life unless
they have become our own; a part, so to say, of our mental make-up."
Thus, the focus of education must be geared more to the needs of specific
populations in Iraq, bearing in mind available resources,.rather than
towards abstract notions of universal knowledge. In other words, the
school needs to be rooted in the particular community and its environ-
ment, and consequently, the system must be adapted to suit local needs.
This is not intended to decry universal knowledge, but rather complement
*E.F. Schumacher, op. cit., p. 75.
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it by reducing its present sense of isolation and by helping rural people
to live within their own particular culture. However, far from serving
as a preparation for tackling the country's most urgent tasks, the pres-
ent schools in Iraq often end up producing an elite who escape to the
towns and cities, and feel above any practical involvement. This is
particularly disturbing in view of the rural development policies pro-
posed here.
To cite the examples of China and Japan again, in China* both rural
and urban education are being shortened and made largely vocational in
nature, while in Japan, economic growth at the turn of the century was
accompanied by tremendous emphasis on technical education, particularly
at intermediate levels.** Similarly, in Russia, universities account
for only 10 percent of higher education, the great majority attending
specialist vocational institutes (though the curriculum includes general
academic studies***).
As much as this approach seems reasonable, it may well be a mis-
take to make education overwhelmingly vocational, for it would be a
purely economic-or-manpower-oriented viewpoint. Why always make people
into narrowly specialised workers?**** What must also be stressed is
*Pi-Chao-Chen, op. cit.
**A. Curle, Educational Strategy for Developing Societies, Tavistock,
London, 1970, p. 141.
***G. Jones, op. cit., p. 144.
****Discussions with Kevin Lynch, or as expanded on in an article by the
editor of Current Scene, op. cit., p. 3,"...while the main task of work-
ers is in industry, they should also study military affairs, politics,
and culture, where conditions permit, they should also engage in agri-
culture production...with the same range applying to peasants and
students."
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that education is humanistic, and it can help people maintain contact
with their culture and obtain joy and stimulus while they acquire new
knowledge.
The idea is to readmit the surrounding world, physically, socially,
and culturally into the classroom. Teaching at present in Iraq clearly
contributes to a certain kind of learning, but most people acquire most
of their knowledge outside schools; that is, most learning happens cas-
ually, or accidentally. By divorcing education from its surrounding
reality, it becomes even less meaningful. The development of a child,
like that of a culture, must come from within itself and not by being
a passive recipient of knowledge.
To put it simply, the main educational change called for here is to
make primary and middle levels of schooling, vocational and technical
training, adult education and mass literacy goals in themselves rather
than remaining as mere channels to secondary or university training.
Even more, the proposed changes are qualitative; that is, applying to
school curricula and teaching methods, particularly for the primary,
middle schooling, and adult education. This viewpoint reflects the
'push from below' philosophy, rather than the present pattern of the
'pull from above', which has created a narrow, elitist economic enclave
style of development, without a spread of benefits.
The problem in Iraq is that the educational system is not designed
to produce appropriate skills or proficiencies that correspond to the
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needs of agriculture, industry or government. Both primary and second-
ary education are mainly designed to prepare for university education,
which the majority of the rural population in Iraq never reach.*
Furthermore, the sizeable number of primarily urban students who do
reach this level often remain underemployed and alienated, as their
expectations were falsely raised. The policy proposed here is that
both levels, particularly that of secondary schools should be trans-
formed to become complete in themselves, rather than remain university
preparation for the few.** In the context of rural development poli-
cies, the educational establishment needs to be focussed on the pro-
ductive and cultural life of rural communities.
In addition, (as is evident in Table 4, Appendix 1) the ratio
of male/female students is only 70:30. This clearly leaves a lot to
be desired, but it also illustrates the relative liberation of women
compared to previous years. The continuity of this process is crucial,
for not only does it encourage women to participate more actively in
the economic life of the country, but it also greatly helps in breaking
*The pyramid of enrollment is as follows: (for 1970-71)
Primary school students =1,075,000 of whom 35% are in Baghdad
Secondary school students = 300,000 of whom 221,000 are intermediate,
(40% are in Baghdad)
79,000 are preparatory
(45% are in Baghdad)
University students 37,000 of whom 48% are in Baghdad.
**In the words of Arthur Lewis, in G. Jones, op. cit., p. 130, "Second-
ary school products are the steel framework of the economy as techni-
cians, record keepers, supervisors, teachers, managers, and administra-
tors, and for every university graduate, you need 5-10 secondary school
graduates."
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down the social barriers between urban and rural areas.
It must be emphasized that the proposed educational system
should also allow those students who show particular promise, and
desire, to continue with higher education. Any strict tying of educa-
tion solely to local needs, although positive, has the very negative
effect of encouraging the continuity of a 'caste system'. The impor-
tance of education is that it gives individuals the freedom to parti-
cipate in society. By allowing for occupational mobility, it becomes
easier to break the links which in the past tied the socio-economic
status of a child very closely to that of his or her parents.
In other words, the bias against children from rural areas must
be removed. At the same time, as has been mentioned, the educational
system must not be geared towards a professional/academic grand finale,
as at present. A combination of educational emphasis mainly on local
needs, as described above, while allowing for capable students to con-
tinue with secondary and higher education at regional urban centres, is
probably the best policy.
Scientific and technical education should also be introduced at
the primary level, as this level will still for some years to come mark
the end of formal education of a sizeable proportion of the population.
This will also involve teaching or re-educating the teachers. An
immediate, easily implementable policy is to set up for each primary
school in rural towns and some villages, a small workshop as well as
incorporating a small farm in which crafts and elementary farming could
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be taught. A similar programme needs to be developed for secondary-vo-
cational schools in rural communities.
Concerning the number of such schools, it seems clear that of
the 23 existing and 6 proposed rural settlements in the five Northern
regions identified earlier, most, if not all, should have secondary-
vocational schools,* (as their overall catchments are up to 50,000)
and certainly primary-vocational schools. Primary schools need to be
well distributed in the villages (with some additions of middle and
perhaps even secondary schools).
With regard to adult education, and the literacy programme,
the present use of abstract and meaningless texts, such as those used
for 5 year olds, and the subordinate position of students, reinforces
existing social and economic pressures, to make the peasant feel dif-
ferent, and inferior.** As with all other schooling, it is very im-
portant here to link the subject matter to the local community. Paulo
Freire, the distinguished educator, says that "any adult can begin to
read in a matter of 40 hours if the first words he deciphers are ones
charged with local and political meaning."*** In other words, the
*This has the enormous advantage with respect to agricultural exten-
sion workers, of facilitating contact with, and acceptance by, local
farmers. This trust and mutual identification, normally missing, is
absolutely critical to the success of the extension worker.
**Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society, Harper and Row, N.Y., 1972, p. 56,
also instruction of this nature, in his words, "smothers the horizons
of their imagination".
***Paulo Freire, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Seabury Press, N.Y.,
1970.
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teacher must first find out what words designate currently important
issues in the villages, towns, or cities. Beyond this, any teacher is
able to use the available educational technology such as books, library,
workshop, etc., either to teach and incur dependency by restricting
their use, or to encourage learning and independence by making these
resources generally available, and accessible.* The guiding principle
should be to remove barriers and open up the school as an integral part
of the community.
Throughout this thesis, explanations have been given concerning
the need for a policy to raise the present low prestige attached to
agriculture.** In this educational context, one approach is to attach
degrees to vocational professions by combining training and, for example,
two or three years of practical experience in the field. On a more
general level, agriculture and rural industry should be opened up and
have their own proper channels of advancement. Other complementary
policies include officially controlled salary structure so as to ensure a
minimal difference between rural and urban living conditions, where there
are large inequalities at present.
It is simple to blame education when to a large extent, these in-
equalities simply reflect the values and rewards of society. The present
system of incentives makes it altogether rational to seek a white collar
*Ivan Illich, op. cit., pp. 111-116.
**Annual Abstract of Statistics, Iraq 1971, op. cit., p. 543, p. 548.
University students in the Agricultural Department = only 7.1 percent(5.3 male, 1.8 female) of the total, and 35 percent of the total vocation-
al school students are in agriculture.
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job in the large towns and cities. Furthermore, able people presently
shun rural employment, because they feel totally out of touch with the
power structure concentrated at the centre. As mentioned earlier, most
of the policies in this paper become academic if there is no complemen-
tary decentralisation of government, administration and the planning
process.
The aim of the approach presented here is to make people as
self-sufficient and independent as possible through appropriate know-
ledge. It is more in the supply of intellectual rather than material
goods that this can be achieved, in that the gift of knowledge, provided
that it is of the right kind, makes them free.*
To sum up, education as formulated here aims to:
-reduce or minimise elitism, where only a small percentage
of the population reach secondary schools and universities,
leaving the remainder with a sense of failure;
-reject the present approach which divorces its participants
from the society it is supposed to be preparing them for,
thereby causing alienation;
*A story in E. Schumacher, op. cit., p. 186, provides a good illustration
of this.. .give a man a fish, and you are helping him a little bit for a
very short while; teach him the art of fishing, and he can help himself
all his life. On a higher level, supply him with fishing tackle (this
will cost you a good deal, and the results remain doubtful), and the
man's continued livelihood will still be dependent on you for replace-
ments. But teach him to make his own fishing tackle, and you have helped
him to become not only self-supporting, but also self-reliant and inde-
pendent."
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-refute the belief that all worthwhile knowledge comes
from books or educated people, thereby discounting
general wisdom and common sense, as well as the trad-
itional skills of the farmer.*
This can only be achieved by changes in curricula, reorganisation of
schools, making each level of education complete in itself, as well as
by retraining the teachers themselves. Each level is intended to be
self-reliant and self-sufficient in varying degrees. The difficulty
with all this is that it threatens the existing status quo, imposing
new burdens on the whole teaching force, and threatening the reputation
and status of existing teachers, particularly the older ones. Perhaps
these problems have to be accepted as being insurmountable at present.
Nevertheless, a programme of re-education and re-training these teach-
ers becomes vital.
As has been pointed out throughout this thesis, almost any policy
in isolation from its surroundings is not only doomed to failure, but
is likely to have negative effects. Thus, the higher the level of ed-
ucation (in qualitative and quantitative terms) in an area or region
remaining depressed, with no complementary investment and effort in
agriculture, rural industry, health, and other facilities, the greater
will be the propensity to migrate.**
*Ivan Illich, op. cit., p. 149, is full of examples in which educational
institutions claim to speak for the people, thereby reducing local crea-
tivity and participation.
**See B. Higgins, op. cit., p. 9.
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Although the scope of this essay has not included health facilities,
or other infrastructure, a few words will illustrate that the same trend
of thought applies. For health facilities in rural areas, it would seem
to be cheaper and more logical, particularly in early stages, to empha-
sise preventive medicine, which can be administered by relatively easily
trained medical staff, than attempting to install full medical centres
which cannot be adequately staffed. This policy could be implemented
by introducing preventative and diagnostic clinics at the rural level,
which channel people to better equipped institutes and hospitals in nearby
urban centres.
In conclusion, to initiate the rural development policies proposed
here, a few well-dispersed rural settlements provided with the relevant
agro-industrial and social capital in terms of both quality and quantity,
would , assuming success, be a powerful stimulus towards the necessary
shifts of budgetary priorities called for by this thesis. The following
and concluding part of this thesis looks into the requisite decentralised
planning process and institutional structure, without which these policies
can neither be properly formulated nor implemented.
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PART 3
THE DECENTRALISED PLANNING PROCESS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT
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6. DECENTRALISATION OF THE PLANNING PROCESS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWQPJ(
6.1 A PREVIEW
Life is lived, and major problems occur at the regional and local
levels, but resources are gathered in and the power of decision making
resides in the national capital. To counter the extreme polarity and
inequity of the resulting development, the policies proposed in Part 2
for the diffusion of development benefits emphasise rural development,
that is, allocating priority investment to agriculture and small-to
medium-scale industry, located in dispersed rural settlements. It is
through the use of intermediate technology and more locally appropriate
education that these policies are implemented.
In keeping with these objectives, the resulting strategy includes:
strong limitations on the growth of Baghdad, the primate city, together
with attempts to reverse the flow; some (though strictly controlled)*,
encouragement of growth in well-dispersed secondary cities, to counter
the pull of Baghdad, particularly in lagging regions; with the major
concentration of development effort being on rural development as de-
fined earlier. This thesis has been mainly concerned with the latter, in
which rural settlements would function as service centres for the sur-
rounding agricultural villages and communities, as well as being locations
for small-to medium-size industries (including food and processing).
These policies require a suitable, decentralised planning process, em-
*Through the regional authorities who as we shall see are in effect con-
trolled by local organisations.
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bodied in local and regional institutions, within which to operate.
This is the subject of discussion here in Part 3.
It must be emphasised that this chapter raises more questions than
it answers, and is incomplete, and at times lacking in local specificity.
Part of the reason can be found in the lack of sufficient information
on the existing planning institutions, but this, of all subjects, is
probably the most difficult to study at a distance. The need is not
simply for greater knowledge of government, but also for the active
participation of people in evolving indigenous, local organisations
relevant to the peculiarities of their locality. This is not so much
an excuse as it is a statement of the very preliminary nature of this
chapter regarded as an initial step in an ongoing process to be further
developed in Iraq.
Agriculture, industry, and education as discussed in this thesis
are strictly tied to the locality, whereas the present planning process
is totally divorced from such spatial disaggregation and specificity.
To counter this, active local participation in the planning process be-
comes essential, as opposed to its present exclusive nature limited
to an elite few (though it is unlikely that they would be divorced from
the picture). Only through self-reliance and self-development can the
persisting dependency and dualism of development in Iraq be decreased
and eventually removed. Ideally, the demand is for a vertically decen-
tralised (national, regional, and local) and horizontally integrated
(physical, economic, and social) planning process in Iraq. This is an
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expression of absolute terms; reality ensures considerably less, and
we will only be concerned with certain of these aspects relevant to the
policies of this thesis.
As has continuously been emphasised, the decentralised process
is not limited to the planning field, and indeed, only becomes possible
if complementary political, institutional, and professional functions
are also changed. The need is for:
-the active involvement of the political authorities in the
planning process;
-a distribution and decentralisation of such authority in-
stitutionally and administratively;
-the integration (or coordination) of the functioning of
local, regional, and national authorities by creating struc-
tural links;
-the active involvement and participation of citizens in the
planning process.
These requirements are explicitly considered in this chapter in varying
depth, while a fifth - the horizontal integration between social, eco-
nomic, and physical planning, is implicitly considered.
6.2 DECENTRALIZATION OF THE PLANNING PROCESS
The rural development policies to be implemented demand, first,
that development should serve the rural community and, second, that the
rural sector should serve national development. This is a reversal of
present policies (as discussed in Chapter 2), and requires a radical
change in the presently centralised planning process (as discussed in
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Chapter 3) The following section discusses this change, first by con-
sidering local planning and its regional context which forms the crux
of the decentralised planning process. This is followed by an examin-
ation of the interactions between the three levels, national, regional,
and local, and the time factor in this process.
Planning at the national level allocates the basic factors of
production among different sectors based on aggregate statistical data.
The wide differences in social, cultural, and economic conditions be-
tween the different provinces and districts in Iraq, makes it imposs-
ible to formulate a plan at the national level that will fit in with
the specific human and institutional conditions of a particular local-
ity. In rural areas, it is particularly difficult to understand the
inter-relationship among the various factors operating by remote con-
trol.
The essential starting point for implementing the rural develop-
ment policies (based primarily on self-help and self-sufficiency), is
for planning to be intimately linked to the specific human and social
environment and institutional factors. In other words, it involves
factors that do not lend themselves to quantitative expression. The
goals and projects determined at the national level, therefore, seldom
acdord with real-life circumstances at the local level, and national
planning data cannot be accurately represented by the arithmetic sum
of local figures, as no common denominator exists. This is exemplified
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by differences in:
-socio-cultural structures, customs and human resources (level
of skill, literacy, etc.);
-climate and physical endowment;
-technology level and type of existing agricultural production;
-stock of social-overhead facilities for the pursuit of commun-
ity ends.
Chapter 2 discussed the very substantial regional differences in
these factors, particularly in the extreme Northern and Southern-Central
regions. Furthermore, agriculture in particular must be geared to thou-
sands of farmers and co-operatives, widely dispersed geographically.*
The real interdependence of agriculture and climate, soil, and water
availability is far greater than in industry, in general, but as proposed
in this thesis, rural industry would be directly tied to agricultural
production, functionally and spatially. In other words, in no other part
of the economy is a decentralised planning process (including policy
implementation) as important as it is for rural development.
From another viewpoint, the rural development policies require
appropriate levels and quantities of technological inputs, as well as
new knowledge, skills, credits, and changes in the organisation of the
production process. These factors are basically institutional or organ-
isational in nature, and do not fit into the global quantities of planning
*e.g., success of a fertiliser dose with one crop in one locality may
yield a loss in another area.
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at the national level. For example, to adapt a new technology to local
conditions requires an administrative service capable of effective func-
tioning at the local level. Thus, to render a national policy for rural
development effective, planning must be done from the 'bottom up', as
well as from the 'top down'.
A decentralisation of the planning process is necessary not only
to cope with the wide differences between localities and regions, often
calling for subtle variations in policy, but the complexity and range
of conflicts that exist are invariable hidden or overlooked by central-
ised planning in Baghdad. For example, the problems of national decision
making, where regional conflicts are strongest, is in the distribution of
national resources among the various regions and their localities. To
place such allocations on a more objective basis, decisions must be re-
lated to local needs, resources, and performances. Only local organi-
sation (through regional authorities) can be closely related to and
acquainted with the local situation to make up this gap.
To offset the historical trend of local governments (being domi-
nated by traditional interest), it is absolutely critical that the local
population actively participates* in policy formulation and implementa-
tion. A point of importance here is that a community comprising a single
*Unfortunately, the scope of this thesis does not include a discussion
of the different participatory models, none of which are truly satisfac-
tory, or effectively participatory, but for further documentation of the
present inadequacies, see "The Identity and Validity of the Planning
Process in Developing Countries: The Role of the Indigenous Planner",
by this author.
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'batn' (as described earlier, this pertains to a tight tribal grouping,
often of about 100-150 individuals) tends to be more equitable in its
internal dealings. However, it is when a number of these groups or mixed
groups in villages and towns are considered that real problems of 'self-
benefit' arise, and it is with this larger community that local planning
and participation must be oriented (otherwise a narrow distribution of
benefits occurs)
In other words, the local communities need to determine their
collective interest, that is, to reconcile the immediate interests and
conflicts of each group in arriving to a common preference. This process
must involve considerable give and take. In reaching a sufficient degree
of consensus on selected options, the communities must seek a suitable
compromise in the traditional efficiency-equity conflict, by balancing
a mix of investments or inputs and their programmed outputs against the
desired income distribution effect. This would be a means of ensuring
a reasonably equitable distribution of investment and income. In addi-
tion to the means already discussed, of obtaining local participation,
there are two other important avenues that need to be considered, namely
mass communications (tv, radio, newspapers)and the local educational
service (as discussed in Section 5.4) This latter item is critical, for
people whose needs have been neglected for so long often tend to be
apathetic, and therefore, part of the responsibility of education is to
teach people how to participate.
The planning process must therefore consult the people who are
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supposed to benefit from rural development, allow them to air their con-
flicts, and respect the autonomy of different kinds of people and groups*
It must also allow time for people to understand and assimilate change,
so as to avoid alienation. If participation in planning is to be taken
seriously, it is essential that the unofficial participants have a
measure of control over the process. The respective rural community must
be able to apply sanctions against their positions being ignored. If
they have a legal right to participate, they must also have a means of
legal redress if they are not properly consulted.** In practise, parti-
cipation has to be more or less institutionalised, that is, some organi-
sations of citizens have to be recognised as representing specific com-
munities, otherwise it would be impossible to articulate discussions and
negotiations. The institutional aspects and executive powers of these
local organisations is dealt with in the following chapter. The frame-
work within which local planning takes place is discussed first.
Local planning, in the context of the rural development policies,
*In the words of Peter Marris', op. cit., "...when people formerly
without influence were invited to participate in decisions, they lost
their irresponsibility." He goes on to say, "when people or reformers
try to impose change or propose policy, if they deny others the chance
to do the same, they are treating them as Iuppets. ' When liberal people
propose reforms on behalf of blacks (or rich fur poor) even the most
honourable intentions can be profoundly alienating if they assume the
identity of those they seek to help, and tell them what their lives
should mean. To be told the meaning of your life by others, in terms
which are not yours, implies that your existence does not matter to them,
except as it is reflected in their own lives.
**In the United States, for example, citizens' groups have been able to
secure constant injunctions against plans on the grounds that they have
not been adequately involved, as is their right.
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requires a larger spatial context based on social, cultural, economic,
and physical functions, otherwise the locality will remain an enclave
of development or underdevelopment. Between the allocation of resources
at the national level, and its detailed organisation at the local level,
there is a qualitative gap (discussed earlier) which cannot be accomo-
dated within a single analytical framework. Regional planning is the
most suitable integrative tool for co-ordinating information and policies
between the two. It is both the synchroniser and the political tool for
the resolution of local and national aspirations. For example, the allo-
cation of national funds (as opposed to potential local resources from
agriculture, rural industry) that is, primarily the oil income in Iraq,
can be more readily achieved on a regional than a local basis. These
investments cannot be subdivided on the basis of over a hundred locali-
ties, but can be on the basis of nine regions ( discussed in sections
3.1 and 3.2), if for no other reason, the organisational task in the
former is well beyond Iraq's present reans (however, there are numerous
others).
An important clarification of the relationship between regional
and local planning as seen in this thesis must be stressed, that is, the
power of the regional authorities is primarily based on the aggregate
authority of the local units. This is necessary to safeguard against
regional planning becoming a mini-version of the present national planning
authority, resulting in centralised planning and development on a regional
basis. Furthermore, regional planners are likely to remain urban intell-
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ectuals for some time to come in Iraq, and just as liable to sweep aside
local qualitative and equity considerations as occurs presently at the
national level.
To expand on this critical issue, the internal balance in repre-
sentation within the nine regional authorities between the local urban
and rural populations will vary by region. For example, the new
Kurdish regional authority (a combination of Dhok, Arbil, Sulaimaniya,
see Map 7) would comprise: representatives from two cities of 100,000
population each; and from the localities, made up of representatives
from about 16 rural settlements of 5,000-14,000 population, and from a
similar number of agricultural co-operatives and rural industries which
could be chosen in rotation.* The representatives are not grouped
according to any hierarchy, rather, the body functionally and legally
represents a relationship among equals, to safeguard against the dic-
tation of policy from the two large cities. The regional planning and
administrative staff would be subject to this policy, and perhaps par-
ticipate in it at times. In addition, the majority of committee reetings
for decisions on specific rural development policies including financial
allocations need not include representatives from the two cities. How-
ever, for all major considerations both urban and rural representation
is required so as to avoid continued emphasis on the present dichotomy.
*For another example, the Mosul regional authority would comprise repre-
sentatives from one major city of 310,000, another city of 46,000 popu-
lation, and from the localities made up from rural settleirents, and a
similar number of agricultural co-operatives with a supporting planning
and administrative staff.
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The financial sources for the regional budget are dealt with in
the following section; however, it will clarify the argument here to
understand that it is made up of local revenues and taxes* plus a per-
centage of the national budget. The maning of decentralisation is that
the regional authority has the power, and eventually the capacity to
generate at least part of its finances and use them without intervention
from the national government. The crucial element in defining struc-
tural and financial relationships between the localities making up a
regional grouping then becomes the amount of control each exercises over
the operations of the productive systems in their areas, and over the
distribution of its output. The proposal of this thesis is that the
localities should have a majority control, but to ensure that each social
group derives benefits from the system, a certain percentage of profits
is redistributed through the collective regional authority. Similarly,
to ensure even distribution within a productive unit, the call is for
broadly based enterprises, for example, co-operative farming.
Regional planning is therefore not a substitute for either nation-
al or local planning. The argument is not one of centralisation versus
decentralisation, per se, rather it is one of striking the right balance
between the two. Regional planning is intended as a tool to align local
and national aspirations as much as possible through a continuous process
of approximation and mutual support. In sum, the regional planning au-
*Not over and above nationally collected taxes, but a part of them.
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thorities' responsibilities comprise:
-the co-ordination of local planning (through the collective
regional body) in addition to formulating regional plans
in the context of local situations, but within national con-
straints;*
-the determination of objectives and constraints for projects
controlled nationally, inter-regionally, or regionally (ex-
amples of the former include major highways, oil installa-
tions, and of the latter two, dams and major industrial
plants);
-the collection and generation of regionally based data;
-the responsibility directly or indirectly (through localities)
for implementation and follow up.
It is clear that this decentralisation has removed considerable
power from the national level, or the local and regional authorities
have been strengthened at the expense of the centre. This devolution
of authority requires political strength at the centre, which fortun-
ately is the case in Iraq. In China, for example, the highly central-
ised system disappeared in 1958 almost overnight, with some 85% of
*It should be noted that emphasis on analytical tools requiring large
quantities of refined data is not recommended, partly on the basic
grounds of lack of data, but also because the validity of such methods
to the participatory rural developwent policies outlined is questionable.
Furthermore, the dynamic quality of rural development is not well served
by the generally static models developed for the very different condi-
tions of developed countries.
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centrally controlled enterprises transferred to provincial authorities.*
This dispersal of industry to the countryside was accompanied by a vast
improvement in the economic situation of the rural population.**
The powers at the national level in Baghdad are mainly considered
in the following section after a better political context for decentral-
isation has been set. At this stage, it is only necessary to state that
the national authority does not have powers of veto over regional au-
thorities except in matters of centrally controlled enterprises such as
oil and petrochemicals, sulphur mining, iron and steel, other heavy in-
dustry, major transportation, military installations, major power and
electricity enterprises including dams, and other nationally important
public works and social and economic infrastructure. In other words,
it does not control the sectors specifically relevant to the rural de-
velopment policies, that is, for most agriculture, small-to-medium-scale
industry, local education and health, local public works, including roads
and infra-structures: although clearly there can be no uniformity in the
level of decentralisation between sectors at any time.
To establish the linkages between national, regional, and local
planning, we must turn to the process of integration or feedback between
these three levels. The traditional appraisal of a straightforward
breakdown of policies and aggregate figures from the national to region-
al to local levels, has already been severely criticised as inducing
*See Richard Kirby, "China's Strategy for Development," in Architectural
Design, London, March 1974, p. 142.
**Ibid.
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polarity and rigidity, and any approach to aggregate separately formula-
ted regional plans is also likely to lose relevance in the subsequent
attempt to coordinate them at the national level.
The answer, in keeping with the earlier discussion on decentrali-
sation of the planning process, is a continuous process of feedback and
interaction between national and regional levels, in which the latter
has few executive powers in isolation from the local communities it rep-
resents (therefore, it literally represents the locality in its dealings
with the centre). The function of regional planning is well described
in the following diagram, where the vertical function coordinates the
national and local levels. To be operative, regional planning must be
linked at both ends of the development chain. The sketch has been pur-
Localities
Region
National level
posely drawn horizontally to emphasize that there is no rigid hierarchy
in the decision making process. To the question of where to start this
process, the answer is, that assuming feedback, it does not matter. How-
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eyer, in the case of Iraq, because of the present centralisation, it
would be more appropriate to start at the regional level.
No discussion of a policy or planning process is complete with-
out relating it to time. Time is very ambiguous, difficult to focus on
and difficult to define. At this point the focus will be on aspects
of long, short, and immediate time spans, relevant to the rural devel-
opment policies and decentralised planning process just described.
Long-term guidelines for the rural development policies are
necessary to provide the context for their short-term development
(for example, directed towards the functional organisation of the
rural settlements in space), as well as to provide the necessary per-
spective for complementary longer term investments (such as dams and
main irrigation structures for rural development). In other words,
investments need to be allocated in both space and time. Fear of rigid-
ity resulting from the organisation of settlement development patterns
is not really justified here, as the diffused and decentralised approach
leaves considerable room for change in subsequent stages.
Short-term planning on its own, that is. without a longer-term
perspective, suffers from the constraints of time, and a necessity for
immediate action: As a result, it is often trend-extending, leaving
little maneuverability for the changes in policy and locations called
for by rural development. Furthermore, short-term planning, while
often leading to immediate benefits for some, may well aggravate future
problems and lead to long-term disbenefits. That is not to say that
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short-term benefits to the poor are necessarily harmful, rather, the
full implications of certain policies, such as the problems of rapid
urbanisation and polarisation discussed in Parts 2 and 3, must be con-
sidered both in the short-and-long-term. The problem here is one of
raising aspirations much higher than can be achieved (for example,
that of jobs in urban areas), which for example, the Chinese are gen-
erally careful not to do.
At the same time, it is important not to lose sight of the fact
that there is a qualitative change in nature between short-and-long-
term planning, where the latter is primarily directional and still
keeps the options open. Even the short-term plans, to be effective
must not be thought of as blue prints, for this assumes that policies
and the decision making process marks time, which is clearly unrealis-
tic. The dichotomy between long-and-short-term planning is parallel
in nature to decentralisation, as opposed to centralisation, in that
decentralisation keeps the options for future development open, while
the latter considerably reduces the field of choice.
On the other hand, participation of people in the planning pro-
cess, particularly as the concern is with rural development, is unlike-
ly to be very active or dynamic in considering long-term plans. The
rural population is more likely to be interested in planning new devel-
opment for the immediate future, as is the political decision maker
(who is the principal instrument for implementation). Thus, time rel-
ative to people and politicians (immediate and short-term must be con-
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sidered) together with time relative to the success of policy (often
long-term objectives).
A plan or policy for rural development is only as good as its
implementation : In the words of Napoleon Bonaparte, "War is easy, it is
waging it that is difficult" : In effect, this requires the direct and
active participation of both politicians and the affected rural popula-
tions. An established period of time in both political and agricultural
processes is one year. The former relating principally to the annual
budget and the latter to the seasons. It is here where the reconcilia-
tion between planner and peasant and politician must start. The most
widely circulated approach, proposed by Albert Waterston in response to
these problems is to:
-prepare annual sectoral plans, with an inventory of annual
public investment, consistent with available resources;
-link these annual plans with budgets by improving budgetary,
organisational, and administrative procedures;
-add perspective by the preparation of multi-annual sector
plans, or rolling plans, for a three year period (where
one plan is revised at the end of each year), followed by a
10 year perspective plan, in both cases by starting from
the annual plan.*
This process has numerous advantages and disadvantages. Among the former
*A. Waterston, Ibid., pp. 94-141.
154
are that it is a continuous ongoing process, involving or integrating
planning with political decision making. It has also built into it a
procedure for regular review, evaluation, and revision. However, the
problems are more numerous, and include the likelihood of trend-extend-
ing (because of lack of long-term perspectives at the outset), and little
emphasis on inter-sectoral linkages. In addition, over reliance on
budgets avoids the issues of radical change which the policies of this
thesis require, in that by focussing on public fiscal allocations,
attention is not directed towards mobilizing resources through other
means. To put it bluntly, most qualitative issues are lost. Further-
more, a lot of planning such as land reform, has little direct connec-
tion with expenditures, but a lot to do with development, and finally,
the budgetary process is not conducive to the proposed policies of dif-
fusion and multiple, small-scale, widely dispersed investment.
A more suitable approach is to first establish the constraints
for both national and regional planning authorities, set by the long-
term objectives and guidelines for rural development (determined by
the feedback process between national and regional authorities). This
would be followed by the production of an annual rolling plan adhering
to the long-term constraints and determined through the process of
iteration and participation described earlier. These rolling plans
particularly at the regional level, that is, relevant to the localities,
would comprise the fiscal, and non-fiscal qualitative aspects mentioned.
earlier, with an emphasis on the latter. In this manner, a more meaning-
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ful and implementable strategy is evolved and repeated annually, includ-
ing re-evaluation of the long-term constraints as a result of the pre-
vious year's performance.
The functioning of this process, particularly concerning the
budgetary aspects, will become clearer in the following sections on the
institutional aspects of this process. To initiate it is the most diffi-
cult step. A start, albeit an insufficient one, has been taken for the
Northern regions, which, as has been seen, lag behind most other regions.
The addition of the Southwestern region (grouping Qadisiya, Thi-Qar, and
Muthanna) which are the most lagging areas in Iraq, would seem to make a
suitable start. However, success of the process must be ensured and to
avoid unnecessary setbacks, final say on the initially decentralised re-
gions will require further on-the-spot study. Having discussed a theory
of decentralisation, it is the practise that is now considered.
6.3 THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK
The necessary political and administrative context for the devo-
lution of planning authority to regional and local authorities is con-
sidered in this section. As mentioned in the previous section, Iraq's
political ideology cannot be divorced from its planning system, if de-
centralisation is the aim. The essential starting point is the need for
a strong and cohesive ideology, partly to ensure a minimum of common
denominators concerning the general development goals, and the acceptance
of some basic criteria, perferences, and priorities. In other words, the
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healthy differences between cultures and localities described earlier
would be subject to a minimum of consensus concerning the priority of
rural development.
In addition to having a strong cohesive ideology, the government
needs to be stable* enabling it to take the radical decisions called
for by this thesis; such as redirecting a large portion of government
investment away from the major urban areas to agriculture and rural
industry, and the decentralisation of the bureaucracy, which is a slow
and costly process, very difficult to achieve, and will be strongly re-
sisted by the bureaucrats themselves. This explicit weakening of the
central government for the benefit of the local and regional authorities
will only be undertaken in government circumstances of strength in ide-
ology and security.
A decentralised planning process should be easier in a socialised
economy,** as social conflicts are likely to be more evenly handled
than in a market economy, where stronger pressures for individual gain
are more likely. However, in practise there are serious problems, as
exemplified by the U.S.S.R., where overconcentration of power breeds sim-
ilarly biased pressure groups (although the more successful Chinese and
Yugoslav models will be discussed later). Iraqi socialism at present
suffers from a similar over-concentration (see Section 3.1) where ideol-
ogy is interpreted primarily at the national level, and is imposed on
*Although danger clearly arises in this if a dictatorship settles in.
**A. Waterston, op. cit., p. 562.
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lower levels, which remain primarily administrative or technical. In
1958, a revolution in Iraq replaced a colonial ideology left over from
the British mandate, with a new ideology, which although more socialist,
remained polarised.
The progression in Iraq has so far moved from a heavily dualistic
society in which the rural sector is perceptibly divorced from and lags
behind overall development, to a government more concerned with rural
development, but superimposed from above. In the latter, a pattern of
reconstruction emerges, such as unilaterally imposed land reform and
co-operatives, where the people concerned are not consulted or partic-
ipant in the policy formulation. This thesis has no complaint against
the policies per se; however, they have not been particularly successful
because of the lack of local consultation and cooperation, as well as a
lack of local organisation.
Lasting roots can only be found in the rural areas, and from the
local culture, which is a reason why the stress has been in the previous
sections on building up the grass-roots base, within the present social-
ised ideological framework. To this end, a decentralisation of power to
the regional and local levels becomes necessary. As already discussed,
this process has been initiated in the Kurdish regions, where a start,
albeit insufficient and under the pressure of force of circumstances has
been taken. Encouragement of the government to take this process further
can only come through its own internal confidence and the persuasion of
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the government by different communities of the absolute necessity of
decentralisation for the integrity and true development of the country.
To enhance this devolution of authority, the narrowing of the
communication gap between planner and politician is necessary. It goes
without saying that to succeed, planning must be joined to effective
power at all levels. This rather obvious and simplistic statement is
continuously overlooked, and its importance underestimated by planners
in Iraq (and elsewhere), hence the low level of plan or policy implemen-
tation. Due to the radical nature of the policies proposed here, it is
particularly important for planners to spend a large proportion of their
time making sure of political support, and less time in preparing plans.
A better balance is called for, away from the present over-concentration
on plan preparation alone, otherwise, essays such as this will simply
acquire dust on a basement bookshelf.
The process being advocated attempts to lessen the present mutual
alienation between planner and politician by involving the politician
in the planning process from the outset, and more important, by ensuring
the planners (rather than the administrators) a role as the principal
advisors to the political decision makers. The stress on the latter is
because,
... the politician holds a position in a
power structure, from which he or she
cannot withdraw long enough to gather
detailed information, and subject it to
critical analysis. Nor are they free
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to draw conclusions impartially from
the evidence..,*
because their hands are always partially tied, and thus, any real as-
sessment depends on the politicians' outside advisors. It is through
this channel that the planner can enhance the chances of initiating
rural development policies and decentralisation.
It is not just a devolution of some of the powers of the centre
that must be sought, but also an internal change in the decision making
process itself towards a reduction in its hierarchy and structure.
Centralised governments such as Iraq's' are organised to institutionalise
not rational procedure, but levels of authority with "each level
jealously guarding its power from the intrusion of those below."**
Decision making starts at the top (ministers and top advisors), with
its administration and implementation below, while fact-finding, anal-
ysis, and planning are cast out of the hierarchy altogether. A hier-
archy of power therefore, cannot accomodate the requisite decentralised
planning process, which is continuous, iterative, self-correcting, and
egalitarian.
A recent survey of management problems in developing countries***
concluded that their management systems (public and private)were often
characterised by a high degree of central authority in the office of the
*C. Leys and P. Marris,"Planning and Development," in D. Seers, and L.
Joy (ed.), Development in a Divided World, Pelican, London, p. 279.
**Ibid., p. 280.
***UNRISD, "Research Notes, No,2," UN, N.Y.
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top management and a lack of delegation, which created difficulties for
effective and efficient management methods. Furthermore, these deci-
sions were often made without adequate consultation with subordinates.
It seems both irrational and unjust to assign to a higher association
what lesser and subordinate organisations are able to do. It should
first be necessary to prove that the lower levels are consistently in-
capable of fulfilling this function satisfactorily, and that the higher
level can do a better job. This is particularly important in the con-
text of rural development policies, where delays in certain supplies or
decisions can mean disaster. To be more specific, if the lines of re-
sponsibility between field officers or local/regional planners and the
top of the hierarchy are long, then requests from the local personnel
(extension-workers, schoolteachers, cooperative organisers) become
utterly frustrated by being more or less unimaginatively reinterpreted
and delayed by a succession of bureaucrats on the way.
In evolving a decentralised planning process for Iraq, a few
case studies are briefly examined, concentrating on China, because of
its emphasis on rural development, whereas decentralisation in the West,
say America or Britain, and even Russia, is more urban in orientation
and less egalitarian in outlook. Although rural decentralisation does
have a long history in America, its early mechanisation and inegalitar-
ian nature reduces its applicability to Iraq.
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Before proceeding with the Chinese case, it might help to very
briefly examine two countries which have strong local and regional plan-
ning authorities, but with a critically different emphasis. In Yugo-
slavia, planning bodies at the lower levels are fairly independent of
those above. There is coordination between the federal and republican
levels, who in turn work with district and local levels in drafting
plans, but at the same time, it is not required of plans at the lower
levels to concur in every respect with those at the national level.*
In fact as well as in principle, in Yugoslavia, the planning bodies at
lower levels are relatively independent of those above and are consid-
ered to be crucial elements of the planning process.** However, in
Russia and some other parts of Eastern Europe, although the regional
planning bodies are very important parts of the planning process, they
are utilised mainly to generate information and implement national plans,
rather than to participate in determining plans and policy,***
*See A. Waterston, op. cit., pp. 560-562.
**Other examples in a similar vein include Tanzania (see P. Marris, MIT
class notes held by this author) and Switzerland (see E.F. Schumacher,
op. cit., p. 107). In the former, the concern for ideology at all levels
has entailed substantial 'economic' costs (according to some accounts),
but it has also achieved stability and some participation, through pri-
mary emphasis on ujama villages and self reliance. This change has been
achieved without loss of confidence in local culture, that is, by re-
placing the previous colonial ideology for a new one, found not so much
among the elites, which are too influenced by Western models, but ra-
ther from the local culture and from the countryside. A very different
yet in some respects similar case, concerns Switzerland, a country of 6
millions, divided into more than 20 cantons, each of which is a kind of
development district, with the result that there is a fairly even
spread of population and industry, and there is no tendency towards the
formation of excessive concentrations.
***The Russian experiment in decentralisation was relatively brief, last-
ing from 1957 to 1970 when the regional councils were abolished and plan-
ning reverted back to a highly centralised form.
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In other words, planning policies are imposed from above on 'efficient'
local organisations which implement them. The Yugoslav approach is
clearly preferred.
In considering the Chinese case study, no attempt is made for
completeness or historical chronology. Only aspects relevant to the
Iraqi case for rural development and decentralisation are considered,
to which reference is constantly made where applicable, directly or by
adaptation. The following chart provides the overall Chinese context;
however, it should not be read in strictly hierarchical terms, due to
the relative autonomy of most operational and organisational aspects.
The related proposals for Iraq are in the adjacent chart. Under the
central government, there are 3 autonomous cities (an example is Shang-
hai), some directly run state factories and public works, and 21 pro-
vinces and 4 autonomous regions* (primarily remote, of minority races,
and of military importance). Translated to the Iraqi planning context,
the proposal is for: One autonomous city (Baghdad) under the central
government; a range of directly run industries (e.g. petro-chemicals,
steel) and infrastructure (e.g. air, sea, and rail transport, most dams);
and 9 regions of which Kurdistan could be an autonomous region.**
*N. Jeffrey, "Administrative/Political Structure for Planning (in China)"
in Architectural Design, March 1974, London, p. 144.
**Although this seems logical in the light of the current situation, at
this stage, it is not possible to be more specific for further on-the-
spot study and information is required.
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Under the Chinese provinces, are a total of 150 cities, many fac-
tories, and 14500 prefectures which are administrative districts for
rural areas.* Next in line are the counties (having towns, factories,
peoples' communes, and production brigades, which correspond in popula-
tion size to the proposed Iraqi regions. Again, translated to the 9
Iraqi regions, there are about 15 cities, certain large factories (such
as the paper mill North of Basra discussed earlier) , and probably
*N. Jeffrey, Ibid., p. 145.
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slightly over 100 districts. It is interesting to note that in China
the counties are the lowest level of State administration with a compre-
hensive responsibility in economic planning and development, industry,
agriculture, finance and commerce, education and health, as is the case
with the proposed Iraqi regional authorities (for certain enterprises
and levels). What is important is that these regional functions must not
relate to central ministries, by the branch principle of organisation,
which generally implies the centralisation of command and administration.
By contrast, in China, the inter-branch coordinating agencies or 'peoples'
committees', cut across branch lines, and therefore have the power to
pull together a broad range of activities such as those necessary for
rural development.
Further application of this principle implies that in a decentral-
ised planning process, the regional bodies must not be responsible to the
central planning organisation, but to the regional government. At pres-
ent, in Iraq, although all provincial activities, planning and other,
must go through the provincial governor (which seems suitable to the
principle of decentralisation), the same governor is a direct appointee
and responsible to the Ministry of Interior, a line agency, which negates
much of this office's value. However, the proposed regional authorities
are not subject to any line agency but to the regional government. Simi-
larly, at the local level, no formal bureaucratic administration is pro-
posed, rather local government is through committees. This is also fa-
ci.litated by the fact that rural areas are more difficult to run bureau-
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cratically than cities.
Decentralisation was only risked in China after the problem of
regionalism was solved. That is, regional power was given to a regional
party rectified of regionalism. Because these people were considered
loyal to Peking, they were awarded a broad range of operational autonomy
under the slogan 'do the best according to local conditions'.* However,
the checks remained in that the party secretary was generally from out-
side the province, and the provincial governors from inside, but most
power remained in the hands of the former. This imbalance between local
and national representatives should be reduced in the case of Iraq to
enhance mutual trust.
This appeasement of both national and regional groups appears to
be the only way to create a functioning regional body in Iraq, partic-
ularly during the initial period, in that the devolution of authority
requires communication and mutual trust between functionaries at the
centre and region. Communication between the region and locality is
theoretically assured by the very form of the executive regional author-
ity (discussed earlier). Thus, for the two initial regions, chosen for
decentralisation: a combination of representation from the Kurdish people
and from the central government is required for the Northern region; and
between Shi'a Arab representatives of the people in the South Western
region, and probably a Sunni Arab representative of the Central govern-
ment. However, it is very important to rapidly recruit local people
*See F. Schurman, Ideology and Organisation in Communist China, Univers-
ity of California Press, Berkeley, 1973 ed., p. 215.
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into regional government to avoid the appearance of an occupation from
outside*. Trust at the early stages is essential to avoid relation-
ships turning sour, which may well set back the programme for long per-
iods of time.
The next stage of the argument concerns the necessary financial
base of the regional and local organisations. As mentioned earlier,
experience shows that regional bodies are most successful when they
have resources of their own and administer their own budgets**. The
sources are partly from within the region, but particularly in the
early stages of decentralisation, a substantial part of the funds for
regional development need to come from the centre (but this portion will
become progressively less). In Iraq, this latter source for regional
budgets is likely to continue indefinitely, because the central control
of the oil wealth is necessary to ensure its even distribution. The
oil sector has not been considered in any depth in this thesis, as it
would have greatly expanded the topic. The wealth and power it.bestows
*An example of this can be seen in the regionalisation programme in
Thailand (set forth in conversations with Richard Meier at MIT in April
1974). The first step was to recruit people from the top rank of the
civil service, that is, the elite, from the capital, for the job of re-
gional development executive. Apparently, the reason for choosing from
the elites was so as to ensure direct access to the central authorities
or ministers, thus enabling the more rapid expedition of projects in
the future. These executives were persuaded to leave the capital only
after being assured that this was a good career line for advancement,
and it seems that later in the process, they all felt that they were
surviving politically. However, there is a clear conflict here with
local or regional identification, in that trust is likely to be short
in an executive from the centre, appointed by the centre. What can be
abstracted from this is, perhaps, an approach to transfer personnel
from central ministries reduced in 'size' (because of the loss of certain
powers) to the regions.
**A. Waterston, op. cit., p. 563.
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on the centre may diminish the possibilities for real decentralisation
unless, as is proposed (in the following section), a percentage of the
oil income is guaranteed by law to the regional government.
In China, the decentralisation in 1958 indicated no structural
rearrangements for financial subdivision in terms of control, but laid
down general lines of revenue sharing between the centre and regions,
with the latter authorities given a greatly increased share of budgetary
revenue (as well as retaining a share of the profits from regional enter-
prises)*. In all this, the heavy losers are the ministries or line
agencies. As the oil income is to be collected at the centre, this pro-
cedure is also proposed for Iraq.
In the Chinese decentralisation plants at county level and above
are primarily financed with government funds (from the provinces or pre-
fecturesf*, while in the communes (in size nearly equivalent to Iraq
districts), a substantial portion of the funds comes from local accumula-
tion.*** Thus, the primary stress at this level is on self-reliance.
To ease the burden on localities in some instances the state offers a
guaranteed market to local plants.**** In effect, the state initially
*F. Schurman, op. cit., pp. 208-209.
**Article by the Editor, Weekly Review, op. cit., p. 9.
***N. Jeffries, op. cit., p. 14, for an example of this in the financing
of a hydro-electric and irrigation project for 2,000 hectares in Shen
Deh county (in Kwangtung province), where the decision started at the
county level (after consultation with commune and brigade levels), and
was then reported to the Prefecture and Provincial levels for clearance.
Of the 6 million yuan required, the state, through the county, provided
1.2 million with the remainder coming from locally accumulated funds.
****Article by the Editor, Weekly Review, op. cit., p. 9.
168
assumes broad economic responsibility for the profitable operation of
local enterprises. All this is applicable to the Iraqi situation. In
time, both administration and budgeting would be more fully transferred
to the regions and their localities.
It is clear that one essential part of the decentralisation
process is for the centre to share with the local and regional entities
a portion of national revenues (see section 6.4) proportionate to the
responsibilities being transferred, otherwise, decentralisation would
amount to an increase in indirect taxation (to the detriment of the local
population).* Although the decentralisation of planning and plan im-
plementation is warranted,.the evidence indicates that in matters of
taxation, the opposite may be necessary, to ensure equitable distribu-
tion.** Another important aspect of decentralisation of financial power
is that it is likely to result in a reduction in corruption, due to the
less centralised control of funds.
To ensure equitable distribution within regions, dual control of
prices and certain supplies, some centrally and others regionally con-
trolled, is necessary.** To conclude this section, a brief examination
*Thus, in China (see article by the Editor, Weekly Review, op. cit,,
p. 12) the financial responsibility is being transferred from the gov-
ernment directly to the farms and factories in the towns and cities, in-
cluding education (responsibility of brigades at primary level and com-
munes for middle schools). Whereas, in India.(see Malgavkar, op. cit.,
p. 125), the rural industries programme was reviewed in 1966 (four years
after its inception) to find that the existing administrative process
adversely affected the implementation of the programme.
**Again, the case of China, see F. Schurman, op. cit., p. 178.
169
of some specific implications of such decentralisation for rural indus-
try, agriculture and education follows, again mostly using the Chinese
case study.
Industry transferred to provincial and lower levels of control*
in China comprised most light, non-strategic, heavy, and construction
industries.- The provincial authorities thus acquired a greater share of
production profits and greater control over personnel and the allocation
of materials than previously. Concomitantly, the planning system was
greatly simplified with considerable leeway given to factory managers,
with flexibility in decisions on reinvestment of a percentage of enter-
prise profits.** Of particular interest in this context is the fact that
some 80% of light industry in China (in 1957) was dependent on agricul-
tural raw materials, and the particular emphasis on self-reliance at the
lower levels meant reliance on labour-intensive production and the devel-
opment of notably local capital resources. These procedures would all
seem to be very valid for Iraq, and form part of the proposals for rural
development and decentralisation.
*For'a m6re detailed subdivision, see the article by the Editor, Weekly
Review, op. cit., p. 8, which lists the following breakdown of responsi-
bilities: -at provincial level - major plants for tractors, machine
tools, electric power;
-at district level - farm machinery, small engines, simple
lathes; .
-at county level - machine repair shops, small chemical fer-
tiliser plants;
-at commune level - small shops for maintenance and tool
repair.
N.B. There is a certain similarity here with the rural industries sug-
gested in Part 3.
**F. Schurman, op.it., pp. 176, 205.
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For agriculture, the concept is of a network of local cooperatives
which, particularly at the early stages, can draw on technical and finan-
cial support from the main local agro-industrial organisation of the
district (based in the small rural towns discussed in Part 2). It should
be remembered that these main local organisations together form the core
of the regional authority (see previous chart), and provide an effective
link between the different regional administrative units, as well as
helping in the training of local technicians and operators, and in the
maintenance works.
The importance of these organisations can be seen by their in-
ducement of high agricultural growth rates in Japan and Taiwan,* and in
the Comilla Academy in Bangladesh. This academy
.propagates the methods it teaches by handing
the responsibility directly to those who in the
long run have to make use of the new techniques,
and it is in a large measure due to the direct
involvement and participation of both officials
and the people that the academy's work is effec-
tive in mobilising efforts for rural development.**
Two crucial points come out of this quotation, namely: that the
success of the local organisations proposed in this thesis requires con-
tinuous political support (for which local competence needs to be demon-
strated); and that while financial and technical measures are extremely
important, their effect will be relatively small in the absence of active
local participation. A major problem here is that cooperation has to be
*UNRISD, op. cit., pp. 105-106.
**See R. Schickle, op. cit., p. 62.
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stimulated, and often created where there has been no tradition of it
except in the very small tribal 'batn' and extended family scale (men-
tioned earlier).
The absence of cooperation between the present centrally and
bureaucratically administered industrial and educational establishments
in Iraq, and between them and the more diffused and badly organised agri-
cultural establishments is a very powerful negative influence on regional
and rural development. In improving communication and cooperation the
role of education is particularly important. The problems of education
(particularly concerning rural development) in Iraq are found at the local
level, yet the resources and powers of decision are concentrated in the
Ministry of Education in Baghdad.
In the context of a more decentralised and appropriate educational
system, the potential link between local schools and the Ministry of Ed-
ucation could be a regional administrator or supervisor, incorporated
within the regional planning authority. This office offers the potential
for communication between national and local planning levels, enabling
the modification of programmes in response to local need. The machinery
for this already exists within the present Muhafadha (province) system,
but authority is lacking. These regional supervisors are key people to
recruit and must be resident in or near the locality, have sufficient
powers, and be able to get a hearing and timely decisions from above.*
*An illustration of this approach can be seen in the case of Ciudad Guyana
in N..McGinn and R. Davis, Build a Mill, Build a City, Build a School,
MIT Press, 1969, p. 250.
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As mentioned in the Preview, the lack of sufficient local infor-
mation is the reason why at times this chapter becomes perhaps too gen-
eral in nature. However, this is not necessarily detrimental, for to
take the arguments of this section concerning the relationships between,
and the formations of, the local, regional, and national planning organi-
sations and authorities further requires local participation as well as
additional information and on-the-spot study. The following concluding
section takes these issues concerning the three main planning levels,
namely national, regional, and local to their operational or institu-
tional towns.
6.4 THE OPERATING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
This section follows on directly from the previous two on the
decentralised planning process, and its political and administrative
framework for rural development. Here the concern is with the three
principle planning institutions, namely the Central Planning Organisa-
tion (CPO), Regional Planning Organisation (RPO), and local organisations
which together form the heart of the decentralised process.
THE CENTRAL PLANNING ORGANISATION
As described earlier, in Section 3.1, the existing CPO is largely
concerned with maintaining the status quo. Its structure is hierarchical,
and any linkages with other central agencies, let alone regional author-
ities, are nominal, or at least uni-directional. Evolving a CPO to fit
the requirements of decentralisation and rural development calls for the
present organisation to cease resembling a bureaucracy in the traditional
173
sense, and lose its rigid lineal hierarchy. This demands:
-augmenting the present vertical linkages with strong
horizontal ones, between sections and departments in
the administrative structure;
-shifting the emphasis of the CPO's administrative
structure from organisational or rule-observation,
to a goal or policy orientation;
-recognising its mutual interdependence with other
ministries and departments, and consequently es-
tablish two-way communications;
-recognising its mutual interdependence with the 9
regional authorities, particularly important in
the light of the devolution of a sizeable portion
of its present responsibility and authority to them.
Two principal approaches to CPO's have been identified. To
be more explicit, the first coincides with the present CPO in Iraq, and
considers that a Ministry of Planning (the parent ministry of the CPO)
is not adequate, because the conflicts with other ministries involved
in the planning process in a 'competition among equals' remain.*
Consequently, it calls for a cross-ministerial co-ordinating planning
*A list of those presently involved in rural development includes the
Ministries of: Agriculture, Agrarian Reform, Irrigation, Northern
Affairs, Municipal and Rural Affairs, and Economy (mainly for agricul-
ture); Industry; Public Works and Housing, Communications, Health, and
Education (for social and other services); and of course, the Ministry
of Interior.
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authority attached to the President's or Prime Minister's office. This
authority would, therefore, be above ministerial or sectoral realms, and
assuming it is bestowed with the relevant authority, it would have access
to and coordinating powers over them. The magnitude of potential con-
flicts in such a proposal, which reduces some of the independent planning
powers of the various ministries, is considerable, and although such
bodies do exist in some countries, they not surprisingly, remain inoper-
ative; that is, without sufficient power and authority.
The second point of view complains that such an agency is treated
with suspicion and even hostility by other government ministries and
agencies, let alone any regional authorities to whom they seek to dictate
policy. Experience shows that if a planning agency's powers impinge
heavily on another department, antagonism results and it becomes diffi-
cult for the planning agency to perform its functions.* In other words,
activities work better if they do not entail any threat or hint of in-
fringement of autonomy. Furthermore, the relative autonomy of the min-
istries often corresponds to the real. political independence of powerful
ministers, and tends to make the theoretical hegemony of an all-powerful
planning office unrealistic.
The second approach correctly assumes that the smaller the burden
placed on the central planning agency, the better its chances of operating
effectively. This is clearly implicit in the devolution of a large por-
*A. Waterston, op. cit., p. 465.
175
tion of its power to the regional authorities. Hence, a planning agency
does well to remain small, leave much to other ministries, and not attempt
to compete with them. Waterston, in echoing this approach, states that
common sense tells us that the operating organisation will cooperate more
wholeheartedly on a project or programme which it has conceived and pre-
pared than on one which was formulated and foisted upon it by another
agency.* However, if left in total isolation, inter-sectoral problems
appear. This lack of coordination between the planning and operational
ministries can be minimised by bringing operational personnel into the
planning process, and appointing planners to the relevant operational
ministries for rural development: the.most important ones being Agri-
culture and Agrarian Reform, Industry, Irrigation, Minicipality and Rural
Affairs, and Health and Education.
In short, variations on the second option are more in keeping
with the decentralised process for rural development. The role of the
CPO should be mainly to perform a sufficiently broad synthesizing role
and to avoid becoming absorbed in over-specialised administrative tasks,
and to evolve and evaluate policy in cooperation with regional author-
ities and the other relevant ministries.** In actual fact, the CPO
cannot synthesize effectively without some controls,*** that is, while
*See A. Waterston, op. cit., p. 445.
**Ibid., p. 464.
***Among the decisions which planning must influence if it is to be effec-
tive (in addition to agricultural and industial investment) for rural de-
velopment are budgets, legislation, land acquisitions and sales, building
permits, schools and health facilities, etc.
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the planning agency can be less involved in detailed implementation,
both the CPO and the relevant operational ministry must be involved in
the policy or plan formulation stage of the process, partly through a
two-way exchange of staff. The importance of the two-way link is that
the CPO must be willing to learn from the operational ministries (and
the regional authorities) who are more involved in the practical reali-
ties of specific situations.
What must be avoided is making and imposing plans or policy on a
ministry, for this will surely stop their implementation. It must not
be forgotten that most policies relevant to rural development are de-
termined at the regional level, that is, by participation of the local-
ities. (Even if the CPO's authority carries the day, the problem will
return at implementation stages. In the case of Iraq, it is probably
only through informal contacts between individuals that the necessary
cooperation and coordination can be assumed.* Unfortunately, this has a
tendency to strengthen central cliques. However, with the devolution of
power away from the centre, this negative aspect of informal contacts
will diminish.)
There are many additional advantages in the more active links
established between planner and politician, some of which were discussed
earlier. A critically important one is the potential for policy eval-
uation. This is crucial because the decision maker needs to know what
*Various other methods, through committees between ministries, or super
ministries, or an official coordinating body have a fairly poor record.
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happened and why, for unless the consequences of decisions are contin-
uously reported back, there can be little rational progress in the
effort towards a continuous and decentralised planning process.
The following diagram represents a crude approximation of the
proposed process; reference should be made to the existing scheme
illustrated in Section 3.1.
HIGHER PLANNING COUNCIL
9 RPO's CPO OTHER MINISTRIES
The suggestion is to retain the Higher Planning Council, which in effect
operates as a Council of Ministers. As discussed earlier, the relation-
ships between the various planning bodies is not hierarchical, rather
it is circular or one between equals.* The 9 RPO's would have access
to the CPO as well as the Higher Planning Council and other ministries
when necessary.
Before concluding this section on the CPO, it should be noted that
the process of annual budgeting is not left in isolation at the Ministry
of Finance, rather the decentralised process foresees close collabora-
tion between this ministry, the CPO, and the nine RPO's perhaps by means
*B. Horvat, in H. Faber, D. Seers (eds_, The Crisis in Planning, p. 198,
states that this philosophy is well advanced in Yugoslavia, where in
contrast to the normal vertical hierarchy, there is no official hier-
archy. He goes on to say that there are no official lines of subordi-
nation, and coordination is instead put on a horizontal footing under
the three slogans, 'decentralisation, democratisation, and de-etatisa-
tion'.
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of interdepartmental budget committees. Although participation of the
Ministry of Planning in the preparation of the ordinary budget has had
a long and unsatisfactory history in Iraq,* it has been primarily due
to the overconcentration of power in the hands of a few ministries, not
least of which is the Ministry of Finance. In the context of decentral-
ization, this power will have been curtailed, which should enhance the
prospects for collaboration. Other extreme measures such as bringing
the budgetary department under the aegis of the Ministry of Planning**
is more likely to subvert the rural development policies proposed here.
Apart from reducing the time available for planning, the inclusion of
this very quantitative process (more inclined to the modern sector)
directly in the planning process, further discourages proper considera-
tion of the qualitative issues so necessary for rural development. In
brief, the CPO's power and function includes: participation in deci-
sions on central budgetary allocation between the 9 regions, Baghdad
(the single autonomous city) and the budget centrally controlled by the
CPO and the various government ministries and agencies, joint development
*F. Jalal, The Role of Government in the Industrialization of Iraq,
Frank Cass, London, 1972, p. 77. A law calling for such participation
was decreed in 1961 (Law No. 70 of 1961), but the Ministry of Finance
rejected this view, and in 1964 another law (No. 44 of 1964) was passed,
making supervision of the budget one of the planning body's obligatory
tasks. This also seems to have had no administrative effect, and a
further law (No. 37 of 1965) was passed, again stressing the importance
of such participation in budget preparation. However, a later law (No.
18 of 1966) reduced the role of the planning body to an "expression of
Opinion" which makes it totally ineffective.
**A. Waterston, op.cit., p. 384, suggests that 'the power of the Ministry
of Finance limits the impact of the CPO, then the government should move
this interdepartmental committee under the aegis of the Ministry of
Planning, as happened in Malaya, Iran, Korea, and Venezuela."
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with the RPO's, of annual rolling plans in the context of the above
objectives, in which the CPO and other central government bodies have
jurisdiction over the oil, steel, and other major heavy industries,
transportation network, hail, sea, air, and main highway, and other
nationally important public works and social and economic infrastructure.
It does not have authority over: local agricultural and rural industries,
local health, education, local public works, and infrastructure, and
the regional budget, all of which are subject to the regional and local
authorities.
The following section discusses these regional planning bodies,
which complement the CPO but are not related to it hierarchially. In
this context, it bears repetition that the RPO's are not isolated
planning bodies, but a collection of local organizations, and this is
crucial, for a plan's success depends also on public acceptance of its
objectives. Planners should never forget this.
REG IONAL PLANNING ORGANIZAT IONS
It should be clear by now that both the quality of planning and
the degree to which its general objectives are supported by the country
as a whole, depends to a large extent on giving responsibility to the
regional and local authorities. To this end, the present regional
structure (the 16 existing Muhafadhas or provinces were discussed in
Section 3.1), must change radically and fundamentally, although they
represent a starting point from which to progress to better regional
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definition, more authority, and better personnel. The detailed deline-
ation of regional boundaries need not cause much trouble, as the new
lines could -be drawn along existing gada (district) boundaries. It
must be emphasized that these boundaries should not be Considered as
fixed, and should be allowed to change and evolve in time as needed.
Of the nine RPO's proposed, two have been selected for initiating the
policies for decentralization: one is the North, covering the Kurdish
areas (primarily Dhok, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya) where a faltering step
in the right direction has already been taken, and the other is in the
South West, comprising Qadisiya Muthanna and Thi-Qar. To function
effectively, these regional authorities must be statutory and not merely
advisory bodies with no executive function. Otherwise, there will be
little incentive or authority to coordinate the various activities
called for by the rural development policies, and any local planner/
administrator or manager with capacity and initiative, not to mention
the rural population in general, will move to Baghdad, the centre of
power. With this, the local rural population will subside to passivity,
as at present.
To ensure permanence, the RPO's must be institutionalized. There
are 4 of potentially applicable institutional variations for these
authorities, as indicated below.
- legal--providing each authority with a percentage of national
revenue (determined by consultations between the Higher Planning
Council, the CPO, and the nine RPO's), which need not be a
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fixed percentage, as this may will rigidify the system, and
lead to misallocation, in terms of too small or too large
sums for a particular region;
- administrative--that is, institutionalized by administrative
decree, which is the present case, but this alone would be too
weak a measure to shift the centre of gravity of decision
making;
- corporate-- (for example, Guyana Corporation, Tennessee Valley
Authority), having ample financial resources, however, in
practise, these have been limited to one, or a few important
and often lagging regions in a county, resulting in pressures
on the government to redress the imbalance; in addition, they
are generally very non-participatory (the TVA being an exception);
- independent local government--having its own resources is not
feasible because of the necessary central collection of the
oil and mineral wealth to ensure equitable distribution.
The first approach appears to be the most favorable, given that the
revenue allocation remains flexible. By this is meant that the alloca-
tions need to take account of the existing conditions in each region in
terms of size of population, level of income disparity, level of social
and economic infrastructure, etc., all of which will change in time
between regions. As all the nine regions, with the exception of Anbar,
roughly have populations between 0.7-1.05 million out of a total popu-
lation of 10.4 million (that is roughly 7-10 percent of the country's
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population in each region), a good rule of thumb may will be to distrib-
ute not less than 7 percent of development funds to each region (expept
Anbar). Minimum allocation is often a euphemism for maximum allocation,
but the fact that the distribution is decided by consultation between
the various regional and central authorities is in itself a safeguard,
although perhaps not a foolproof one.
The only other feasible alternative is the corporate institution.
Such authorities are potent institutes, and being regionally based,
often succeed in obtaining local popular support, giving them extra
strength in dealings with the national authorities. Although this is
in keeping with the philosophy of decentralization, these authorities
have a tendency to become very strong, which may well lead to pressure
for regional separatism, and this is sadly becoming a real danger in the
Kurdish regions. For this and the reasons cited earlier, it is not a
particularly suitable regional institutional form for Iraq.
Regarding financial allocation, the annual resource allocation
and budgetary process whereby a regionalized national budget is effected
has already been discussed. The ensuing political power accorded to the
RPO's will give them the feeling that they truly form an integral part
of the country, and hopefully, will become very effective in promoting
rural development and regional dynamism. To further stimulate and
encourage public participation, particularly at the outset, the govern-
ment should actively publicise the new approach for rural development
strategies. People will be able to see the goals in perspective, and
183
how they fit into them. That is, a villager might not migrate, knowing
that the local rural settlement was to be infused with the social
capital presently lacking, as well as with small scale industry. This
would be particularly enhanced by the decentralization process, as the
villager would be in a position to press for its implementation through
the local organization. This process which yields considerable control
to the people most affected by the same decision seems certain to
mobilize popular self-help, by employing individual and collective poten-
tials of the local community and region.
To conclude this section, there are two simultaneous problems
regarding the institutionalization of the RPO's within the planning
process. The first concerns the establishment and internal functioning
of the RPO's, and the second concerns the problems of structure, coor-
dination and communication with higher levels. Communication with
lower levels is implicit in the very nature of the RPO's; however, these
local organizations need to be given time to establish themselves and
their identity. In the present case, the crucial starting point is to
first establish the two RPO's proposed and subsequently expand the number
(whether all at once of one by one is an issue for further study) while
allowing for coordination and communication (that is, the iterative
process) will improve gradually.
The concluding section of this chapter is on local organizations,
which are critical for the success of the rural development policies,
as well as for the deceatralized planning process. Without them, region-
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al planning may well become just as polarized in its application as
central planning is at present.
LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS
Mobilization of the rural potential, a clear objective of this
thesis, is, at least in the initial stages, likely to depend largely on
initiative, organization and resources from outside. However, the
emphasis of this effort must be principally focussed on developing local
awareness and abilities for organization, without which, their present
dependency will never be replaced by self-reliance and active partici-
pation in rural development.* Under laissez-faire economies, the lack
of such organization encourages large-scale development and polarized
benefits, but in Iraq, a country where land reform has removed the
previous land distribution inequalities, the lack of effective local
organization has resulted in migration, apathy, and a neglect of agri-
culture and the rural areas.
The approach towards rural development, as established in this
thesis, cannot be understood except in the framework of the wider insti-
tutional reform which has been the subject of this whole chapter. In
this favorable institutional framework, the need to evolve local organ-
izations is critical; after all, progress is mainly made possible through
*The lack of such organization in Mexico has been instrumental in
encouraging the dualistic pattern of development, whereas in Japan and
Taiwan, the presence of these institutions has been such as to
encourage wide participation, particularly of small family farms in the
technological transformation and development of agriculture, enhancing
the relative uniformity of income distribution.
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local initiative, that is, when it is released. In other words, when
small rural population groups acquire a sense of functional belonging
to a wider society, they are more likely to lose their sense of being
at the mercy of the outside forces. Or in the words of Liu Shao-Chi,
"Only through the people's own struggles and efforts can their eman-
cipation be achieved, maintained and consolidated."* Furthermore,
"Creativity always comes as a surprise to us, therefore we necessarily
underestimate our creativity, and a lot of tasks that seem improbable
at first sight, are very feasible, given the chance."**
Instead of dogma and rigid doctrine, society becomes integrated
through the cross-cutting loyalties of these local organizations, to
which everyone is subject. Thus, in rural areas, a villager's occupa-
tion makes for loyalty to the local cooperative, or industrial enter-
prise; as a tribesman loyalty is to the clan, and so on. So long as
each bring the villager into association with a different group, the
potential disruptiveness of block (rather than societal) loyalties, is
checked by the need to maintain ties with other bodies. Such local
organizations also guard against excessive differences between urban and
rural wages. Paradoxically, trade unions, the equivalent urban organi-
zations, in this context, represent and defend the'already priviledged
urban workers, often at the expense of the undefended agricultural laborer.
*S. Barraclough, in R. Weitz (ed.), op.cit, p. 378.
**A. 0. Hirschmann, Development Projects Observed, Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institute, 1967, p. 13.
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The principle local organizations foreseen are those pertaining
to rural settlements (agro-industrial enterprises as well as municipal
authorities), and agricultural cooperatives. These local organizations
contribute to planning to the extent that they influence political
processes and decision making. The principle local organization based
in the rural town, discussed earlier (for the Northern region) is made
up of representatives from the local agricultural cooperatives and rural
industries, chosen in rotation if their number exceeds a manageable
level. Again, there is no hierarchy. There may well be a difference
in population size or wealth, but this is not translated into a rigid
hierarchical structure. The absence of any part of this lower level
of organization (below regional) will tempt the upper levels to misuse
their power as they have done in the past.
An approach to growth, particularly in the agricultural sphere on
purely cooperative lines, without the use of privately employed labor
is almost certain to be much slower and probably less productive. However,
it holds out more hope of an equal distribution of wealth. Cooperatives,
as local organizations, have multiple purposes and are also likely to
be more effective than purely social organizations, as they associate
people as well as an economic enterprise. Their tasks are fairly wide-
spread and integrative, incorporating economic production; the diffusion
of intermediate technology, and training; the development of informed
citizens; as well as the social and political aspects of generating local
leadership, of encouraging people to contribute to improving their
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condition by their own means and effort through participation in the
working comunity, and encouraging awareness in others.
To be effective, a cooperative structure must not be imposed from
above, as is the current approach in Iraq, for unless the necessary
educational work is carried out simultaneously, the organizations will
be cooperatives in name only. It seems obvious that if cooperatives
are to achieve their aims, all of their workers should participate in
their economic benefits and decision making. In practice, this is very
difficult in traditionally organized societies, because of the likelihood
of excessive paternalism from within, further exacerbated in the "top
down" approach by the presence of officials and extension workers from
a "higher" and better educated social class.* It generally appears to
these officials to be more efficient to build cooperatives from the top
down, instead of from the bottom up, as the latter course is more diffi-
cult and requires patient and skillful educational and promotional
efforts.**
For all its present problems, there is much room for hope in the
framework of the proposed principle local organizations in rural settle-
ments, which will serve as a catalyst in organizing marketing facilities
*See S. Barraclough, op.cit., p. 382.
**F. Schurman states that to negate the problems of the traditionally
structured communities just mentioned, the Chinese would set the bound-
aries of cooperatives through the village, hoping by dividing it to
"smash the traditional leadership." At a later stage of development,
the cooperative could be reformulated to include the whole village.
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and diffusing intermediate technology. These organizations will also
be participant in initiating localized education and training called
for by these.policies. Through the better organization envisaged by
the process, these principal local organizations, acting as local govern-
ments, should also be in a better position to extend credit facilities
from within, and by borrowing from the various agricultural banks, or
the regional fiscal authority.* Through these credits, it would seem
to make sense to most cooperative organizations for the government to
acquire a small equity interest (but without managerial involvement).
This is partly so that it may directly -benefit from any profits, but the
interesting point is that its voting or non-voting equity interest pro-
vides an opportunity for the regional authority to be directly involved
and aware of local affairs, and then ensures a useful channel of
conmunication, which could greatly enhance coordination and the inte-
grative process.
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that these coopera-
tives or local groupings for rural industry are not an end in themselves,
but are primarily an institutional means of organizing mutual self-help
and development. It is the local population's subsequent initiative
that decides the relative success of a project. However, in lagging
*J. Van Muralt, Rural Institutes and Planning Change in the Middle East
and North Africa in A Review of Rural Cooperation in Developing Areas,
Geneva, 1969. So far, apparently only in the Basra region have cooper-
atives extended loans to members from within (to buy pumps); elsewhere,
it has been through external banks, etc.
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areas, where the population is poor and unstable (where the more dynamic
people have systematically migrated), the government needs to play a
very active and encouraging role, so as to stimulate people long accus-
tomed to seeing their region lag far behind other areas. This could be
done through the regional authorities where applicable. This raises
the issue of whether RPO's get initiated before local organizations and
cooperatives get going. Again further study is called for; however,
emphasis on the local organizations sould be greater so as to avoid
powerful RPO's being formed.
According to Schickle, there are five basic needs for rural devel-
opment, namely:
- local transportation and marketing facilities (such as food
processing plants) in which the types, size and financing
cannot be decided by the center, but must be locally determined;
- R & D and extension services, in which the need is to adopt
and develop technology suitable to local conditions, and sub-
sequently demonstrate them;
- credit and marketing services, implying well-managed cooperatives;
- favorable rural social environment which includes the need to
develop managerial capacities, and encourage opportunities
for self-improvement, the need for participation, schools,
land reform, etc.
To these should be added equitable distribution of the benefits of devel-
opment, which as with the other items requires the lessening of dependency,
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and dualism, particularly between agriculture and industry (or between
rural and urban areas). This thesis has attempted to deal in varying
depth with all these issues for rural development in Iraq. It is
fitting that this chapter concludes, as did Part 2, with local organi-
zations in general, and people specifically, for this has been, and
remains, the primary focus.
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7 SUMMARY STATEMENT AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
At the outset, it should be stressed that this thesis no more than
initiates the study for rural development and decentralization in Iraq.
An enormous amount of work is now required to make implementable pro-
grams out of the initial policies.
The thesis just sets out in Part 1 to establish the polarizing
tendencies of present policies and the overcentralized and uncoordinated
nature, in terms of physical, economic, and social aspects, of the planning
process, leading to the concentration of investments and benefits of
development primarily in Baghdad and to a lesser extent in Basra and
Mosul. The losers have been and remain the rural population who have
been denuded of their most able people through imigration. The theme of
this thesis, namely rural development, is in response to the present
dualism which neglects the traditional rural sector.
Part 2 discusses the rural development policies and concludes with
proposals for developing agriculture and rural industry in a complemen-
tary manner through the extensive use of intermediate levels of technol-
ogy and more appropriate forms of local education. The importance of
local R & D institutes in the former and of a decentralized or localized
educational system in the latter was emphasized. The principle statement
of this second part is that the diffusion of development benefits and a
reduction of the inequities in income and life style between the urban
and rural areas is only possible through development "from below", that
is, through self-reliance and self-sufficiency. To this end, the parti-
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cipation of people in this development of their locality becomes essential.
To render this participation meaningful, power must be invested in the
local and regional organizations, which calls for substantial devolution
of authority from the center. The process of achieving this decentral-
ization is the subject of Part 3.
Decentralization is probably the most difficult topic to evolve a
program for from a distance, because of the explicit requirement for very
specific and detailed knowledge of the present institutions in Iraq, and
the numerous localities and regions. In addition, the people in these
localities and regions are the principle benefactors of rural development,
must be encouraged to organize themselves locally. None of these factors
can be satisfactorily studied from a distance. For this reason, this
part more so than the others represents an initial step in which more
questions are raised than answered.
The decentralized planning process hinges on the interactions
between the Central Planning Organization and 9 Regional Planning Organ-
izations. The latter organizations are subject to and a part of regional
authority composed of representatives from agricultural cooperatives,
rural industry, rural municipalities, and the major regional cities.
The relationship between these representatives must be hierarchical so
as to ensure that the regional authority is not dominated by its main
urban center. Thus, regional authority is dependent on local sanction
and approval, and cannot function in isolation. This is to ensure true
diffusion of development in the rural areas rather than it being recen-
tralized at the regional level.
193
The power and authority of the respective levels (that is, national,
regional, and local) is as follows: At the national level, power and
authority of the CPO is restricted to determination of long-term objec-
tives and guidelines for short term development jointly with the Regional
Planning Organization; joint development also with the RPO's of annual
rolling plans in which the CPO and other central government bodies have
control over the oil sector, steel, other major heavy industries, primary
transportation, and other nationally important public works and social
and economic infrastructures.
Budgetary appropriations between the central government, the 9
regional authorities and the autonomous city of Baghdad is another critical
area in which the CPO patricipates. The allocations are determined by
joint decision of these same parties; however, as a safeguard, a minimum
of 7 percent (evolved on the basis of regional population) of the national
development budget must be allocated to the 9 RPO's (see section 6.4).
This is, some 60 percent of this budget is guaranteed to be spent in the
regions and primarily in the rural areas, because the control of the
regional authorities is biased towards local communities and their
organizations. The importance of this is that a sizeable portion of the
national income is from the oil sector, and this is likely to continue
to be centrally controlled in the forseeable future. It should not be
forgotten that a sizeable portion of the central budget is also spent in
the regions, but most of this will be on major projects and infrastructure.
The regional authorities have complete comtrol of the regional
budget; that is, the central government has no powers of veto. The
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authorities (whose composition was described earlier) are aided by the
RPO's in determining regional plans (on an annual rolling basis) and
allocating the regional budget to local agriculture and rural industry,
local health and education, local public works and infrastructure. In
effect, their principle responsibility is to coordinate the needs and
opportunities of the various localities within the region.
The local organizations need to be considered in conjunction with
the regional bodies. The main local units based on the rural towns of
5,000-15,000 population and averaging about 10 per region (see Section
4.5) bring together the surrounding agricultural cooperatives, rural
industries and local municipalities, and represent them at the regional
level. However, control of local agriculture and industry is in the
hands of the respective agricultural cooperatives and rural industrial
organizations; that is, once the regional budget has been allocated,
the power is transferred to the specific enterprises.
The three organizations (national, regional, and local) together
form the crux of the argument for decentralization. It is perhaps
appropriate to conclude by restating the objective of this thesis, and
that is to reduce inequities between peoples in different regions and
in urban and rural areas. The emphasis here has been on rural people
and their development through self-sufficiency and self-reliance and the
theme is well illustrated in this quote from Albert Camus, "real generosity
towards the future lies in giving all to the present."*
*A. Camus, The Rebel, New York: Vintage Books, 1957, p. 304.
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APPENDICES 1 AND 2
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A)'ENDIX 1 (to sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4)
URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH
It is not clear on what basis the projections in Table.1 were made,
except that the figures imply extrapolation for 1973-80 on the basis of
the growth that took place between 1965-73. This is evident in the simi-
larity of the relative values of the gain or loss in urban and rural pop-
ulation at these bench-mark years. This trend-extending viewpoint needs
to be borne in mind in reading the figures and their conclusions as de-
scribed below.
Between 1947 and the projected figures for 1980, the national pop-
ulation increases by a factor of less than 3, while:
1. Baghdad region increases by a factor of 6;
2. Sulaimaniya, Babylon and Kerbela regions- increase
by a factor of 3;
3. Kirkuk region increases by a factor of 2 ;
4. Nineveh-Dhok, Diala and Anbar regions increase by
a factor of 2;
5. Wasit region increases by a factor of less than 2;
6. Qadisya, Muthanna, Maysan and Thi-Qar regions retain
remarkably stable population totals, indicating con-
siderable loss through migration.
The percentage increase in urban population and its regional distri-
bution between 1973-80 is similar to the increase between 1965-73 and
tallies with the polarized tendencies implicit in the above figures. The
national urban population increased by over 40 percent and the distribution
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is as follows Cusing the same regional groupings by number as
above):
Region 1 and 2 increased by about 50%;
Region 3,4,5, increased by about 30%;
Region 6 increased by about 20%.
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rQOULATIQN DENSITY BY MUHAFADHA AND QADA IN 1965 (population per sq. km)
S50 100 150 mi
0 50 100 150 km
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I R A N
'.4.
UN, Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Coruntries in 'the
Middle East, 1971, UN, N.Y., 1971.
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APENDIX 1 (continued)
TABLE 1 URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY REGION IN 1965, 1973,
1980 (POPULATION IN '000s)* (continued on next page)
1947 1957 1965
Region Total Total Urban Rural Total
Nineveh 358 384 742
595 755
Dhok 52 94 146
Sulaimaniya 226 305 128 272 400
Arbil 240 273 135 222 357
Kirkuk 286 389 232 242 474
Diala 272 330 135 262 397
Anbar 193 253 123 184 307
Baghdad 817 1,313 1,597 449 2,046
Wasit 225 296 103 231 334
Babylon 261 355 165 283 448
Kerbela 274 217 250 90 340
Qadisiya 131 269 400
378 520
Muthanna 51 92 143
Maysan 307 330 104 241 345
Thi-Qar 372 459 133 366 499
Basra 369 503 415 254 669
Total 4,816 6,299 4,112 3,935 8,047
*Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1971,
Ministry of Planning, Iraq, and M. El Imam, Interpolation of Preliminary
Estimates and Projections of Governorate Population by Sex and Age, Rural
and Urban, UNESOB, 1972.
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AFFENDLX 1 (continued)
TABLE 1: URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY REGION IN 1965,
1973, 1980 (POPULATION IN '000s) (continued)
1973 1980
Region Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total( ) indicates % in- ( ) indicates % in-
crease, '65-'73 crease, '73-180j
Nineveh 506 368 874 656 349 1,005
.(41) (18) (30) - (15)
Dhok 73 90 163 94 86 180
(40) - (12) (29) - (10)
Sulaimaniya 213 308 521 317 336 653
(66) - (30) (49) - (25)
Arbil 216 245 461 312 263 575
(60) - (29) (44) - (25)
Kirkuk 334 239 573 440 234 674
(44) - (21) (32) - (18)
Diala 204 271 475 279 275 554
(51) - (21) (37) - (17)
Anbar 182 188 370 245 189 434
(48) - (21) (35) - (17)
Baghdad 2,650 516 3,166 4,025 593 4,618
(66) - (55) (52) - (46)
Wasit 148 227 375 192 222 414
(44) - (12) (30) - (10)
Babylon 257 304 561 363 320 683
(56) - (25) (41) - (22)
Kerbela 424 104 528 652 121 773
(83) - (55) (54) - (46)
Qadisiya 172 241 413 205 218 423
(31) - (3) (19) - ( 2)
muthanna 67 83 150 81 75 156
(31) - (5) (21) - (4)
Maysan 139 220 359 171 200 371
(34) - (4) (23) - (3)
Thi-Qar 186 353 539 235 341 576
(40) - (8) (26) - (7)
Basra 622 262 884 852 272 1,124
(50) - (32) (37) - (27)
Total 6,393 4,0
(55)
19 10,412
- (29)
9,120 4,094
(43) -
13,214
(27)
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APPENDIX 1 (continued)
TABLE 2: EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN LARGE INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS, 1970*
Total 100.0 1100.0 82,628 8,768 31,334 379
N.B. These employees are mainly employed in food manufacturing (17,000),
textiles (14,000), and non-metalic products (8,500).
*Central Statistical Organization, op. cit.
N.B. Large industries are identified as employing 10 or more
**Female unavailable
Total Wages Avge. Wage
%Empl. Avge. No. Empl. (Male)** Employee
Region % Pop. Male Male Female ('000 I.D.) I.D.
Nineveh + 10.4 7.6 6,317 259 2,492 394
Dhok
Sulaimaniya 5.0 1.7 1.431 474 593 414
Arbil 4.4 0.4 310 3 84 271
Kirkuk 5.6 1.5 1,214 6 396 326
Diala 4.7 1.8 1,520 11 596 374
Anbar 3.7 0.6 527 - 157 300
Baghdad 28.5 63.7 52,636 3,361 21,215 403
Babylon 5.5 6.4 5,288 128 1,848 349
Kerbela 4.8 2.8 2,293 57 657 287
Wasit 3.7 2.9 2,377 415 629 265
Qadisiya 4.3 0.8 615 - 127 207
Muthanna 1.6 1.1 942 1 284 301
Maysan 3.8 3.0 2,439 5 811 325
Thi-Qar 5.6 0.8 699 4 121 173
Basra 8.4 4.9 4,023 4,044 1,351 336
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APPENDIX 1 (continued)
TABLE 3: EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN SMALL INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS , 1969*
Avge. No. Empl. Total Annual Avge. Wage/
Region % Pop. % Total Wages ('000 ID) Empl.
Nineveh and Dhok 10.4 7.5 4,421 321 73
Sulaimaniya 5.0 2.9 1,686 121 72
Arbil 4.4 3.7 2,162 109 50
Kirkuk 5.6 6.0 3,517 211 60
Diala 4.7 3.1 1,803 136 75
Anbar 3.7 1.9 1,136
Baghdad 28.5 40.6 23,830 2,359 99
Babylon 5.5 4.0 2,355 199 85
Kerbela 4.8 11.8 6,920 491 71
Wasit 3.7 2.2 1,303 101 78
Qadisiya +
Muthanna 5.9 4.3 2,538 148 58
Maysan 3.8 2.5 1,455 100 69
Thi-Qar 5.6 3.0 1,757 114 65
Basra 8.4 6.5 3,836 380 99
Total 1969 100.0 100.0 58,719 4,876 83
Total 1968 100.0 100.0 54,227  5,014 92
Total 1967 100.0 100.0 56,302 4,984 89
Total 1966 100.0 100.0 46,124 3,832
*Ibid.
N.B. Small industrial establishments are identified as
less than 10.
employing
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TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF PRIARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS 'AND
TEACHERS, 1965*
% Pop. 1965
% Distrib. of
Primary School
Students**
% Distrib. of
Primary School
Teachers
% Distrib. of
Secondary School
Students
Nineveh & Dhok 10.9 10.2 11.0 9.2
Salaimaniya 4.9 3.2 3.2 1.1
Arbil 4.4 2.9 4.0 2.0
Kirkuk 5.8 5.0 5.4 5.1
Diala 4.9 3.2 3.2 4.3
Anbar 3.7 3.7 4.5 4.1
Baghdad 25.2 34.9 29.2 45.4
Babylon 5.5 4.9 5.7 4.9
Kerbela 4.1 4.6 4.3 5.3
Wasit 4.7 2.9 3.9 2.4
Qadisiya &
Muthanna 6.7 4.6 5.3 3.2
Maysan 4.2 4.0 3.7 1.9
Thi-Qar 6.1 3.9 4.4 2.2
Basra 8.2 9.4 8.7 8.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
*Ibid.
**Out of a total population of 8.1 million, 1.03 million were primary
school students, of whom 30 percent were female.
Region
Total
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TABLE 5 DISTRIBUTION OF HOSPITAL BEDS AND DOCTORS,
Pop. 1965
% Distrib.
of Doctors
*% Distrib. of
Hospital Beds
Nineveh & Dhok 10.9 7.0 8.4
Sulaimaniya 4.9 1.4 2.6
Arbil 4.4 2.0 4.9
Kirkuk 5.8 3.8 3.5
Diala 4.9 3.4 2.4
Anbar 3.7 3.4 2.6
Baghdad 25.2 50.0 46.4
Babylon 5.5 3.8 4.6
Kerbela 4.1 5.0 3.9
Wasit 4.7 2.3 2.7
Qadisiya &
Muthanna 6.7 5.0 4.7
Maysan 4.2 3.0 4.3
6.1
8.2
2.2
8.8
I t
100.0 100.0 100.0
RegQion
1965*
Thi-Qar
Basra
Total
*Ibid.
2.1
7.9
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APPENDIX 2
TABLE 1: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR ARBIL MUHAFADHA, 1970*
Location Population
Urban Rural Total
ARBIL
Arbil QC**
Aincowa
Qosh Teppe
MAKHMOUR
Makhmour QC
Guwair
Kandinawa
Qarach
KOISANJAQ
Koisanjaq QC
Taq. Taq
RAWANDUZ
Rawanduz QC
Bera Dost
Diana
Khalifan
ZIBAR
Mirgasur
Barzan
Mezuri Bala
SHAQLAWA
Shaqlawa QC
Khoshnaw
Harir
Salah Edin
CHOUMAN
Balak
Total
107,129
101,779
4,790
560
6,540
3,261
1,192
2,087
11,416
10,772
644
8,167
5,493
541
1,865
268
2,188
607
1,081
500
12,575
7,456
763
2,309
2,047
1,627
149 ,642
55,522
25,388
30,134
60,288
6,376
19 ,564
21,921
12,427
31,060
13,782
17,278
33,422
7,025
10,657
7,200
8,540
21,673
7,122
3,978
10,573
35,031
10,825
11,184
13,022
15,059
252,055
162,651
101,779
30,178
30,694
66,828
9,637
20,756
24,008
12,427
42,476
24,554
17,922
41 ,589
12,518
11,198
9,065
8,808
23,861
7,729
5,059
11,073
47,606
7,456
11,588
13,493
15,069
16,686
401,697
*Source: Iraq Consult, Socio-Economic Studies for Development of
Tourism in the North of Iraq, Baghdad, 1973.
**QC= Qada (sub-regional level) Centre
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TABLE 2: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR DOHUK MUHAFADHA, 1970*
Location Population
Urban Rural Total
DOHUK 23,305 39,173 62,478
Dohuk QC 18,284 - 18,284
Sumail 2,943 15,988 18,931
Doski 1,390 12,420 13,810
Zawita 343 7,543 7,886
Mizoori 345 3,222 3,567
AMADIYA 4,402 56,430 60,832
Amadiya QC 3,354 8,338 11,692
Sersink 1,048 16,228 17,276
Barwari Bala - 18,427 18,427
Mirwarican - 13,437 13,437
ZAKHO 15,620 44,639 60,259
Zahko QC 13,778 - 13,778
Silifani 627 17,969 18,596
Sindi 314 15,385 15,699
Guli 901 11,285 12,186
AQRA 9,900 48,644 58,544
Aqra QC 7,462 - 7,462
Nahla 852 6,324 7,176
Ashayer Al-Saba 939 22,740 23,679
Surchiya 647 19,580 20,227
Total 53,227 188,886 242,113
*Ibid.
207
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TABLE 3: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR NINEVEH MUHAFADHA, 1970*
Location Population
Urban Rural Total
MOSUL 322,420 63,638 386,058
Mosul QC 310,313 - 310,313
Bashiga 7,929 18,365 26,294
Hemidat 1,257 26,355 27,612
Hamam Al-Alil 2,921 18,918 21,839
SHIRQAT 8,807 74,185 82,902
Shirqat QC 2,918 37,160 40,078
Qayara 3,811 24,631 28 ,442
Zab 2,078 12,394 14,472
HkIMDANIYA 11,505 34,440 45,945
Hamdaniya QC 11,505 13,172 24,677
Kalak - 7,929 7,929
Namrud - 13,339 13,339
TELKAIF 11,568 39,813 51,381
Telkaif QC 7,249 15,127 22,376
Wana - 8,825 8,825
Algosh 4,319 15,861 20,180
SINJAR 12,067 85,046 97,113
Sinjar QC 9,161 51,679 60,840
Al-Shimal 2,906 33,367 36,273
SHIKHAN 7,126 23,866 30,992
Shikhan QC 7,126 13,991 21,117
Meriba - 9,875 9,875
TAL 'AFAR 51,576 79,837 130,913
Tal'afar QC 46,138 - 46,138
Zunmar 2,205 37,942 40,147
Ayadhiya 2,356 21,512 23,368
Rabi'a 877 20,383 21,260
HADHAR 1,856 19,961 21,817
Hadhar QC 1,002 1,002
Tel 854 19,961 20,815
AL-BAAJ
Al-Baaj QC 1,858 21,130 22,988
Total 428,783 441,916 870,199
*Ibid.
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TABLE 4: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR KIRKUK MUHAFADHA, 1970*
Location Population
Urban Rural Total
KIRKUK
Kirkuk QC
Qara Hasan
Altun Kupri
Shiwan
Dibis
Taza Khurmatu
KALAR
Kalar QC
Bibaz
Shirwana
KIFRI
Kifri QC
Qara Teppe
Jibora
CHEMCHEMAL
Chemchemal QC
Aghjalar
Sangaw
TUZ KHURMATU
Tuz Khurmatu
Qadir Karam
Daquq
Sulaiman Beg
Amerly
HAWIYA
Hawiya QC
Hawiya
Al-Riyadh
Total
211,179
191,294
2,144
4,563
632
6,917
5,629
2,076
1,324
369
383
12,234
8,283
3,418
533
7,951
6,350
819
782
25,081
QC 16,404
830
2,942
2,133
2,772
6,162
4,802
1,360
264,683
*Ibid.
64,751
6,356
13,765
9,298
15,692
11,386
8,254
23,328
7,105
16,223
28,656
17,924
10,732
34,446
12,200
12,718
9,528
61,661
11,826
13,067
17,851
8,454
10,463
43,192
23,145
20,047
256,034
275,930
197,650
15,409
13,861
16,324
18,303
13,883
25,404
1,324
7,474
16,606
40,890
8,283
21,342
11,265
42,397
18,550
13,537
10,310
86,742
28,230
13,897
20,793
10,587
13,235
49,254
4,802
23,145
21,407
520,217
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TABLE 5: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR SULAIMANIYA MUHAFADHA, 1970*
Location Population
Urban Rural Total
SULAIMANIYA
Sulaimaniya
Tanjro
Qara Dagh
Surdash
Bazian
HALABJA
Halabja QC
Sirwan
Khormal
Derbendikhan
Shahra Zur
PENJWIN
Penjwin QC
Qarmak
SHAHARBAZAR
Shaharbazar QC
Mawat
Serojik
Sewil
PISHDER
Pishder QC
Mirga Bengord
RANIA
Rania QC
Chinaran
Nawdasht
Rania
Total
*Ibid.
111,962
QC 103,091
1,014
701
1,087
288
29,772
13,950
514
7,921
3,792
3,595
5,864
5,864
4,691
1,574
1 ,605
1,512
12,126
10,126
2,000
10,513
5 ,040
872
2,177
2,424
174,928
67,104
13,962
12,386
17,922
9,049
61 ,515
20,301
18,555
10,518
12,141
24,912
11,169
13,743
48,179
13,730
14,666
9,126
10,657
35,690
21,273
14,417
46,299
6 ,583
20 ,062
19,654
283,699
179 ,066
103,091
14,976
13,087
19,009
9,337
91,287
13,950
20,815
26,476
14,310
15,736
30,776
17,033
13,743
52,870
15,304
16 ,271
10,638
10,657
47,816
31,399
16,417
56,812
5,040
7,455
22,239
22,078
458,627
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